



ESTABLISHED

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JOSEPH G. W. L.

IN TWO VOLUMES

OF

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64/15

Turpin de Crissé (d. de)
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O N T H E
A R T O F W A R.

Translated from the French of Count TURPIN,

By Captain JOSEPH OTWAY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

L O N D O N,
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A N

To His Excellency
JOHN LORD / Major General
of the

Field Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Ministry
of War

My Lord
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst.
in relation to believe that
the Hon. Joseph

me the honor of your friendship to your Lordship;
yet I am constrained to decline the same, because
I am constrained to decline the same, because
obtained your notice, will not want any other recommendation
to the public

When I presumed to solicit your
posting, that your Lordship could be of service in the military
science



TO HIS EXCELLENCY

JOHN Lord Viscount LIGONIER,

Field-Marshal and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's
Forces, &c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,

ALTHOUGH I have sufficient reason to believe that the merit of the author, rather than my own, procured me the honour of inscribing this translation to your Lordship; yet I have been much encouraged by your patronage, because I am convinced that a treatise on the Art of War which hath obtained your notice, will not want any other recommendation to the public.

When I presumed to solicit your favour, I was far from supposing that your Lordship could be instructed in the military

D E D I C A T I O N.

science by this, or any other author. The eminence of your character has long entitled you to dictate to the military world; and those who desire to excel in the profession of arms, next to the happiness of learning immediately from your Lordship, will wish to be taught by him whose rules you have approved. I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient

And dutiful servant,

JOSEPH OTWAY.

D E D I C A T I O N

THE

C O N T E N T S

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THE

PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE.

IF it be true, that the dignity of sciences is more, or less in proportion to their usefulness, how apparently does the art of war claim the first place? War is a great evil, but it is inevitable, and oftentimes necessary. If he, who first reduced to rules, the art of destroying his fellow-creatures, had no end in view but to gratify the passions of princes, he was a monster, whom it would have been happy to have smothered at his birth: but if his intention was the defence of persecuted virtue, or the punishment of successful wickedness, to curb ambition, or to oppose the unjust claims of superior power, mankind ought to erect altars to his memory.

War, in the last case, is the most necessary, and useful of all the sciences: the various kinds of knowledge, which ought to furnish the mind of a soldier, are not without great difficulty to be attained. Of most other sciences the principles are fixed, or at least, they may be ascertained by the assistance of experience; there needs nothing but diligence to learn them, or a particular turn of mind to practise them. Philosophy, mathematics, architecture, and many others, are all founded upon invariable combinations. Every man, even of a narrow understanding, may remember rules, apply them properly, and sometimes draw just consequences from them: but the study of war is of another kind. Experience can so seldom be referred to rules, that nothing but a mind en-

lightened by diligent study can make a due application of rules to circumstances.

Most artists may join practice to theory, and make one perfect by the help of the other. The warrior has not always the like assistance; he spends part of his life in forming plans, of which humanity does not suffer him to wish the execution; and when he has an opportunity of judging from experience of the solidity of his principles, the operations are so rapid, the motions so diversified, the actions so confused, that he has scarcely time for a glimpse of those things which require the most calm and close consideration.

In learning of every kind, theory is the completion; in the study of the military science, it is only the introduction. Many a man, depending on his rules, has found that the marches, the camps, the dispositions, the manœuvres performed with exact and strict order in the closet, have not only been very difficult, but even impracticable in the field. A disposition good in a mountainous country, would be bad in an open one; a disposition proper for one open country may fail in another, for want of foreseeing that a manœuvre, which in one case may have been the cause of winning a battle, may in another occasion its loss: the circumstances of time and place almost always throw the best constructed systems out of order. It is therefore only by dint of study, and by the contemplation of cases incessantly varied, that the want of practice can be supplied, or action at least made less difficult.

A military man who would be master of his profession, has no hours to lose; in peace, he ought to study with the greatest diligence; in time of war, he will see his principles open themselves of their own accord; his ideas are then more distinct, he acts with clearness and certainty in all cases he has foreseen, and applies his rules to all those which now occur for the first time, and which till then had escaped his thoughts. Who

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does not know that bravery, courage, and comprehension, are useless and often fatal to a military man, who wants knowledge of his business? Having no previous helps from study, it often happens that the braver he is, the more he is liable to mistakes, and the less able to foresee or avoid them.

The science of war branches out into so many particulars, it takes in so many different parts; there are so many reflections necessary to be made, so many circumstances and cases to be brought together, that it is only by a continual application, grounded upon the love of his duty, and an inclination to his profession, that any man can attain it.

To march an army in every sort of country, whether open, woody, or mountainous; to know how to form a camp in all these countries, with which the general must be thoroughly acquainted, in order to do it with security; to make a proper disposition for a battle, whether with a view to the posture of the enemy, or to the situation of the country; to foresee events which depend, in a manner, upon chance; to be capable of making a good retreat on proper occasions; to direct the forages without fatiguing, or exposing the troops; to send out detachments with precaution; to conduct the convoys in safety; to know how to canton an army, and to settle it in winter-quarters in such a manner, that by the just disposition of all the parts, it may be able to assemble readily on the first order, though widely dispersed; to establish magazines in places, both safe and within reach of the army, so that it shall never be in want of subsistence; these are the great ends of the military science. The Alexanders of Parma, the Spinolas, the Gustavuses, the Weimars, the Condés, the Turennes, the Montécucullis, the Vendômes, the Marlboroughs, the Eugenes, and all the great men who have gone before us, would never have been the subject of our admiration, if they had neglected this study in any of its branches. It is by courage, genius, and ca-

capacity, by having an head always cool, and an eye at once quick and exact; by a nice knowledge of the country, by skill in the choice of officers, and by strict discipline kept up in his army, that a general is enabled to take such just measures as will frustrate the designs of the enemy.

It is commonly thought sufficient for a military man to know how to obey; and it is also supposed that the success of a day cannot be dubious, if a general joins the confidence of the soldiers, to all the foregoing qualities.

It is true, that in cases of perplexity, many generals have in a great measure owed to their own capacity, and the confidence their soldiers have reposed in them, the advantages they have gained over the enemy; but is the officer who loves his duty, and who would make himself master of it, under the less obligation to know what qualifications his station requires? that he ought to have such, or such a quality, in such, or such a circumstance? that here only bravery is necessary, there only courage? and that he is not always obliged to have both at the same time?

These two virtues, which are often confounded in the same subject, merit a particular distinction; they are not so closely united, but that they are often to be found one without the other. Courage seems fittest for a general, and all those who command; bravery more necessary for a soldier, and all who receive orders; bravery is in the blood; courage in the soul; the first is a kind of instinct, the second a virtue; the one is an impulse almost mechanical, the other a noble and sublime conception. A man is brave at a particular time, and according to circumstances, he has courage at all times, and upon all occasions: bravery is so much the more impetuous as it is less the result of reflection; courage, the more it is the effect of reason, become more intrepid. Bravery is inspired by the force of example, insensibility of danger, and the fury of action; courage is infused by the love of our duty, the desire of glory, and zeal for

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our king and country : courage depends on reason, but bravery on the constitution. Achilles*, such as Horace describes him from Homer, implacable, cruel, despising every other right but that of force, presents nothing to the idea, but the hardness of a gladiator†. But the Roman general, whose death would have produced the ruin of the army, the great Scipio, when covered by the bucklers of three soldiers, to avoid a shower of arrows, which the enemy directed against him, approaches in safety the walls he besieged, and standing only a spectator of the action, and contents himself with giving them orders, exhibits the idea of true courage. Bravery is involuntary, and depends not at all upon ourselves, whereas courage (as Seneca observes) may be taught and acquired by education; but yet, nature must sow the first seeds of it. It would be easy to make the difference of these qualities better understood, by running over all the cases in which they make their appearance, were it not for the fear of going too far in so copious a subject. It is said of a magistrate, who exposes his life and fortune in defence of the laws, that he has virtue. Cicero, sheltering himself from the hatred of Cataline, undoubtedly wanted bravery, but certainly he had an elevated firmness of mind (which is in reality courage) when he disclosed the conspiracy of that traitor to the senate, and pointed out all his accomplices; or when he pleaded for Deiotarus against Cæsar, his friend and his judge.

Coolness is the effect of courage, which knows its danger, but makes no other use of that knowledge, than to give directions with greater certainty; courage is always master of itself, provided against all accidents, and regulated by the present occasions; never confounded by any danger so as to lose sight of the motions of the enemy, or of the means by which he may be most effectually opposed. At the battle of Cannæ, when Gisco seemed to be much astonished at the superiority of the enemy's

* Horace de Arte Poetica.

† Tit. Liv. lib. 26.

number, Hannibal answered him coolly, "There is, Gisco, a thing still more surprising, of which you take no notice." Gisco asking him what it was, "It is, replied Hannibal, that in all that great broud, there is not one man whose name is Gisco." * Plutarch observes, that this coolness of Hannibal greatly animated the Carthaginians, who could not imagine that their general would joke at so important a time, without being certain of overcoming his enemies.

Although bravery and courage are the most essential qualifications of a subordinate officer, yet he should not be deficient in those which are required in a general, and which have been already mentioned; obedience to the orders delivered to him is no longer a virtue than whilst he comprehends, and knows the intention of them. † War, says a celebrated author, is a business which like all others must be learned; it supposes some qualities to be born with us, and demands others which are to be acquired: but since all these qualities must have the original source in genius; a man who proposes war for his profession, should never engage it without having consulted his natural bent, or without knowing the particular turn and power of his mind. Ability, whether in a general, or an officer, is the effect of his genius, quickened by a natural liking to his business. Without this liking, without this sort of call, which as it were, draws us on against our wills, and which is the sure sign of a particular determination of the mind, a man studies without effect, and practises without judgment.

Genius is not to be acquired, it is born with us; genius has been defined, a natural aptitude of doing something: but that definition is wrong, it is the disposition only that should be so defined. It is said to be easier for nature to produce a monster, than a man without a particular disposition; but every body is not born with a genius, it is the fairest attribute of the soul. With parts a man may be a good soldier, but

* Plut. in Fab. Max.

† St. Real, Traité de la Valeur.

with genius a good soldier becomes a great general; it is sometimes an assemblage of talents, but it is always the perfection of that which nature has given us, that discovers genius. A man studies, he searches for his talent, and often misses it; genius unfolds itself. Talent remains hidden for want of occasions to shew itself; genius breaks through all obstacles; genius alone is the contriver; talent only the workman.

It often happens that he, who has only bright parts, is believed to have genius; these two modifications of the soul are very different one from the other. Genius can only apply itself to the sciences and noble arts; wit, more airy, skims indifferently over all; the former undertakes but one science, but goes to the bottom of it; the other would undertake every thing, but touches only lightly upon all; wit renders the talents more brilliant without their becoming more solid; genius with less application conceives every thing, outstrips even study itself, and brings the talents to perfection.

There are some amongst us who become soldiers, only because their ancestors were so; they undoubtedly have bravery, that virtue is not scarce among the French, but there are many others which ought to accompany it. The virtues of our ancestors ought to stimulate our minds, and engage us to follow their steps; but their blood transmitted to us, does not always convey that sagacity, that intelligence, that particular inclination for our business (the true mark of genius) in a word those talents of which we must carry the seed within us.

But some are by their birth engaged in the profession of arms, before time has permitted them to consult their genius and their powers, are these men to quit it if they perceive that they are not endowed with every talent that profession requires? Undoubtedly no, because they may acquire them. Study and application will supply the defect of genius; docility may serve instead of talents, the love of glory be equivalent to

a liking for their business, and the virtues of their fathers should always be present to their thoughts. When a man has no ancestors to imitate, he is, as may be said, at liberty to raise a reputation of more or less lustre: by being descended from celebrated ancestors, he is obliged to follow their example, and may often improve upon their virtues. Claudius reproached Cicero with being the first of his race. But you, answered Cicero, are the last of yours. An illustrious descent is oftentimes a burden; if it adds splendor to the man of virtue, it always disgraces him who knows not how to support it.

A quick eye is natural in some, and in them it is the effect of genius; others acquire it by study or experience; he, who knows how to command himself, and has courage enough to keep himself cool on the most urgent occasions, has the readiest and quickest eye. A quick hot-headed man, however brave, sees nothing, or if he does, it is confusedly and generally too late.

It is this quick eye which enables him to judge of an advantageous post, of a manœuvre to be made, and of a good disposition for the troops, whether with respect to that of the enemy, or to the situation and nature of the country.

There is a quickness of eye which depends upon the enemy, and another independent of him; it depends upon the enemy when he has made such a disposition, that to attack him another must be made upon the spot, which renders him defective and weak in some part; or when being advantageously posted, the general obliges him to change his position, by making him fearful of being taken in flank, or being surrounded, or when it is so contrived as to render the troops on the right useless by attacking the left, without their being able to assist it.

It is independent of the enemy, when a commander being at a distance, knows how to take an advantageous position, and how to chuse a
camp

camp strong by situation ; when he sees at once what distances there are upon the right and left of the troops that may prevent their being either molested or furrounded, and observes the posts necessary to be occupied for their safety ; when he marches with a detachment, and diligently surveys the ground by which he may retreat, if he should be attacked and repulsed by superior forces, taking care that he may not be furrounded, and that the enemy may not be able to oppose to him a front more extensive than his own.

The quick eye is no other than that penetrating genius, which lets nothing escape it ; that looks into the heart and discovers the lightest impressions which can disorder it. A general who knows how to unite this quality with perpetual coolness, never is in want of expedients ; he will see how those events, which to any other would be the presage of his own defeat, may end in the overthrow of his enemies.

The army of Cyrus, in the presence of that of Cræsus at Timbrea, took a clap of thunder for a bad omen : this impression escaped not the quick eye of Cyrus ; but the coolness which on this occasion he knew how to preserve, suggested to him an interpretation which removed his soldiers fears. “ My friends, cried he, heaven declares for us, come on, I hear the sound of victory : great Jupiter, we follow thee.”

The choice of the general officers depends upon this genius, which discovers every thing ; they ought to be the right hand of the general, and as capable of commanding the army as himself.

Whatever good dispositions a general may make, they must prove ineffectual, if not seconded by the general officers under his command ; he cannot be every where, neither can he foresee all exigencies that may arise. He is obliged to give only general orders ; it is therefore the business of those who command under him, to know how to take advantage of a wrong movement of the enemy ; to take upon them to attack or sustain

the troops which are engaged; and, as circumstances vary, to make them advance towards the enemy, either to keep him back, or to attack him. But still we must except the reserve, which ought never to march without an order from the commander in chief.

It is highly commendable, that princes should be employed in the armies, till by maturity, study, and experience, they shall become able to command them; danger vanishes from before the soldier's eyes, when generals, whom he looks on as something above the rest of mankind, share it with him. But among us the advantage goes still further. The French, among whom honour is the *primum mobile* of virtue, obey with more zeal and intrepidity whilst they know that men born to be their masters are become their companions; besides, the love of a Frenchman for his king, makes him pleased to find that those who partake his blood, exhibit his virtues.

At the battle of Steenkirk, gained in 1692, by marshal Luxembourg, the duke of Chartres, the prince of Condé, and the prince of Conti, who commanded under him, increased by their courage and ability the valor of those who attacked the enemy, and revived the ardor of those who seemed ready to give way.

But the qualities already mentioned would be useless, if order and discipline were not severely observed: the most numerous and best composed army would soon become little else than a body of rangers, who being only united by the hope of booty, would separate as soon as that motive ceased; and trusting each to his own head, or indulging his own humour, would be cut in pieces party after party: so that, if the general does not keep up subordination (the soul and strength of discipline) his army will be nothing more than a troop of Tartars acting more from the hope of plunder, than the desire of glory. What art, and what genius is there not

Montesquieu *Esprit des Loix*,

Luxembourg.

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requisite to maintain this subordination? Too much severity disgusts the soldier and renders him mutinous; discourages him and makes him desert; too much indulgence sinks him into indolence, and makes him neglect his duty; licentiousness causes that subordination to seem burdensome, which should never in any degree be given up: he loses that respect, and often that confidence, which he should have with regard to his officer; and indulgence often makes a well disciplined body become a set of sluggards, who march against their will, and who on the most pressing emergencies think only on their own safety.

The Romans have left us examples both of indulgence and severity; no people ever took more properly the opportunities of punishing or forgiving. Manlius caused his son to be punished with death, for a disobedience which at any other time would have merited the honours of a triumph. Varro was applauded for an imprudence, which at another juncture would have caused his death. In the time of the republic, it was necessary to be severe, because, as every Roman could aspire to the same rank, it would have been dangerous, that small crimes against the community had remained unpunished; such impunity would have countenanced enterprizes, which might have destroyed the whole system of their political government.

The ability, foresight, and prudence of a general, gains him the entire confidence of the soldier and officer; the soldier indeed judges but by instinct, and is determined only by the event, but his judgment is not less infallible; that of an officer is equally just, but he is determined only by full conviction; he puts event out of the question, and places his confidence in nothing but courage and prudence. Confidence is again to be acquired by affability to those who are subordinate to us, and by supplying their wants before they are complained of; these two motives for confidence afford a plentiful and certain harvest of laurels to the general. M.

Luxembourg, M. Turenne, prince Eugene, marshall Saxe, and many others, have partly owed the advantages they have gained over their enemies to the confidence of the soldiers, who, loving their general, considered it as their duty to please him, and had no joy in victory, but as they shared it with him.

Besides these qualities, which are essential to a general, and which all who would attain that high rank ought of course to have, there are still many others necessary to make a great man. A hero requires fewer virtues: the great man is always a good member of the community; he considers humanity as his first duty; he is just, open, and unbiassed; his temper may be fiery, but this ardour is always regulated by prudence; he gives advice with the same openness as he would ask it; and never asks but of those whose experience, which he estimates rather by their actions than their age, makes them capable of giving such as may be trusted; he is haughty only to his enemies, free to his equals, affable to his inferiors, brave without either arrogance or rashness, and easy of access to all.

The general ought to be acquainted with the interests and force of princes (a science very necessary in judging of the power of princes upon whom war is made, that he may fall sooner upon the country of him who can obstruct his projects, than upon a prince who, by the situation of his dominions and force, can make no opposition). In a word, a general who would merit the title of a great man, ought to unite in himself all civil, military, and political excellence. It is by this, that he will easily attain to make war with success; nothing will escape him, he will know without difficulty the genius of every country, and of the nations which compose the enemy's army, the abilities of the generals who command, and the nature of the troops under them. Without these precautions he would never think that he could act upon certain grounds; he knows he
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may venture a motion with some troops, that he would not dare attempt with others that are equally brave. One nation is vehement, fiery, and formidable in the first onset; another is not so hasty, but of more perseverance; with the former, a single instant determines success, with the latter, the action is not so rapid, but the event is less doubtful.

No man is born a general, although he brings into the world with him the seed of those virtues which make a great man; Cæsar, Spinola, Turenne, the great Condé, and some others, shewed even in their earliest years, such qualities as ranked them above other men; they carried with them the principles of those great virtues which they drew forth to action by profound study, and which they brought to perfection by the help of practice; those who came after them, with perhaps fewer natural talents, have by study rendered themselves worthy of being compared to them. Cæsar and all conquerors had this advantage, that they were able to make their own opportunities, and always acted by their own choice. A man may be a good general without being a Turenne; such geniusses are scarcely seen once in an age, but the more they are raised above the rest of mankind, the more they ought to excite emulation. It is by endeavouring to surpass the intellects of the second rate; it is by striving to equal the most sublime, that the imitation of them is to be attained. This passion in a soldier is neither pride nor presumption; it is virtue, and it is by this only that he can hope to be serviceable to the state, and add to the glory of his king.

How much soever the honour of commanding armies may be sought after, it degrades him who is not worthy of it; this rank so much desired, borders on the two extremes of glory and ignominy. A military man, who labours to make himself capable of commanding, is not to be blamed; his ambition is noble: by studying the art of commanding, he learns that

that of obeying, and of executing. I should be astonished in the highest degree if I saw soldiers thinking only on preferment, and neglecting the study of their business; I should perhaps wonder less if I saw others, without having been tried, proposing to themselves to command in chief; because such attempts suppose in the projector an absurd temerity, founded on a profound ignorance of the talents he ought to have, and the virtues which he has not. Such boldness is the character of a man, whose mind is too narrow to perceive his danger: I should rather approve the timidity that suffers itself to be dejected by terror, since it shews at least that he knows to what hazards he is exposed; both one and the other are blameable: modesty is the only proper quality of a soldier; it gives splendor to virtue, it argues diffidence of himself, and desire of arriving at perfection.

* Mardonius, Xerxes's general, proposed himself to the king to command his armies; this conceit of his own talents ought to have been answered by a refusal: the innumerable troops which he led were defeated by a small number of Greeks, and his presumption served but to increase the misfortune of his prince. Cincinnatus, endowed with every quality, both of a great man and a great soldier, was holding his plough when the Romans came to intrust the fate of the republic to him; he set out, and Rome was delivered from her enemies.

The title of general would be less tempting, if proper attention was paid to the qualities it requires, and the duties it imposes; it would then appear a very honourable but painful burthen. The most firm and intrepid genius, might be discouraged merely by thinking that on the conduct of a general depends the fate of a state, the glory of his prince's arms, and his own reputation.

• Justin, Lib. 2.

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PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE.

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But yet the reward that follows such irksome labours, ought to animate men to undertake them. Obstacles, however numerous they may be, are not insurmountable, since so many great men have got the better of them: difficulties should stir up a soldier's emulation, but should never terrify him; he should endeavour to copy such great originals, though he should not be able to equal them.

This work is divided into five books: in the first are mentioned all the operations of a campaign, from the greatest to the smallest, sieges excepted, which belong not to this subject; and the means of executing these operations in any kind of country are endeavoured to be laid down.

In the second, the precautions that are to be taken to attack the enemy in all the forementioned operations, are considered.

The third treats of the cantonments, the quarters, and of the manœuvres relating to them.

The fourth of the attack of the enemy's quarters, or cantonments, whether in general, a certain number, or one only.

The fifth book, of that made by small parties, the necessity of the light troops, and their proper use. As almost all powers have those troops, it seems of consequence to know how they ought to be conducted; and to shew what service they may perform, whether during the campaign, or in the day of battle.

In a word, I have endeavoured to fix an army in all the positions and in every kind of country in which it can be placed during a campaign; and the means for defence are not given, without likewise laying down those of attack.

Readers already perfect in the military science, may perhaps think precepts dry which they have already learned; but the instruction which

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those entering on the service may draw from them, will, I hope be allowed as an excuse for some moments of weariness.

I have rather endeavoured to convince the heart than to please the ear; if zeal for our king, love of our country; in short, if honour and virtue had any peculiar style, in that I should have chosen to write; but a military man is sufficiently eloquent, whilst he delivers his thoughts with clearness; and my wish is satisfied, if I am understood by the soldier, without the labour of too close attention.

PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE
ESSAYS
ON THE
ART of WAR.
BOOK FIRST.

CHAP. I.

Of the KNOWLEDGE of a COUNTRY.

A Campaign of which the plan is well formed, and the dispositions well concerted, may nevertheless prove unsuccessful, if the general, to whose direction they are intrusted, hath not a thorough knowledge of the country in which they are to be carried into execution. The marches, camps, convoys, forages, detachments; in short, the most important operations, will be performed with impropriety, if this knowledge is not previously acquired; events are often determined by it.

There is one knowledge of a country, which for an officer to be without, should be considered as a reproach; that of the situation of cities, towns, villages, forests, streams, rivers, which is to be acquired by studying of geographical maps. There is another branch of knowledge yet more particular, such as, of the passes, or the boundaries of the country, the situation, the nature of the ground, whether it is plain, or divided by hollows, rivulets, hills, &c. which is to be acquired by the assistance of topographical maps. In the study of these last, care must be taken, not

blindly to follow the marks they lay down. It very seldom happens, that topographical maps are perfectly exact : for besides the many circumstances, which may sometimes in a year alter a large extent of country, they seldom take notice of fords, bridges over the small rivulets, small hills, and hollows of little importance; neither can they mark whatever may be occasioned by recent inundations and disruptions of the earth : whereas any of these unforeseen circumstances may prove an obstruction to a great design, either by retarding the march of an army, preventing a column of troops from advancing, or leaving the enemy in possession of some passes, from which he might have been driven.

It is nevertheless impossible for a map to explain every particular : for example, an hollow way may be marked, but its depth will still remain unknown ; neither can it show whether the ascent and descent of it be easy or difficult. A general, studious to avoid the imputation of negligence, ought, before he engages in an enterprize, to make himself acquainted with every particular relating to the country, and by that means make up for the deficiencies of the maps. In short, if he is desirous of fixing a camp in a position strong by situation, but unacquainted how that is to be done, or in what manner the wings can be supported, he should then get information whether there is any river by which the camp may be covered, whether this river can be passed easily, and what is the nature of its banks.

In order to avoid the errors into which a general may be drawn by maps, the safest method is to apply to the inhabitants of the country, and go over it with the most intelligent of them, and remark every obstacle, however trifling it may appear.

For marching with greater security, a general ought to form a company of guides of the peasants, be assured of their fidelity, and attach them to him by all possible methods, particularly by unbounded liberality. It is by money only that trusty spies and faithful guides can be secured; the latter

latter are less expensive, but full as necessary as the former. Parsimony should be avoided in war; for, as Vegetius* observes, money should never be spared, when expence is necessary to secure possession. In proportion as an army advances into a country, great care must be taken to change the guides.

The command of this company should be given to an intelligent man, who should be perfectly acquainted with every thing relating to the country, and who should also be fully able to answer any objections started by the general or officer that accompanies him. This company of guides will be capable of informing the general of whatever may have escaped his observation; of directing him in his inquiries, by which means his discoveries will always be to be depended upon. By this manner of proceeding, neither will the position, or the distance of one place from another, nor the situation of any particular city, town, or village, nor any circumstance be unknown to a general who joins their information to what he himself already knows: he will be informed of all the pathways, of the different roads leading into the country, and what number of them terminate at the same point; he will judge what number of men, either horse or foot, can march abreast, whether the enemy can prevent his pursuing his intended route, by taking the field, and to what distance he will be able to march in safety.

The general should send out detachments along with some of these guides to examine the streams which cross the country, whether or no their mouths are at a distance, into what river they empty themselves, from whence they take their source, whether they may be easily forded, if their banks are steep or sloping, marshy or covered with bushes; other detachments should be employed in examining the woods, in order to find out whether troops can pass through them, or not.

* Book III. Ch. 1. Art. 3.

A general ought himself to examine into the truth of the reports made to him by these small detachments, or send out others more considerable, under the command of general officers: however certain a general may be of the fidelity of his spies and guides, yet he should not always rely upon their reports: mistrust, which in general is accounted a vice, may almost be esteemed a virtue in the business of war.

Furnished with these lights, a general can allot the easiest road to the artillery and baggage, the shortest to the infantry, and longest to the cavalry: he can at once judge from the nature of the ground, into how many columns the army can be divided, in order to expedite the march, and what dispositions will be necessary for the columns with regard to the enemy's position.

By the knowledge of the country, a general is informed of what camps the enemy doth, or can occupy, and of those necessary to be taken to oppose his designs; whether the enemy's detachments can easily approach, or how he can himself advance towards him, without being discovered; if there is forage in the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, or whether he is obliged to draw it from a distance; where he hath fixed his magazines, and whether an attempt to carry them off is practicable or not; in what manner his quarters are disposed, and which of them is most exposed; what distance there is between himself and the enemy; where the enemy hath established posts, and which those are, that himself ought to occupy with regard to the situation of his own camp and quarters, and those belonging to the enemy; which is the properest road for the detachments and the patrols to keep, in order to gain intelligence; and lastly, with what degree of ease the enemy can attack the army on its march, and whether in front or flank. This knowledge is essential to a general in every kind of country; but in a woody or mountainous country, it would become more particularly dangerous, and even impossible for him to march an army, if unacquainted with it.

By the maps, a general will know whether there be forests in a country; but if he does not endeavour to get a more particular information, he will be unacquainted with the nature of them; whether they are boggy, smooth, or rugged, and, consequently, whether it be possible for the troops, artillery, and baggage, to pass through them.

In 1702, the duke of Burgundy*, being desirous to attack the enemy who were behind Cleves, but not being perfectly acquainted with the forest in his front, he detached the marquis d'Alegre with five hundred grenadiers, and eight hundred horse, to see if it was not possible to find some passage through it. M. d'Alegre met with a defile which was occupied by the enemy: he attacked and forced it; but being advanced beyond it, found it was not possible to proceed further, by reason of the great number of defiles that succeeded to each other; he thereupon turned back, sent, and had another passage surveyed, where there were found still greater obstacles. He gave an account of this to the duke of Burgundy, who, not choosing to miss the opportunity of attacking the enemy, sent him out again with a larger detachment, that he might examine whether, by keeping along the side of the forest, it would not be practicable for him to march up to them by way of the heaths of Mook, on the side of Grave and Nimeguen. The marquis d'Alegre discovered a defile which led to these heaths: he took possession of it, and sent notice thereof to the duke of Burgundy, who ordered the army to advance, obliged the enemy to send their infantry into Nimeguen, and cannonaded their cavalry which had taken post on the glacis, but were unable to maintain it; and the consequence was, that the enemy sustained a great loss in men, artillery, waggons, and baggage.

This example tends to prove, that maps are not always to be relied on. There can be no reason to doubt that the duke of Burgundy was fur-

* Relation de la journée de Nimeguen, tiré du Mercure galant.

nished.

nished with the most exact: but yet it is probable that he might not have succeeded in this enterprize, if he had neglected sending M. d'Alegre to survey the passes, and examine two, before he proceeded to that through which he marched.

The following is a general rule: That it is upon the ground, and not upon maps, that the roads through which an army is to march, must be examined, as well as the situation of places where camps are to be fixed, and fields of battle chosen. An army should never move before ways are opened for every column: with regard to a detachment it is different, as there may circumstances arise, which will prevent the general from foreseeing what road it may take. The command of a detachment should always be given to an intelligent officer, and one who has made his business his only study; who hath been particularly careful to acquire a knowledge of the country, and of whose genius the general should entertain no doubt. A particular choice stirs up emulation in young men, and induces them to exert their utmost endeavours to deserve so distinguishing a mark of approbation.

Into how many mistakes have even the greatest generals fallen, by not being thoroughly acquainted with a country, and by suffering themselves to be guided by general notions? M. de Feuquieres cites many examples of great enterprizes which have miscarried by it.

Toward the end of the year 1673, when a considerable body of infantry, with only few cavalry, was on its return from Holland, under the conduct of M. de Luxemburg, the prince of Orange having assembled the whole force of the Dutch and the Spaniards (under his command) came upon the Maese, with an intention to fight M. de Luxemburg between Maestricht and Charleroy. This march made it necessary for the court to send an order to M. de Schomberg to assemble all the cavalry that were in Hainault and Flanders, and immediately join M. de Luxemburg, who was greatly inferior

ferior to the prince of Orange in cavalry. The prince's aim then should have been to prevent the two generals from joining, and to have fought one or other of them, before their junction. The prince's being unacquainted with the country, made him mistake for real, the feints made by M. de Luxemburg, whilst he was upon the river Ourte; as if his intention was to march by way of the Condros and the Ardennes, in order to gain Sedan and the Mezuris. The prince of Orange drew near Huy and Namur; and, by that means, was at such a distance from the high road, that M. de Schomberg had an opportunity of advancing with his cavalry to Tongres; at the same time that M. de Luxemburg, by a forced march, passed the Maese at Maeltricht, and arrived at Tongres, where the junction of the two armies was effected without any accident.

If the prince of Orange had made only two reflections upon the nature of the country, he would have avoided the mistake he fell into; the first of which is, that scarcely any body can be ignorant that the Condros and the Ardennes are sterile and mountainous countries; from whence it is evident, that M. de Luxemburg could not have subsisted his army, especially in the month of December: the roads in those parts, very bad in the summer, are almost impassable during the winter; consequently the carriages could not have passed but with the utmost difficulty.

The second reflection is, that, if M. de Luxemburg had actually designed to pass through the Ardennes, why did M. de Schomberg advance towards Tongres, and so expose himself to the danger of being beaten, without a possibility of receiving help from M. de Luxemburg, who was on the other side of the Maese? If the prince of Orange had had a thorough knowledge of the country, through which M. de Luxemburg pretended he would pass, he would soon have perceived that it was only to throw him into a perplexing uncertainty, with regard to the road which the enemy's general should naturally take: in a word, he would not have remained a moment in doubt on the part he had to act.

By this, then, it appears, that the prince ought to have continued on the side of Liege; by which position he would have stopped M. de Schomberg, who would have scarcely dared to advance to Tongres, nor would M. de Luxemburg have attempted the passage of the Maese at Maestricht: by this means, the junction would have been prevented; or, if either of the two armies had advanced, the prince could have attacked and beaten it; neither would it have been in the power of the other to have assisted it.

It is certain, that a thorough knowledge of the country would have induced the prince of Orange to have remained on the other side of Liege; by which position the junction of M. de Schomberg and M. de Luxemburg would have been impossible: this last would then have been, in a manner, compelled to continue his march by the Condros and the Ardennes; and the prince of Orange, without losing a man of his own army, would have made M. de Luxemburg lose a great number of his, who would have been unable to have resisted both hunger and cold: by this conduct, he would have acquired such glory, as would perhaps have caused him to forget his past misfortunes.

Antiquity hath furnished many examples of generals who have fallen into like mistakes, by involving themselves in countries with which they were unacquainted. When Cambyfes * was at Thebes, he dispatched fifty thousand men, who were to march over dry and burning deserts, against the Ethiopians; the army had scarcely entered them before a furious wind arose, and buried it entirely in the sands. The same prince, when he marched against the Ethiopians, engaged himself in barren countries; the consequence of which was, that his soldiers, after having subsisted upon the beasts of burden, were reduced to the necessity of devouring one another. Hannibal †, who well knew how to profit by the mistakes of his enemies, owed great part of his successes to the negligence of

* Herodotus.

† Tit. Liv.

the Romans, who did not take proper care to avoid the disadvantageous positions he drew them into.

With this company of guides, and an exact knowledge of the country, a general will be enabled to undertake an enterprize, that another with double the number of troops durst not think of attempting. These precautions will furnish him with stratagems, oftentimes more efficacious than force and courage: under the appearance of flight, a general will often get possession of an advantageous post, and decoy the enemy into one, that may prove his undoing.

If M. de Turenne had not been perfectly acquainted with Alsace, and the avenues of the mountains of Vauge, which open there, he would never have succeeded in 1675, when he undertook, with four or five and twenty thousand men, to drive out the emperor's army, which was sixty thousand strong, and which had already taken up its quarters in that province.

It hath frequently happened, and will continue to do so, that a general who knows how to take advantage of the knowledge of the country, although inferior in point of force, may change a defensive, into an offensive war. In 1671, M. de Créqui, who began the campaign on the defensive, ended it with obliging the duke of Lorraine to pass the Rhine: that prince dispersed his army, and then M. de Créqui formed the siege of Fribourg.

The knowledge of a country is still more essential in retreats: there is more art and more precaution required in a retreat, than in any other action; that operation is the conclusion of all preceding ones. If a general, obliged to retreat precipitately, hath but a superficial knowledge of the country, how will he be able to reassemble his troops, re-establish order, or march with any degree of security? After the battle and taking of Agrigentum*, while the Romans still celebrated their vic-

* Tit. Liv.

tory by festivities, Hannibal, shut up in the place, from whence there was no apparent likelihood of his escaping, nevertheless contrived to get out with his troops, and retreated with such order and expedition during the night, that the Romans could not afterwards come up with him.

Xenophon's retreat with the ten thousand Greeks, is one of the most useful lessons a commander can study: in that undertaking were united the virtues of a consummate general, and the most intrepid courage of a soldier; and in particular it exhibits the most profound knowledge of the country. The history of that retreat, written by the general, presents an example of the greatest precautions. That young Athenian, conducting his troops through roads covered six feet deep with snow, gathering fresh intelligence at every place he came to, shews the danger of being guided by received notions taken from maps. The march and passage of the Alps by Hannibal, shews in what manner a general may be guilty of negligence, especially when he carries a war into a cold mountainous country, covered with wood or marshes.

M. Belleisle, following the example of the Greek general, undertook, in the month of December 1742, to withdraw the French army from Prague, where it was at that time shut up, and to march over the enemy's country through a road of thirty-eight leagues, covered with ice, and over mountains whose precipices were concealed under the snow, having, besides, an army of between eighteen and twenty thousand men, under the command of prince Lobkowitz, to fight with. It shall suffice to recapitulate in few words the circumstances of this retreat, which deserves to be written by Xenophon himself.

M. Belleisle having received intelligence, that prince Lobkowitz was detached from the grand duke's army, in order to come, and shut up the army still closer in Prague, quitted his quarters, where he had formed a camp to preserve the openings which lead to the Elbe. Whilst
he

he was busy in collecting forage, and putting his army into a condition of acting, after M. de Lobkowitz should be recalled by prince Charles of Lorraine, that general came and encamped within four leagues of Prague, with an army of twenty thousand effective men, to which was added six thousand hunters, or militia of Moravia.

M. Belleisle formed the resolution of quitting Prague, and made the best preparations for it, without letting his design be known, which he concealed with great care from his own army, as well as from that of the enemy. He caused the roads which lead from Prague to Egra to be surveyed; and finding only two, and those very well known to the enemy, he then sent out spies to discover a third: at length he made his retreat without noise; and in the night, between the 16th and 17th, he set out, causing his army to march in two columns, appointing its rendezvous at three parts of the city, where he arrived the 17th at day-break with eleven thousand foot, and eleven thousand horse, hussars and dragoons, thirty pieces of cannon, with waggons of ammunition and provision.

It was thirty-six hours after its departure, before prince Lobkowitz knew any thing of the retreat of the French army, and even then his first intelligence of it was brought to him by twenty cuirassiers, who had been taken in their quarters by the advanced-guard of the army; and the whole regiment would have shared the same fate, had it not been for a thick fog which facilitated their escape: these cuirassiers were sent by M. Belleisle to prince Lobkowitz by a trumpet.

As the country was very open, and there was also a plain of about fourteen leagues to cross, and the enemy had above eight thousand horse, M. Belleisle divided his army into five divisions; a disposition the most suited to that country, and by which the army was also in a condition of making a strong head in the front, rear, and length of the column.

The army, on its departure from Tuchlowitz, was harrassed by some hussars and Croats, sustained by twelve squadrons of cuirassiers: the fire of the grenadiers, who were posted behind the waggons and cannon, obliged the enemy to retire in disorder; the center was attacked the same day, but with no better success; they also presented themselves before the advanced-guard to as little purpose. These skirmishes served only to prolong the march.

The enemy had, before-hand, broke down all the bridges which were upon the road on the left, not supposing the army could take to the right, as it did.

In order for the better deceiving them, M. Belleisle caused the artillery and some brigades to halt at Jecknitz; from which circumstance, they might imagine, he would continue his way towards Pilsen; but as soon as it was night he turned off towards Steben.

As it was at this place that the mountains and streights commenced, he altered his disposition, sent off his cavalry to Egra, and only kept with him a party of carabinters, all the hussars and dragoons; and, at one o'clock in the morning, he put his army again upon the march, left the great road about a league, took to the left across the steep mountains, where never any army had passed before, and, after four and twenty hours march, cantoned his troops in the suburbs of Luditz: he was obliged to drag his artillery over frozen fens, round a mountain, inaccessible by reason of the ice, with which it was covered; he arrived at the entrance of the forest that covers the mountains of Konigswart, from whence he descended by precipices, which would have been impassable had it not been for the snow that lessened the steepness of them.

At length, on the 27th, he cantoned all the infantry betwixt the rivers of Egra and Vanheim, and the cavalry on the opposite side of the river of Egra.

Marshal

Marshal Belleisle, wonderful in his retreat, but yet more so in the precautions he took to mislead the enemy with regard to his real intentions, shows, by his conduct, that a general ought to compare each circumstance, foresee every thing, and that he should, above all, have a thorough knowledge of the country; a presence of mind that nothing can disconcert, and a firmness of soul that will remain unshaken amidst the most apparent dangers.

In a march thus severe, he lost no more than seven or eight hundred men, and fifteen officers who were not able to follow; as for those who were frozen with the cold, they died; and the others, with whom marshal Belleisle left passports, were sent to the enemy by a trumpet as prisoners of war.

This general left but four thousand men in Prague, the greatest part infirm, sick, or on the recovery. M. de Chevert, to whom he entrusted the command of those troops, by his firmness and conduct, worthy of admiration, obtained a most honourable capitulation.

The knowledge of a country is as necessary for a private officer, as for the commander in chief, because he is to execute in part, what the general performs with all the troops. When an officer, to whose conduct an expedition is intrusted, joins this knowledge, one of the chief branches of military science, to practice and experience, he will, with so much the greater ease, comprehend and execute the general's intention and plan; and he will be also enabled to take the properest measures for success: if, on the contrary, he begins a march, without being acquainted with the country, his mind misgiving him, will encrease the danger, by the very means he takes to avoid it: he will suppose it in places, where there is nothing to be feared, and often fall into it where he was least apprehensive of it. Thus prepossessed, he will always remain undetermined, and by this prepossession his attention will be taken off from many things of

of the greatest importance: suppose him as brave as possible, and his intention to execute the orders given him equally good, he will of course be drawn into mistakes by his over-care to avoid them.

To rely upon fortune on these occasions, is but a poor resource; it is to his conduct that an officer owes his success, that which is vulgarly called good luck being in reality no other than the effect of study, and the most consummate knowledge.

The general who commands in the cantonments and winter-quarters, and each officer who commands a particular quarter, will never be able to take proper measures if they are unacquainted with the country: they will be unable to preserve a proper strength when separated, or to assemble without difficulty on the first order; and for want of knowing the posts which it is proper to guard, they will occupy such as are unnecessary, and leave those defenceless that are most liable to be attacked; the troops will be greatly fatigued by encreasing the number of posts without occasion, by superfluous or too numerous detachments or patrols. In a word, whatever precautions are taken within, the quarters will never be in security, if the country round about them is not perfectly known.

Unless a general demolishes those bridges, which from their distance he cannot guard, if he neglects getting possession of all the passes, occupying the country that is between him and the enemy with detachments, and cutting off all communication with the enemy and his camp, he will be liable to be surprised in it. A general should always know whether there are any rivers between his camp, his quarters, and the enemy's; he should constantly have detachments upon those rivers, to prevent the enemy from repairing the bridges, or passing the fords; he should cause the woods to be carefully scoured; he should occupy the avenues and the defiles, and know at what place the roads begin, and where they meet; if any of these precautions are neglected, a general can never remain quiet, but will always lie open to some surprise.

In short, whether it be in the operations of the field, or in the establishment of the cantonments and quarters, an officer can never shew too much attention in acquiring the knowledge of a country. Without this knowledge, it is almost impossible for a general not to commit errors, by which not only his own designs will be destroyed, but unexpected success be procured to the enemy.

C H A P. II.

Of the Preparations before taking the Field, and the March
of an Army on leaving its Quarters to go into Cantonments.

THE time for an army to come out of winter-quarters, is always regulated by the plan which the general has formed for the ensuing campaign. It leaves them very early, when they are at a distance from the country where the war is to be carried on; but later, if, by their situation, the operations of the campaign can be commenced, after having made two or three marches; but whether by the situation of the quarters, the army is enabled to enter immediately on the campaign, or whether it must be first of all cantoned, the magazines should be so situated as to be always within reach, especially in that early season of the year, when there can be no forage upon the ground, and consequently the cavalry must be subsisted out of the magazines. The magazines ought to be distributed about in different parts, that the troops may have less way to go for their forage. The general is to issue his orders to the intendant of the army, for whatever regards the magazines, and to mark those places to him where he would have them established; and, for the greater security of these places, there must be troops posted in them, the roads should

should be good, and the communication well-guarded, by which means the convoys will arrive in safety.

The distribution of the magazines should be regulated by the movements which the general foresees the army will make on leaving its quarters, supposing it leaves them when there is only dry forage; but if the army is in an enemy's country, and there is forage upon the ground, it is certainly better to reserve the magazines entire, by which not only great trouble will be avoided in transporting the forage, but also a great expence saved to the government.

Of what nature soever the country may be (an enemy's country is supposed) it should be foraged in front, as much as possible, in order to reserve that which is in the rear, that, when the campaign is over, it may be found laid up in the barns: if this precaution is not attended to, the army will be destitute of forage at its return, and will of course be obliged to draw it from home, and consume those magazines which were before spared; consequently there will be nothing saved, the expence will only have been deferred, but it will be increased, by transporting the forage from the magazines to the army.

The forming of the magazines should never be delayed till the time for opening the campaign approaches. The intendant, pursuant to the general's order, should lay in the provisions during the winter, and distribute them in the frontier towns, by which means they can easily be transported to whatever place the general shall order. By these precautions, the general will not only avoid the inconveniency of being obliged to wait till there is forage upon the ground, but he will also be enabled to be the first in the field. The reader may see M. de Montecuculli's * observations upon distributing and storing the magazines of ammunition and subsistence.

* Montecuculli, Book I. Ch. 2. Art. 3. § 1, 2, 3, 4.

The same precautions should also be taken with respect to the artillery; whether for that wanted for a siege, if it is intended to open the campaign by that operation; or whether for that which is necessary in the course of a campaign, it should be assembled upon the glacis of the frontier towns, or rather upon that of the conquered places: the more it is within reach of readily joining, the sooner the operations will be commenced.

From prudence in the execution of these dispositions, as well for the magazines, and for the artillery, as for every thing that is necessary to an army, it follows, that a general hath often formed a siege, or at least invested a place, and completed his lines of circumvallation, before the enemy could be in a condition of coming out of his quarters: he will likewise have made many marches, and will have possessed himself of advantageous posts, without the enemy having it in his power to oppose him.

The success of the general's designs is ascertained by his own forecast, and the dispatch with which his orders are executed; negligence and sloth are always productive of miscarriages.

Here would be the proper place to point out the order which an army should observe in its march to invest a town, and to mention the precautions necessary to be taken for doing it with security; but this would be only repeating what has been already said by the marshal de Vauban, with regard to this grand operation. What could be said here would not, in the least, add to the depth and wisdom of his instructions: the reader is therefore referred to the writings of that great man, as this branch of military science doth not fall within the design of this work.

A general should observe that, in order to make an army come out of its quarters, and cause it to be cantoned within a march of the country where he designs to commence the operations, he must make all the troops leave their quarters together; assemble them in many bodies, in

different frontier towns; proportion the marching days to the distance of the quarters and the rendezvous that shall have been appointed for them, that they may arrive on the day appointed, and that from thence they may march in a body to the place where they are to canton.

All the bodies march either in the number of columns that the situation of the country will allow, and arrive at the cantonment together, or else they march separately, and arrive on different days: but in either of these cases, the cantonments for each regiment ought to have been marked out, and, if possible, forage for at least three or four days distributed to each quarter.

In the marching-orders which are sent to each commander, the situation and name of the place where each regiment is to canton, should be carefully expressed; whether on the right, the left, or in the center: the discipline to be there observed, the place where to go and receive orders, and that where to receive forage, should also be particularly specified.

Troops, when upon a march, should always observe the most exact discipline; and never be suffered to advance, but in the same order, and with the same precaution, as if they were in danger of being molested or attacked.

Whenever an army is cantoned, it is generally in an enemy's country; therefore, for the greater security of the cantonments, there should at least be one place that may serve for a support. In 1746, Brussels was the center of the cantonments of M. Saxe's army. In 1747, his quarters were sustained by Anvers on the left, Malines and Louvain supported the center, and Namur the right. If no place of this sort can be found, the army must then march out together and encamp, instead of going into cantonments.

As the cantonments are properly nothing more than a halting place, where the troops are to remain till the season permits them to take the field,

field, till the proper quantity of forage is collected, or till the necessary preparations for the intended operations are completed; they should necessarily be more connected than the winter-quarters. But as soon as the weather permits, and all the necessary preparations, which should have been forwarded during the winter, are finished, there is then no time to be lost; for an army will always find its advantage in encamping early, getting the start of the enemy as much as it possibly can, and beginning the campaign, no matter by what operations, before the enemy can have time to assemble.

The greatest generals of former times have constantly adhered to this rule; and, in our times, it hath always been followed by marshal Saxe. The cantonment of his army under Brussels in 1746, and the famous march he made in 1748, to invest Maestricht, on leaving his quarters, are examples which ought to serve as models; but in all these cases, the varying of circumstances must be attended to.

It is undoubtedly true, that an army commanded by one general, and who only receives orders from his own sovereign, ought to be in a condition of taking the field much earlier than a combined army; every different nation of which hath a separate commander, who is obliged to follow whatever instructions he receives, and which often tend more to his sovereign's own personal interest than to the general good.

If any particular column, upon the march, presents its flank to any of the enemy's towns, although it is indispensibly necessary for every column to observe all possible order and discipline on the march, yet this column is more particularly obliged to it; necessity makes it become a duty. But that it should not be too much exposed, some hussars ought to be appointed to march upon its flank, who should also be ordered to advance till they come within sight of those towns. This column, whether consisting of infantry or cavalry, must detach some troops to sustain the

hussars, in case they should be attacked and repulsed. By posting these detachments upon the flank, the enemy will be kept at a distance from the column, and the hussars will be also sustained.

In a word, every measure that shall appear necessary for the disposition of the army on leaving its quarters, either to go into cantonments or to encamp, ought to have been provided for, and laid down with such exactness, that there shall remain no obstacle to prevent the army's assembling in a very few days.

The like attention is also requisite for the artillery, the baggage-waggons for the infantry, and the waggons for the provisions; the magazines of forage, as well as for every equipage that is necessary for a campaign, so that they may be able to march on the earliest notice; and the general should also be well assured that, before the army quits its cantonments, it shall be in a condition of entering the enemy's country, completely furnished with every thing necessary, both for subsistence and action.

CHAP. III.

The March of an Army in an open Country.

IF, according to the observation of Vegetius, an army is in a more dangerous situation upon a march than when it is drawn up in order of battle, because a soldier, not seeing his enemy, is not so much upon his guard, there is consequently a greater degree of precaution required in a general, that he may not be surpris'd by an unexpected attack, or fall into ambuscades, the likelihood of which should always make him proceed with caution.

It is upon a thorough knowledge of the country which is the seat of war, that a general should direct the march of armies; that he should

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concert the measures for conducting them in safety; and that he will be enabled to foresee the enemy's motions.

There are but three sorts of countries which may become the theatre of war, an open country divided by rivers, a woody, or a mountainous one; the dispositions for a march must be varied as the situations of places are different. Altho' the face of an open country is sometimes interrupted by woods or hollows, there are nevertheless fewer precautions necessary, because it exposes, or at least does not greatly conceal, the enemy's manœuvres from the general: in a mountainous country the danger becomes more considerable, because those very obstacles which serve to impede the progress of an army may prove so many resources to the enemy, who can march without being seen, and lay snares at almost every step they take.

When an army is in an open country, the general may take whatever road he thinks most convenient, without being under a necessity of keeping the beaten road. If he chuses to march across the country, it may be done by cutting down the hedges, filling up the ditches, levelling the ridges, and filling up the hollow-ways, thereby rendering their ascent or descent easy, and by building bridges over the streams and rivulets which divide the country; but nevertheless it is very imprudent for a general to suppose himself entirely free from danger upon a march, for the consequences of self-security are generally fatal: the effects of negligence in any military operation are pernicious, but more particularly so upon a march; and although a general should never fear his enemy when in presence of him, he should nevertheless always apprehend the worst from him, when he is out of his sight.

The number of columns in which an army can march in an open country is arbitrary, whilst it is advancing and the enemy at too great a distance to attack or annoy it upon its march. But if, on the contrary, the enemy is near at hand, and there is a possibility of his attacking the army, it should

should then be disposed after such a manner, as to form in order of battle in a very short time, and to be able to take a favourable position for action upon the first signal.

The ill success of the French at the battle of Ramillies may perhaps be in some measure attributed to the neglect of this precaution, as it is certain that the French general preserved his original position, notwithstanding the duke of Marlborough changed his.

If the army presents its flank to the enemy, the dispositions, without considering the probability of its being attacked, should be changed; for an army upon a march ought to be always prepared against any accident that may happen.

A general should never cause an army to move without having previously considered and examined the intended march of it, nor without a thorough knowledge of the enemy's position and where he is, or without knowing particularly the ground intended to encamp on. An army ought never to move but with some design, either to seize on some advantageous post, to prevent an intended march of the enemy's, to draw him into a disadvantageous situation, to deprive him of subsistence, or to procure some for itself.

This maxim being established, let it be supposed that a general would cause his army to march, and the enemy's distance to be also such as to secure him from any danger of attacks; the general hath it in his power to open four, six, or eight roads, in proportion to the number of the troops under his command; for the more the number of columns, the less is the body of troops contained in each: consequently there will be less confusion, and the sooner will the army arrive at its destined camp.

The general having nothing to fear from the enemy, who, as hath been just supposed, is at a distance, orders the army to march in six columns; it seems probable he would cause it to be executed by the following dispositions,

sitions, of which however only a general idea can be formed, the whole being dependent upon particular circumstances.

Before the march is planned, and the number of columns determined upon in which the army is to march, notwithstanding the general is acquainted with the country, he should send out a detachment some days before, to reconnoitre the intended route of the army, as well as the camp it is to occupy. This detachment is to be commanded by the officers of the day appointed for its setting out: they must have staff-officers and guides with them, to conduct and to inform them of the nature of whatever may prove an obstacle, of the places where the roads begin, and those where they terminate; they should also have labourers with them, to mend the ways, enlarge the roads, and make new ones, if necessary; to cut down the hedges, fill up the ditches, level the ridges of the hollows, and build or repair bridges.

When the general commanding this detachment is ready to enter the different ways through which the army is to follow, he will divide his detachment into as many separate bodies as the army is to be divided into upon its march; if into four, the major-general takes the command of one, the brigadier of another, the colonel of the third, and himself will remain at the head of the fourth. This division being thus made, he will distribute staff-officers, guides, and labourers to each detachment, with orders to meet again at the same place from whence they separated.

Each of these detachments should advance to the extremities of the woods, if they meet with any, and of the roads leading to the camp intended to be occupied; the commanding and staff-officers will then advance with an escort to reconnoitre its situation, and will leave part of their men in ambuscade in the woods, or concealed behind some heights, or in some hollows. The knowledge of the situation of the camp being attained, each detachment will return by the road it came; but first, the

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commanding officer of each detachment will make a report to the general of the roads they have passed, what discoveries they have made, and, in short, will give him a particular detail of every thing they have met with on their way, whether woods, villages, hollows, bridges, and of every thing they have done to render the road easy for the column that is to pass through it. This detachment being assembled at the place appointed for meeting, will take the road to the camp, where being arrived, the lieutenant-general will make his report to the commander in chief of the army.

With these precautions the army may not only advance in safety; but the roads also, for every column, having been reconnoitred and repaired, no accident can happen to retard the march of the army.

The general must take care to have detachments of hussars or dragoons always in the front and upon the flanks, to observe and clear the march of the army; neither should a general suppose himself to be in an entire security from the distance of the enemy: but whilst he sees all clear before him, it would shew great weakness for him to be apprehensive of a surprise, especially when every necessary precaution for avoiding it hath been taken. It is certainly a mark of prudence to take precautions; but multiplying them without cause is an undoubted sign of fear and anxiety.

It is proper to make the army march, as near as possible, in the same order in which it is to encamp; by which means the troops may enter the camp without confusion. The army being supposed to march in six columns, the infantry will form three, the artillery and baggage the fourth; the cavalry, with the remainder of the corps of hussars that are not detached, and the dragoons, the two last upon the flanks; so that the army, on its march, will be in the following disposition: the column upon the right will consist of cavalry, the one adjoining to it of infantry, and that which comes next will be formed by the artillery and baggage;

gage; then two columns of infantry, and the sixth closing, the left will be composed of cavalry. It is to be observed that, if the baggage-wagons belonging to the army form too long a row, some of them may be sent into the rear of the columns of infantry, with express orders to the officers to make them march in the column.

There should be an advanced and a rear-guard to each column, formed from the troops of which the column is composed; there should be also detachments of light horse upon the flanks of the cavalry, in order to keep off any of the enemy's parties that might advance to annoy the army upon its march. The rear-guard to the column of baggage should consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons, besides the escort always appointed for it. The general officers who are at the head of the two columns of cavalry, should not march too fast, lest they should get too far advanced before the infantry; a matter always to be avoided. The march of an army being disposed after this manner, every column will enter the camp at the same time, and find itself opposite to its ground. See the FIRST PLATE.

If, by the enemy's position, although at a distance, the army should on its march present a flank to the enemy, without fearing its being attacked, yet as the enemy may have stolen one or two marches, as hath happened on many occasions, there must be only two columns of infantry placed in the center. The third must be placed upon that flank which the army presents to the enemy; so that the army will find itself disposed upon its march after the following manner. Supposing it is the right which presents the flank to the enemy, the first column will consist of infantry, the second of cavalry, the third of artillery, the fourth and fifth of infantry, and the sixth of cavalry. The baggage will then be distributed to the three columns upon the left; so that neither the two columns upon the right or the artillery will have the least embarrassment, in case an

action ensues; the same disposition must be made upon the left, if it is that which presents the flank. Particular care must be taken that the artillery have orders, supposing the enemy advancing in full force to attack, to transport itself to the column of infantry, and to divide itself along the front, when it shall be in order of battle, and to keep up a constant fire, in order to give the general time to make such dispositions as he shall find necessary.

The column of cavalry should be divided into two, and be posted upon the flanks of the infantry that is drawn up in the face of the enemy; the other columns must follow the orders which have been delivered to them, and execute them with the utmost dispatch. See the SECOND PLATE.

If it appears, either from the proximity or position of the enemy, that the army is liable to be attacked in front, the disposition for the march should be in the same order as the army is to form in for action: the artillery must then be distributed among the columns of infantry; so that following the divisions where it is placed, the brigades will find themselves spread over the front of the first line. In this case, the infantry will form four columns, which will march in the center of the two columns of cavalry upon their flanks; so that the head of each column, as far as the center, when placing itself in order of battle, shall make the first line, and the remainder, from the center downward, the second; and the reserve which follows, shall form itself behind the other two lines.

It is necessary that an army disposed after this manner, should have orders to draw itself into order of battle on the very first signal, which should be a discharge of two or three pieces of cannon. The signal being given, the first and second lines, and the reserve, will find themselves formed in a very short time. If, from the proximity and position of the enemy, and the

the facility with which he can attack, the general hath reason to imagine he will do it, the heavy baggage, with a good guard and escort, ought to be removed into the rear.

On this occasion, the *campement** should not be far before the army, the escort should be increased, and some detachments of light horse should march in front to cover it, and also to make observation at a distance. The remainder of the body of light horse shall continue upon the flanks of the army sustained by dragoons, who, on the signal being given, shall immediately go and form themselves in the place assigned to them during the action.

On the first fight of the enemy, the *campement* should retire; for when fighting becomes necessary, all thought of encamping must be laid aside; but the escort shall put itself in order of battle, and the light horse shall approach the enemy as near as possible, in order to reconnoitre his disposition and strength. The officer commanding them will immediately send a report of the discoveries he hath made to the commander in chief, who, on every occasion, should be in the front, and even a little advanced, to survey the nature of the ground; it being very certain, that, in these cases, a man can much better rely upon his own than upon the judgment of others. This was marshal Saxe's method, particularly when he was apprehensive of being attacked upon a march, or had himself an intention of attacking. In proportion as the enemy shall advance, the escort of the *campement* must retire in good order; at the same

* I have here chosen to preserve the original, as I shall also do on similar occasions, when a word equally expressive in the English language does not occur to me. The name of *campement* is given to a certain number of troops, who proportion their time of setting out before the army, by the distance or proximity of the enemy, in order to trace or mark out the camp. For this purpose, a quarter-master and a trooper is draughted from every troop of every regiment of horse; and a serjeant and a corporal, in like manner, from every regiment of infantry, furnished with ropes and pickets, to lay out the ground for the tents and the intervals; so that every regiment will, on its arrival, find its ground properly marked out. A field-officer of every regiment also marches with the *campement*, besides the officers of each corps, who command the detachment. DICT. MILIT. vid. *Campement*.

time not neglecting the opportunity, if it offers, of harrassing the enemy's advanced guard, so as to retard his march, and give more time for the army to form in order of battle, and to the general to make such dispositions as he shall judge necessary: after which, the escort, having amused the enemy, or caused him to slacken the briskness of his march, must retire in good order; and when it shall be near the body of the army, each body shall return to its own brigade.

If, from his knowledge of the country, although an open one, the general knows there are any thickets, hollows or heights, either on the right or the left, and that this spot may prove favourable to the enemy, he should try to possess himself of it. If that attempt is not practicable, as the enemy will undoubtedly take advantage of it, and post infantry either at these thickets or heights, the general must place a brigade of infantry at the head of each column of cavalry, which shall mix by platoons with that line of cavalry, when formed in order of battle. This disposition was made by M. de Turenne at the action of Sinzheim, and at the battle of Enzheim.

If, by the situation of the country, the flanks cannot be sheltered either by an hollow, a morass, a river, a town, or a village, the hussars and dragoons must be posted upon the wings, but side-ways, so as to be able to take the enemy in flank, when he shall come down to charge the first line, or at least to keep back his second: these hussars and dragoons should be sustained by the infantry of the light troops belonging to the army. If the right can be formed next a village, and the left next an hollow, some infantry and artillery must be posted there: if there is only the right or the left that can be sheltered, that which cannot must be properly sustained; and the same disposition must be observed that hath been just now mentioned, with regard to an army whose flanks cannot be covered. See the THIRD PLATE.

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If on leaving the camp, the army presents a flank to the enemy, who may have it in his power to attack it on the march, it must then march but in two or three columns at most. Each column should be disposed after such a manner that by a motion to the right or to the left, according to the wing that is liable to be attacked, each battalion and squadron may find itself formed in order of battle before the enemy. Alexander of Parma * observed this order in his march, when he entered France with whom he was leagued. This method of march was again executed by marshal Saxe, during the campaign of 1746, in leaving his camp upon the Orne, in order to march upon the Mayne. The French army presented the right flank to the enemy; and its disposition was such, that by a motion to the right by the left, it would be formed in order of battle ready for action.

The advanced-guard should be composed of light horse, sustained by dragoons; the rear-guard of cavalry sustained by infantry; there should be also some light horse upon the flanks of the cavalry, and some pieces of cannon with the infantry. The artillery should be distributed by brigades in the column of infantry nearest to the enemy: so that performing the same movement as the troops, it may find itself placed in the front of the first line, ready to fire on the first order. The number of three columns is given to the army, in order that the first and second lines and the reserve shall be formed at the same time, which cannot be done if the army marches only in two columns; for troops must then be taken from these two lines in order to form the reserve, which would require a considerable time, and consequently retard the dispositions: whereas this reserve, forming the third column, is separated from the main body, and in a condition to act with readiness, according to the orders it shall have received. As the baggage, in this manner of marching, must necessarily be an em-

* Histoire de Flandres, par Bentivoglio.

barrissement, it must be sent into the rear under a good escort, with orders to join the next day at the new camp.

It is necessary to observe that every different species of troops should be placed in that part where it is to fight; consequently the two columns which are to form the two lines when the army shall be in order of battle ought to be composed of cavalry and infantry; so that when the columns shall make a motion to the right from the left, the infantry may be placed in the center, and the cavalry upon the wings, unless the nature of the country should make another disposition necessary: then the general should regulate his motions according to the situation of the country, and gave such orders as will enable the troops to act with the greatest facility. See the **FOURTH PLATE**.

C H A P. IV.

The March of an Army in a mountainous and woody Country.

IF the situation of the places in a mountainous country furnish a general with a greater variety of expedients to conceal his dispositions, it also renders more precautions and a greater degree of knowledge necessary to avoid being surpris'd. If these kind of countries, on the one hand, present greater advantages for the concealment of marches, they also, on the other, offer many difficulties in the transporting of the provisions and the artillery, and require a greater degree of vigilance for the safety of the magazines and the preservation of the communications with the frontier towns.

The general ought to dispose the march of the army according to the situation of the country: he should carefully guard against surprizes, whether by night or by day; make himself sure of the passes, and turn them

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to advantage against the enemy; in a word, he must not overlook any one circumstance, and he should contrive to make even the obstacles themselves turn to advantage.

It is to be feared that in mountainous countries, in roads that cannot be enlarged, the troops pressed too close together will not be able to move but with great difficulty; and as they will embarrass each other, the front, the rear-guard, and the flanks must be equally secured, the columns must be unbroken and close, that there be no distance left between them; and halting should be particularly avoided, as that is a circumstance by which an army is most fatigued.

It is again dangerous, as the commentator upon Onofander observes, when troops find themselves straightened for room in a narrow road, for the general, in order to enable them to move with greater ease, to lengthen the columns too much: from whence would arise two inconveniencies, the first of which is, that the columns would be weakened, and that in case of a surprise it would not be difficult for the enemy to separate them entirely, and it would also be impossible for them to rally; in the second place, these columns thus lengthened, in going round a mountain and descending into a valley, would take up a prodigious extent; from whence it hath often happened that the windings of the road hiding the middle of the column, those who march in the front rank can see only those who are in the last, and retard their march, because that, being deceived by distance, they will be scarcely able to distinguish whether they advance, or whether they are halted.

In order to avoid these inconveniencies, it is not barely sufficient for a general to have a thorough knowledge of the country: he ought immediately to inform himself of every particular however minute relating to it; he should take the same precautions which have been pointed out as necessary for a march in an open country, and send out a detachment,
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such as hath been supposed in the foregoing chapter. This detachment will examine the narrow passes, survey and found the fords, run round the windings of the mountains, and if there are many roads, it will find out which is the most practicable, and that through which the army, the artillery, and baggage can pass with the greatest ease; what streams cross it, and whether there are bridges over them: it will examine whether they are sufficiently strong, and repair them, or build new ones. It often happens in a mountainous country, that the road which would be very short and commodious, proves to be divided, either by the separation of two rocks or by hollows. As these breaches, however deep they may be, cannot be all of a certain breadth, therefore, in order to avoid marching over the unnecessary ground that going round them would take up, bridges should be thrown over, if possible, from one rock to another.

But as in a march, whether in an open, or in a mountainous country, occasions for throwing bridges very often present themselves, it is very necessary to say a word or two relative to the manner of their construction.

Six or eight thick pieces of timber are laid across a rivulet or any other bad place necessary to be passed, at six feet distance from each other; these must be crossed again by other pieces of timber not so thick, at the distance of three feet from each other; which must be fixed to one another by large pegs, and faggots well fastened together must be laid over them. When the bridge shall be thus covered, some earth must be thrown over it, which ought to be well trampled, in order to fill up the vacancies of the faggots; and then, for the greater firmness, new earth should be thrown over it, which ought to be well beaten down. The bridge thus made, the troops, the artillery, and the baggage, will pass over it with great ease.

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It must be observed that the bridges should be of the same breadth with the roads; they should be broader rather than narrower, because, exclusive of the danger the artillery and baggage would run if they were narrower, the ranks being obliged to be straitened and the column to be lengthened, the march would of course be retarded, and it would be difficult to avoid confusion. The labourers that accompany the detachment ought to be furnished with every sort of tool necessary for the removing of earth, the felling of trees, and working and fitting them for use.

This detachment being divided, as has been already observed, into as many bodies as there are roads through which the army is to pass, will meet again at the place from whence it parted; and the reports of the commanding officers of the different bodies being given to the lieutenant-general, he must make a report of the whole to the commander in chief.

On this report, the general will order as many detachments as there are columns intended to set out two or three hours before the time appointed for the march of the army. These detachments will march carefully over the ways already examined and prepared: they will scour every thing, hedges, narrow passes, entrances of passes, woods, heights, villages, in short all that may serve as shelter for troops in ambuscade; and, for greater security, they will post guards in the villages, which guards are not to retire till the rear-guard of the army comes up.

The commanding officer of each detachment should possess himself of the heights on the right and left, and should distribute platoons of infantry at proper distances from the rocks and narrow passes: he should be careful of what may be done to oppose him, and be attentive even to the smallest paths. When the commanding officer of the detachment shall be advanced to the end of the passes, or to the ground intended for the camp, he will establish his infantry in the most advantageous posts; he

will place his light horse or dragoons in the front, but within reach of assistance ; he will send out patrols of light horse advanced before the infantry. If he receives any intelligence of the enemy, he will send immediate notice of it to the general ; but if, from the report made to him, the enemy does not appear to be sufficiently strong to annoy the army on its march, or only some parties were willing to try if they could enter the passes, his detachment will be sufficient to keep them at a distance, particularly as he is in possession of the heights and the passes.

These troops, in the situation they have been placed, should wait the arrival of the *campement*. As soon as they perceive it, they shall advance ; and whilst the major-general, assisted by the staff-officers, marks out the camp, they shall possess themselves of the villages, passes, and roads by which it is probable the enemy might come and make an attack. These detachments shall remain in their posts, till relieved by the proper officers, which will not be done till the guards of cavalry and posts of infantry necessary for the security of the camp are posted. Then, although the army should be yet at a distance, it may on its arrival enter the camp, which will be found covered by the guards which escorted the *campement*.

With these precautions, if the enemy is at too great a distance to attack the army, the march will be performed without any trouble : there will be no obstacle in the roads, or reason to fear that the waggons will be mired ; and if the wheels or axle-trees of any of them should break, they will be repaired from those which have spare ones : if, on the contrary, the enemy should be so near as to give cause to apprehend an attack, the necessary precautions are taken for forming the troops in order of battle, and for the necessary dispositions during the action.

It has been already observed that an army on a march should be divided into as many columns as the detachments have found openings or roads leading to the camp the general intends to occupy ; suppose two, the army
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will consequently march in two columns. The disposition of the troops in their march differs entirely from what it would be in an open country; the advanced-guard of each column must consist of infantry, some must be distributed either in the narrow passes, or on the heights, and there should be some advanced detachments of light horse to scour the narrow passes: the rear-guard should consist of infantry only; the remainder of the troops may be disposed after the following manner:

Four or five brigades of infantry, according to the number which composes the army, should be placed at the head of each column; the same partition should be made with regard to the artillery, which must follow the infantry; the cavalry must march next, and the baggage of each column, well escorted by infantry, must follow the cavalry; then the remainder of the corps of light horse which are not detached; and the dragoons are placed the last, in order to dismount and sustain the rear-guard in case it shall be attacked.

Each column should consist of the same number of troops as well infantry as cavalry. Platoons of infantry should be detached to march on the heights, at proper distances, in order to cover the flanks on the right and left. Care must be taken to march very leisurely in the front, otherwise the rear will not be able to keep up; then, in order to give the rear time to come up, the front will be forced to halt, by which the march will be retarded and the troops fatigued. See the FIFTH PLATE.

These dispositions are necessary, because as the enemy in a mountainous country will be able to attack with infantry only, it is necessary to oppose him with troops of the same nature; the reason why the artillery is posted behind the infantry is, that in case the enemy should attack briskly in front, and the road through which the columns pass is broad enough, some pieces of cannon may be sent into the front, which firing with grape-shot will soon thin the enemy's ranks, and abate something of his ardour:

if the road is too narrow, and there is not room for more than four or five men to march abreast, consequently the artillery must be carried on sledges, which has been often obliged to be practiced in the Alps. In this situation resolution must supply the want of that assistance which the cannon would give, and the enemy must be charged with bayonets; which is the easier to be performed, as the enemy will not be able to present a larger front than that opposed to him by the army, which is also supposed to be in possession of the heights. The cavalry does not follow immediately, because not being able to act in this sort of country, it must be covered by infantry. The baggage which follows is sufficiently defended by the columns that cover it, and the infantry that escorts it: this infantry should nevertheless join as often as circumstances will permit, without being fearful of exposing itself, that upon the heights being to reinforce it in case the head of the army should be attacked. The remainder of the corps of light horse being as incapable of acting as the cavalry, is free from insult: the dragoons which have been posted behind can, by dismounting, assist it if it is attacked. Troops thus distributed will march on securely; by this means those troops who can act with facility cover and protect those who cannot, neither will they be in the least embarrassed.

There are some mountainous countries so difficult of access, that it is impossible for the cavalry to follow, because some post must either be immediately seized, or the enemy, being in possession of the hills, must be driven from them before it can advance; or because it would be difficult for it to be subsisted.

If the army can march in four columns, the dispositions should still be the same; but as the head of the columns will be weaker in infantry, the heights should be guarded accordingly, and the rear-guard sufficiently strong to resist the enemy: the same disposition should be made for one column only.

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If the march is to be made through a woody country, the precautions which have been already mentioned in regard to examining the ways through which the army is to pass, and for the detachments which set out in order to be before the army, should still remain; but the disposition and order of the troops are different. If by the situation of the country the army is obliged to march continually through woods till it arrives at the camp, the cavalry and the baggage should be in three columns in the center; but some infantry should be placed at their head and their rear-guard: the infantry should march in two columns, one on the right, the other on the left of the cavalry and baggage; some brigades of artillery should be distributed to each column of infantry, the remainder must march at the head of the columns of baggage; the flanks of the columns must be covered by platoons of infantry, placed about at proper distances, which are to follow the columns at forty or fifty paces distance, without ever losing sight of them. See PLATE THE SIXTH.

If by the knowledge which the general has of the country, or rather from the report of the officers who commanded the detachments sent out to view, open, and repair the roads, he knows that the country is interrupted by woods and little plains, the disposition ought to be wholly changed; it will then be sufficient that the second detachment, which in other cases ought to set out the evening before, sets out only two hours before the *campement*. This detachment should be composed of infantry, light horse, and dragoons; the infantry to scour the villages and the woods, the light horse to penetrate into the woods wherever they can enter, and clear the march of the infantry, and the dragoons to sustain the whole.

When the disposition for the march of the army is supposed to be in five columns, the infantry should form two, the cavalry two more, and the artillery and baggage the fifth. If it is thought there will be any occasion for artillery, a brigade or two may be distributed to the columns
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of infantry, and the remainder may march at the head of the escort of the baggage, which is to be defended by the regiment of artillery; to which must be added a detachment of infantry, which will form the advanced-guard. The cavalry and dragoons are to keep the open country as much as possible, and the infantry the enclosed; the dragoons and cavalry should avoid the woods as much as possible, and the best and most accessible road should be always given to the artillery and baggage. In order that the columns may preserve the same length in marching, a brigade of infantry should be placed at the heads of the columns of cavalry: if this precaution, which fixes the head of the columns of cavalry, is neglected, the cavalry will extend a great way before the columns of infantry, which should always be avoided. The rear-guard should consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons: the light horse should always march on the flanks on the right and left, and before the army.

It is after this manner that the march of an army may be disposed through a woody and a mountainous country; but an army must always suit its motions to circumstances, and to the situation of the country where the war is carried on. Was the general always free to chuse his own route, he should sooner be determined by the nature and number of the troops he has with him, than by the goodness of the road: it is not without great difficulty that cavalry can act in a woody country; in a mountainous one they are of no use; there infantry only can be serviceable. If the general is inferior in point of number, he should always make choice of defiles; because in them he can always present a front equal to the enemy's. Who can be ignorant that Leonidas with eight thousand Greeks, at the straits of Thermopylæ, stopped the almost innumerable army of Xerxes, who was unable to force him?

A mountainous and woody country, when thoroughly known, becomes a more favourable theatre for practising the wiles and stratagems
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of war, than an open country; it is true that the knowledge of it is more difficult to attain, and that it requires more vigilance and readiness in the general. Hannibal was even drawn into ambuscades by his own guides; an example worthy the notice of a general who takes guides that have either but little regard for him, or are unacquainted with the country: it is impossible to try them too much, and their ignorance is often more fatal than treachery itself.

The general should chuse brave and active soldiers for the forming of the detachments which precede the army. It has often happened that guides, and even entire detachments, seized with a panic, have imagined the enemy where he was not; and, by that means, have missed the opportunity of finding him where he really was.

The places where the enemy can lay ambuscades ought to be known: neither is it always in the most hidden and secret places that they are to be found; they are often in those that are most uncovered; for the more open a place is, the less suspicion will there be of any ambuscade in it*.

The marches that require most precaution are those made in the night, those made in sight of the enemy, and those that should be kept secret.

The first should be avoided as much as possible, especially in a mountainous country, because surprizes are more unavoidable, and the soldier's fear, which always magnifies the danger he cannot see, renders those marches more difficult, and very dangerous. If the army is beat, the retreat becomes more fatal than the action itself; should it get the better, that advantage becomes useless, because it will not be able to pursue the enemy; whether on account of the ambuscades he may have laid to secure his retreat, or whether from the fear of losing the way. The Numidians†, who had more cunning than strength in war, attacked Marius in the night; because, said they, if we are beaten, the

* Tit. Liv. Dec. 2.

† Salust. de Bello Jug.

darkness will befriend us in our flight ; and if we beat the Romans, it will not prevent our pursuing a vanquished enemy through a country of which they have no knowledge, and with which we are perfectly acquainted.

But if circumstances require and force an army to march over a mountainous country in the night, care should at least have been taken that the roads have been well surveyed during the day ; that the guides march at the head of the army ; that the ranks are kept very close together, that the men may not lose sight of each other : and that part of the troops do not mistake one defile for another, which may easily happen in the dark, if the advanced-guard has marched a little too fast, and the officers hastened their troops too much. The Greeks, according to Xenophon, on like occasions, gave the heaviest arms to the troops that marched at the head, thereby to oblige them to proceed leisurely.

In those marches that are made in sight of the enemy, beside the precautions necessary to be taken for the safety of the troops, and which have already been mentioned, the general should endeavour to deceive them by false appearances, and by an ostentation often, in such circumstances, necessary : as extensive a front as possible should be given to the army ; the intervals of the ranks and columns should be widened, but not so as to weaken them ; the general should take advantage of an height, possess himself of it, and post some troops in it, in order to make the enemy suspect there may be still more behind ; advantage should be taken of a wood, and, by marches and countermarches, the same troops should be made to pass and repass, in order to make the enemy believe the army stronger than it really is. There have been instances of generals, who, on like occasions, have made such good use of their ground, that, by the arrangement of troops, they have seemed to multiply them in the enemy's eyes ; and who, although inferior in strength,

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appearing to have the advantage of numbers, have kept the enemy in awe.

But still, unless it is to deceive the enemy, a general should conceal his force and management; his force, because if superior, he will not fail to profit by that advantage, and if inferior, he should avoid a battle: he will conceal his management, because he will prevent the designs of the enemy's general, who will receive as much information from his successes as from his miscarriages. Pyrrhus *, who taught the art of war to the Romans, was in the end conquered by them. The Mexicans † often turned the arts and wiles of Cortez and the Spaniards against them; and the czar Peter I. never regretted a defeat, when it became the means of instructing him how to conquer in his turn.

It is impossible to lay down fixed rules for secret marches; it is by his address that a general will improve circumstances; it is by art and contrivance that he will evade the enemy's vigilance, and deceive his spies. The marches performed by the great Condé and M. de Turenne, in 1674, may be seen, as related by M. de Feuquieres ‡ in his memoirs.

The last war furnishes us with a memorable example of a march, which at the same time proves the vast and penetrating genius of the princes who planned it, and the comprehension and understanding of the generals who executed it under their orders.

In 1744, the combined armies of France and Spain, commanded by his royal highness the Infant, and his serene highness the prince of Conti, set out to attack the king of Sardinia in his barricadoes. The column on the right marched by Nice, that on the left by Briançon, the two others of the center divided into three, marched by different passes to surround the barricadoes, which the king of Sardinia imagined impregnable.

* Tit. Liv. lib. 38.

† Antonio Solis.

‡ Memoires de Feuquieres.

By the just disposition of every column and division, the barricadoes were invested; and were surrounded with so much quickness, that the king of Sardinia's army, pressed on all sides, gave way, without that prince's knowing to what part to send assistance.

However difficult it may be to attain a thorough knowledge of a mountainous country, this march certainly supposes, in the two princes who executed it, the most digested study and the deepest knowledge: the justness of the orders, and the exactness with which each commander arrived, almost at the same time, on the spot where they were to assemble, in order to make the attack; and the infinite precautions they must have taken for the subsistence of an army, that, during a march of eleven days in a barren sandy country, wanted for nothing, are circumstances not to be sufficiently admired.

This march is a master-piece, not to be outshone even in the eyes of those who neither admire or respect any thing that is modern, by any action of the remotest antiquity.

If, in the passing of mountains, there is only one passage, it is oftener by art than by force a general can get possession of it. The duke of Valentinois intending to pass through Tuscany, and fearing the passage of the Alps would be shut against him, sent to demand a passage of the Florentines; but during that negotiation he passed the Alps, without waiting for their answer*.

If there are many issues, they must all be guarded, and not one of them neglected. In 1515, Francis I†. desirous to pass into Lombardy, and being also apprised that the Swiss waited for him at the different openings of the mountain, sent detachments towards each of these places, as if he intended to force them; and whilst he, by this means, kept them in suspense, he passed with his army through another opening which was

* Not. de Vigenere sur Onozander.

† Histoire de François I. tom. i. liv. i. par Varillas.

shewn to him by a peasant. But if it is impossible to deceive the enemy, and if circumstances render stratagems ineffectual for concealing of the march, all possible care must be taken : any, even the most trifling thing, may cause a discovery ; the neighing of horses, the light in a pipe, the noise of the arms, &c. during the night : and in the day, the dust, and the sun-shine glittering upon the arms. During the march, all these inconveniencies must be guarded against as much as possible, by recommending silence to the men, while in woods and passes ; by leaving the horses and mares behind, if they neigh, to each other, and also every thing that can contribute to noise.

But if, notwithstanding all these precautions, an enemy superior in force, is in possession of a pass, from which he cannot be dislodged but by art, a feint should be made of attacking some post, in order to draw the enemy from the pass, and possession should be taken of whatever the enemy abandons, or withdraws his troops from. The general should make diversions, pretend retiring, and even flight ; he should observe whether there are any heights commanding those occupied by the enemy ; and if there are, he should attack the enemy on the side next them ; so that whilst the enemy is taken up in defending himself, the troops may seize on that post which overlooks him : art and force should be employed by turns, and should be blended together as often as as possible. A Greek general * set fire to a wood which was at the foot of a mountain in the enemy's possession, and which he wanted to go over ; the flames and smoke forced the enemy to abandon it, and leave the passage free for him.

General rules only can be given of the dispositions to be made of troops upon a march ; particular ones would be merely conjectural, because the general of an army must always depend upon circumstances : it is

* V. Onozander.

the situation and nature of the country, the number of troops, the nearness of the enemy, the facility of foraging, and the passes of which the enemy is possessed, that ought to determine him.

In a word, whatever is the order and disposition of the troops, it must be such, that they shall always be able to sustain each other; that the flanks shall be well guarded, and the fronts secured; the roads must have been surveyed and opened; and whatever the nature of the country is, all the columns should arrive at, and enter the camp at the same time.

CHAP. V.

Of Camps in offensive War.

TO take an advantageous position for an army; to make choice of a spot that by its situation is strongly secured; to establish a camp there, and to be also able to have the army within distance of marching easily to the enemy, without fear of being molested; in short, to throw such difficulties in the enemy's way as may prevent his harrassing the army, is one of the most essential branches of knowledge for a general. He who is endowed with this talent can, with an inferior army, not only make head against, but also cause his enemy's designs to miscarry; fatigue him the whole campaign by marches and countermarches, which lead to nothing; oblige him to remain inactive, and at length draw him into a favourable position, where he will be morally sure of beating him, as was done by M. Turenne in 1675; who, after having exhausted every expedient wherewith his military knowledge could furnish him, to draw M. de Montécuculli into a disadvantageous post, at length succeeded, found an opportunity of attacking him, and gloriously fell at the instant victory declared itself in his favour.

War

War is carried on either offensively or defensively : as they each require different management, it would be improper to confound them together in the same chapter ; therefore the camps relative to the former shall be now treated of, then those necessary to be taken in the latter, as well as the occasions where it is proper for them to be intrenched. These two kinds of war shall be supposed to be carried on sometimes in a plain, sometimes in a woody and mountainous country. Let an army be now supposed in the field with a design of making conquests ; whether by attacking the enemy's army, or by advancing into his country, by forcing him to retire, or by attacking some of his towns.

Before a general takes the field, he ought to be very certain what number of troops he shall have, that his magazines both of war and provision are ready, as well as the waggons, pontons, and all other implements whatever that are necessary for an army ; for events may happen that it is almost impossible to foresee, and which often alter the best concerted designs. There have been instances of generals who, having taken the field with an intention of acting offensively, have been obliged to change their plan to the defensive, because the magazines which they had ordered, have, through the negligence of those intrusted with the care of them, not been collected ; or because the army has been weakened by detachments necessarily sent from it, either to the assistance of allies, or to some towns threatened by the enemy : by such kind of accidents the plan of a campaign is entirely destroyed.

But let it be supposed that the general has the troops necessary for acting on the offensive, or that the events of the foregoing campaigns force the enemy to keep on the defensive ; that the heavy artillery, the field-pieces, and the carriages of all sorts are ready to march ; that the magazines are filled, the roads free and safe, the pontons and the boats got together, either for the passing of the troops, or the transporting the
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provision, in case the country should be divided by rivers; then a general possessed of the necessary talents, can foresee the event even before taking the field: he will know beforehand the marches he is to make, the camps he is to occupy, and those which the enemy will endeavour to seize, in order to oppose his designs.

An offensive war is undoubtedly carried on with greater ease in an open, than in a mountainous country. In plains an army acts openly, forage is in greater abundance, the provisions can be conveniently transported from one place to another, and the marches are performed with more ease. Among mountains he who is best acquainted with the country, who has a head fraught with expedients, and is the most vigilant, hath often the advantage, although inferior in numbers; at least he maintains himself in, and preserves the posts of which he is in possession with greater ease; and an attention to seize such advantages as the ground offers will at least put a general upon an equality with his adversary.

But whether in an open or in a mountainous country, and however superior the army be to the enemy's, the least negligence in the choice of situation may render the superiority of troops useless and even hurtful; useless, if from a desire of taking up too much ground, the army is so divided that the enemy may fall either upon the right or left without a possibility of its receiving succour; hurtful, if from a desire of assembling the army in too narrow a spot, the troops too close together are unable to act without embarrassment to each other. This superiority should not cause a general to be neglectful of the safety of his troops in their camp; he should always be assiduous in preserving the strictest order and discipline among them; one or two checks are generally sufficient to discourage the soldier, and take away that confidence which he ought to have in his general: the advanced posts should be well guarded, the flanks secured, and detachments frequently sent out towards the enemy;

my ; for as success is insured by vigilance and care, so negligence and slack discipline are ruin to the most formidable army ; and entertaining a contemptible opinion of an enemy renders him more daring *.

Whatever situation the army is in, it always ought to avoid presenting a flank to the enemy, and should also use every endeavour to take a camp in a situation that is naturally strong ; the wings should be sheltered, and every part both before and behind should be covered by detachments : but whatever the nature of the country is, an army should never fix upon a camp where there is not wood, water, and forage within reach.

It is to be observed that a camp ought never to be fixed on the banks of rivers ; but a sufficient space should always be left between them and the camp, to draw out the army in order of battle. If this precaution is not taken, it may happen that the enemy, encamped either near to, or at a distance from the other side of the river, being informed of the position of the army, will come in the night to alarm the camp, and, by a discharge of artillery and small arms, throw the whole camp into confusion, without risking the loss of a single man : but again, by encamping an army upon the banks of rivers, how will there be a possibility of drawing it out in order of battle, or posting advanced guards ? For these reasons, a camp should always be placed at least eight or ten hundred yards from a river ; so that the guards may be advanced without being exposed, and within the circumference of the camp, and compass of the guards, the army may be supplied with forage for at least four days, and more if possible.

There are some situations for a camp which are in appearance strong, but may notwithstanding prove very dangerous, if care be not taken to examine whether or not the army can with ease come out of it, to form itself in

* Nil tutò in hoste despicitur, quem spreveris valentiorẽ negligentia facies. QUINT. CURT. lib. 6. ch. 3.

order of battle; or whether the enemy can prevent it, by blocking up the avenues and outlets. If this precaution be not taken, an army may be the means of shutting itself up, as was done at Seneff in 1674, and by the allies at Aschaffembourg in 1743.

If the war is carried on in a woody country, the same precautions must be used for the security of the camp; but the dispositions must be changed according to the nature of the country: there is scarcely any country so entirely woody but has some plains in it. The choice and strength of a camp depend on the position of the enemy and situation of the country: a general should always avoid encamping the cavalry in a wood, and should be particularly careful that the wings are sheltered; the woods should be occupied by the infantry, and intrenchments thrown up in front, according to the designs intended to be put in execution. If the wings are sheltered by a village, it should be intrenched and infantry posted in it; and the camp should be covered by a river as much as possible, unless the intention is to march towards the enemy; then all the obstacles that can prevent the army coming up with him should be avoided: but if from some successes of the enemy, or from his superiority of troops, the general cannot determine upon opening the campaign offensively, he must use other means to bring it about; and in the mean time should strengthen himself in his camp, establish posts on the banks of the river, and cover them by continual detachments of light horse, who, by extending themselves, will prevent parties of the enemy from passing to seize on the hind parts of the camp, molest the convoys, and attack the foragers. If there are woods at a small distance from the camp, posts of infantry must be established in them. Guards of cavalry are never advantageously posted but in a plain; but if there should be any space between two woods where cavalry can act, and from whence it can take surveys at a great distance, a guard of cavalry should be placed there; but

but posts of infantry should be placed in the woods to protect it, and to which it may retire in case it is attacked.

Whatever may be the nature of the country, it is often necessary to have corps detached from the body of the army, to cover or keep open a communication with some place, in order to prevent the enemy from foraging too near the camp; to preserve the forage; to raise contributions at a distance; to occupy some advantageous post; to oblige the enemy to divide his forces in order to oppose that body; to cover the camp either in the front or on the flanks, according to that side which is left most unguarded and exposed; in a word, there should always be continual detachments toward the enemy, as hath been the practice of many generals, and of marshal Saxe in the late war. The strength of this body is to be proportioned to the use designed for it by the general; but it is usually composed of light horse, some regiments of light infantry, and a brigade or two of dragoons. In the end will be seen what use should be made of this body; but in whatever situation it is to be placed, the communication between it and the army must always be kept open, that it may always be able to join it on the first order, and its camp must be so chosen, that the general may always receive intelligence from it of the least movements made by the enemy. See PLATE THE SEVENTH.

If the war is carried on in a mountainous country, there are generally some small plains or valleys, where an army may be encamped, if not altogether, at least some part of it: besides, in these sort of countries a general is almost always obliged to separate his troops; to send out many detachments in order to guard the passes and communications between each other; to endeavour to out-flank the enemy, or for such like dispositions; so that the army not being all together, it must be discerned where to fix the most considerable body.

A general who carries on war in a mountainous country, and who by the superiority of his army is enabled to act offensively, ought to endeavour by the positions which he takes to surround the enemy; to render his foraging difficult; to harass him by continual small detachments, which the enemy will be forced to oppose by others more considerable: he should endeavour to steal a march of him; and although a general should never expect success from the enemy's negligence, there have nevertheless been seen instances, where armies by activity and dispatch have gained a march or two on their enemies, although commanded by able generals.

If the enemy's vigilance prevents the general from succeeding, he must employ new stratagems, and never give up his point; he should try all those which lead to the same end, although by different channels; either attacking some detached posts oblige the enemy to send succours to it, and by that means weakening other places which he should endeavour to force; or decamping, and feigning to penetrate on some other side, to oblige the enemy to abandon a camp that is advantageously posted, and by that means to draw him into some post that is weaker either from situation, or from the extent of country he is obliged to defend; and by this method find an opportunity of attacking him with advantage.

In short in whatever country and on whatever occasion, a camp is always defective if the wings are not sheltered, or are to be easily distressed by the enemy; if the front is not guarded and the rear well covered; if the communications with the frontier towns are not secure and easy; if there is any want of forage, wood, and water; and if there are not detachments in front, to prevent the enemy from approaching the camp.

A general who joins experience and study together ought to see into the intention of the enemy's general, and judge of his designs by any of his proceedings, however trifling.

All those who are destined to the command of armies cannot be endowed with this quick and exact eye, that ready power of judging of a good motion or a good position upon the spot. Some generals have excelled in marches; others in the position of camps; these in the arrangement of troops in order of battle; those in their conduct in time of action; others in providing subsistence; others in projecting a campaign. There have nevertheless been some of these great men, whose genius and temper have united and carried these qualifications to the greatest degree of perfection; but the rarer these examples are, the more a man ought, by continual study, to endeavour to augment their number, and strive to merit the honour of being enrolled among those heroes, the ornament of mankind, their country's support, and their master's glory.

C H A P. VI.

Of Camps in defensive War.

IT is in general more difficult to carry on a defensive war, but more particularly so in an open than in a mountainous country. In the former there is nothing to conceal the movements and dispositions of the army from the enemy, whereas in the latter the nature of the places prevents the enemy from discovering them: but whatever may be the nature of the country, the choice of a camp when on the defensive, and the art of pitching upon an advantageous situation, is what proves the genius and talents of a great officer. Exclusive of a thorough knowledge of the country, this operation requires a quick and penetrating eye in a general to enable him to seize the posts, which from their situation may prevent the enemy either from attacking him, or penetrating into the country. It is not difficult for a general to stop an enemy by his courage,

when of equal force: it is still easier to prescribe bounds to him when he hath the advantage over him in number; but a general, under the necessity of receiving them, must seek for such expedients from his own talents and understanding as may serve to balance the enemy's superiority, or make himself equal to him in strength.

A general who acts on the offensive takes what state or circumstances he pleases: he may act as he chooses, and is not under a necessity of regulating himself entirely by the enemy's motions; whereas a general that is not sufficiently strong to attack is generally obliged to continue quiet till the enemy hath acted, and then to regulate his motions according to those made by the opposite army, unless his superior abilities give him a particular advantage over the enemy's general.

Although it is always necessary for a general to have a thorough knowledge of the country, this knowledge will yet become more necessary to him when acting on the defensive. He ought to prevent the enemy's entering his country and forming any siege there (a plan which he cannot execute, unless he is possessed of the most advantageous posts, and also of those which cover the towns liable to be threatened) by proper dispositions that secure his camp; by covering his fronts and rears, and keeping the communication between the camp and the places where the magazines are; by endeavouring to annoy the enemy in his convoys and foragings; by harassing him in his camp, and perplexing him with small detachments, to which the enemy will be obliged to oppose more considerable ones: these dispositions properly managed may destroy any enterprizes the enemy may have formed against the army.

By the enemy's superiority, the nature of the country, and the success of campaigns, the general should determine whether or not his camp should be entrenched; the intrenching of camps requires much observation. It is easy, says Vegetius, to entrench a camp while at a distance from the enemy;

enemy; but it becomes a very difficult operation when the enemy is near at hand. The Romans, according to him, used to keep all their cavalry and half their infantry drawn up in order of battle, in order to cover those troops that were employed in working at the intrenchments. Cæsar when in Spain fortified himself after this manner under the very eyes of Afranius and Petreius, without their having the least knowledge of it.

Before a general fortifies a camp in a plain, he must observe the position in which the ground will permit him to form his camp; whether or no it will be liable to be surrounded; if it will entirely cover the country it is to protect, and the towns for which there is most reason to be apprehensive; if the parts in the rear are open; if forage is in plenty; if provisions can easily be brought; if there is wood and water; if it is impossible for the enemy to enter the country without forcing the camp; if all these circumstances concur, it is certainly most advantageous to entrench the camp.

A general should never be too secure by having a superiority of numbers; he ought not on that account to neglect fortifying his camp: even when he acts on the offensive, these entrenchments will not hinder him from marching out to the enemy whenever he judges it proper, and his army will by that means be sheltered from the enemy's attempts.

Cæsar*, whose good luck was equal to his intrepidity, after having ranged over all the territory of Beauvais, like a conqueror certain of victory; being distressed for forage, was consequently obliged to weaken his army, in order to encrease the detachments which he sent out to forage; he therefore first took the precaution of surrounding his camp with all necessary fortifications.

If a general is fearful of fatiguing his troops, or weakening his army by employing part of it at these works, he must, for that purpose, make

* Cæsar's Commentaries.

use of all those who follow the army : they will work equally the same as the soldiers, for nothing will render men so industrious and laborious as the common danger to which they are all exposed. As formerly at the siege of Carthage the women, the children, and the old men, all worked, and their united labours retarded, at least for some time, the taking of that city ; Cæsar, that he might not fatigue his troops, employed only peasants to entrench his camps.

There are many methods of intrenching a camp by lines beginning on the right, and covering the whole front of the camp to the left : these lines, in their extent, have redoubts and angles at proper distances ; and the line being continued from one to the other, forms the curtains. In the front of them there is a large and also deep ditch ; sometimes a covered way is added, which is pallisadoed and stoccaded throughout the whole front of the lines. To render them yet stronger and more difficult to be forced, there are pits sunk before the covered way. These pits are ranged chequer-wise, about six feet deep and five broad, and are in form like a reversed cone. Such were the lines which the duke of Berwick caused to be made in 1734, to the lines of circumvallation before Philipsburgh ; only with this difference, there was no covered way. Without doubt these lines are formidable, and even very difficult to attack, but a great deal of time is required for constructing them ; and if there is not a sufficient number of peasants in the army to work at them, troops must be employed to expedite them, which will not only greatly fatigue them, but may also cost the lives of many ; because removing of earth often causes great disorders, particularly where the ground is swampy or clayey. Besides the time which these lines take in raising, they are generally defective ; and there are but few instances of their being attacked without being forced ; and if the enemy penetrates at any one part, the troops which guard them are obliged to retire to avoid being attacked in front and flank.

The method practised by marshal Saxe seems much superior to these lines. It contained as large an extent of ground, without diminishing the labour; because, instead of lines, it consisted of redoubts which require as much work to form the four faces and the covered way, as lines always continued. At the siege of Maestricht in 1748, he used these redoubts instead of lines; their distance from each other was forty-eight yards; they were stoccaded, and the covered way pallisadoed. These redoubts presented an angle to the field, and, consequently, were a mutual protection to each other: they were each of them capable of containing a battalion.

His design was, supposing the enemy was come to attack the army, to cause all these redoubts to be occupied; to plant ten pieces of cannon between each, and to draw the army up in order of battle behind them: by this means the enemy would be obliged to force the redoubts, before they could attack the army, which could not be done without great loss. But supposing the redoubts to be forced, how would the enemy be able to enter the intervals without dividing? The army behind in order of battle would charge him without giving him time to recover himself, and it is highly probable would beat him.

By following this method of intrenching a camp, if some of the enemy's battalions should, for example, force three or four redoubts, they certainly will not dare to advance as long as the remainder hold out; so that a general might, by detaching some brigades, and causing them to march to the assistance of the battalions that have been forced, retake the redoubts; or, without disordering the order of battle, may drive away the troops which are in possession of them with his cannon. In short, this method seems to be excellent, because it proves, that all the redoubts may be forced, and yet the army not be beaten, because it has not suffered in the action, but remained the whole time in order of battle with

with all its cannon ; so that the enemy will be reduced to the necessity of beginning a second battle. Lines, on the contrary, have not the same advantage ; all the troops, or the greatest part of them must *line* them ; the cannon is planted at proper distances, either on the angles of the redans, or those of the redoubts. If one part only is forced, the army is beat, and the cannon taken, because the enemy makes the attack with his whole front ; and the front of the army being busied and taken up, the troops which have entered, seize on the flanks of the lines, and consequently the army is surrounded, unless it immediately retires.

Lines are never good, unless when there is a large extent of country to be guarded, and some frontier to be covered from the incursions of the enemy : the front of an intrenched camp seldom exceeds six miles, more or less, whereas lines to cover a country, have sometimes extended thirty miles in front. By some it is thought that, in order to cover a country, it is sufficient to have certain holds, which shall be strong and well intrenched, with patrols continually going from one end of the posts to the other, and each post to be provided with signals both for day and night. It is unnecessary that these patrols should be strong, provided they follow, and are continually crossing each other ; this will be sufficient to prevent the enemy passing undiscovered. It is certain that the enemy will not dare to pass between these posts, whether he be strong or weak ; if he pass in a body, he will be cut off behind, and his convoys intercepted ; if he pass only in parties, they will be cut off with the greater ease. However, lines of this nature would require much labour, and also take up years to complete them.

The lines of Stolhoffen * are a proof that, however well fortified lines may be, they are not impregnable. The prince of Baden had employed a considerable time in the construction of them, had neglected nothing

* Mem. du Marechal du Villars. Tom. 2.

to render them formidable, and they were deemed impossible to be taken: nevertheless, M. Villars forced them in 1704, without the loss of a man. There are many instances of lines, which, encompassing a large extent of country, have been forced: those of Flanders guarded by the French were forced by the duke of Marlborough in 1705, and many others which are needless to mention.

Marshal Saxe's method for intrenching a camp in a woody country interspersed with small plains seems also to be a very good one: the redoubts are to be erected in the plain; and lines thrown up in the woods according to the usual method, with redans placed on the side of each other, at twenty-four toises distance; there should be a pallisadoed ditch in the front, and the lines as well as the half-moons should be fringed with pointed stakes: behind these lines, which cannot be very extensive, because they only cover part of the front of the camp, must be placed the troops necessary for defending them; a considerable intrenchment of felled trees must be made behind with the branches of the trees entangled with each other, and some openings must be left wide enough to permit the troops who guard the lines to pass through, in case they should be overpowered and obliged to retire; the cannon must be planted in the face of these openings, and the remainder of the army must be drawn up in order of battle, an hundred paces at most behind the intrenchments of trees and the half-moons. The retrenchments of trees are placed about sixty or eighty paces behind the lines, and not before them; because it will be a new and unexpected obstacle to the enemy. These retrenchments carefully made, and with large trees, can be destroyed by cannon only, which would take up a considerable time: if they were in the front of the lines, there would certainly be a rampart more, but that might be useless and perhaps hurtful, because the fire of the enemy to make a passage, would drive the splinters of the trees into

the lines, which would do more harm than even the shot itself. See the EIGHTH PLATE.

In a mountainous country the dispositions for intrenchments are different: it is impossible there to find plains sufficiently large to draw up an army in order of battle, and place it behind redoubts, as in an open country; the avenues and the passes only can be entrenched; the redoubts would not be sufficient, because the avenues not only must be guarded, but the heights also occupied. Now, as it will often happen among mountains that there is not a foot of earth, how then can redoubts be erected there? A general must then make use of such assistance as the country can furnish him with, whether by heaping stones upon each other, or by retrenchments of trees well joined; and thus construct lines sufficiently strong to shelter the soldier from fire and all injury. In an open country a general in a manner suits the ground to his dispositions; in a mountainous country he must apply his dispositions to the ground; but in any country whatever, he must use all the assistance of art for entrenching of camps. In mountainous countries there are more inequalities of ground, which render the enemy's approach to the lines difficult; and although it is almost impossible for a camp in a mountainous country to be attacked in front, nothing should be neglected for its safety; but all the avenues, by which it may be surrounded, must be entrenched with care, and all the heights which overlook it secured; because the enemy, without intending to attack in front, will amuse him during the time necessary for troops to take a long round, in order to penetrate to the camp on another side. If Leonidas*, with his eight thousand Greeks, had been possessed of all the avenues, ways, and heights, by which he could be cut off, in the same manner as he was of the pass of Thermopylæ, Xerxes with his innumerable army could never

* Diodorus Siculus, Book 17. Ch. 4.

have forced him in the defiles which he guarded. The three actions of Fribourg are memorable examples of the necessity of securing all parts in the rear, and of occupying the posts by which they can be turned. M. de Mercy, attacked by two generals of the highest reputation, the great Condé and the viscount de Turenne, took such good positions in these three attacks, that, although forced to retire and followed from post to post, he could never be turned, but made his retreat quietly through the valley of St. Peter, without the French army's ever being able to break in upon him.

The intrenchment should never be more than two hundred and fifty to three hundred toises, which make from five to six hundred paces, distant from the camp, and which ought to be divided into three parts: this distance should be made, that the troops may be able to judge of the parts that can be carried with greatest ease, and of those which are most in need of assistance, that they may march there with greater order, dispatch, and facility: whereas if this distance is not observed, it will happen, as hath been sometimes seen, that the troops not having ground sufficient to range themselves in order of battle, the dispositions will be impeded by confusion and disorder, and the enemy will have forced the lines before the troops can be in a condition of opposing him.

But in a mountainous country, it is not sufficient for a general that he cannot be turned; that he hath profited so well by the advantages of ground as to render the enemy's approach to the camp difficult; that the assistance of art hath been joined to nature, and that the country to be guarded is entirely covered; he must also be careful that the communication with the neighbouring towns where the magazines of war and provision are established, is safe and easy: if any one of these particulars is neglected, the camp is exposed, neither can the general continue in it the time that would be necessary to retard the march and designs of the enemy.

As it hath been already observed, that there is scarcely any post that is not liable to be turned or overlooked, the camp should be intrenched only so far as the intrenchments may become an obstacle to the enemy, and as they may be a means of giving the general time to retire to occupy another post.

When the enemy undertakes the siege of some town, and the general, although with an inferior army, is willing to succour it, or cause the siege of it to be raised, he should seek out a spot naturally strong, and entrench it according to its situation: if an open country, according to the method above mentioned; if among mountains, according to the assistance that the nature of the country may give, and make use of these intrenchments as a sure asylum from whence to make sallies upon the enemy, to attack his forages and his convoys, and to oblige him to raise the siege as well by the fatigues of it, when it hath been drawn out to a greater length of time than was designed by the enemy, as by the want to which he is reduced by the continual inquietudes that the intrenched army hath given him. Metellus * raised the siege of Zama, because at the very time he was preparing to assault the place, he was attacked on all sides by Jugurtha; and the Roman general found himself obliged to abandon the attack of the town, in order to repulse the enemy.

There are also some occasions where camps are intrenched under towns; the circumstances wherein these intrenchments are necessary may be seen in the memoirs of M. de Feuquieres †, who, in relating many examples of these sort of camps, seems to condemn them when too much attention is shewn in fortifying them; because, says he, if the camp is lost, the town must follow. This reflection of M. de Feuquieres supposes the defence of the town to be neglected for the intrenchments, which is not common; but without canvassing this opinion, it may with certainty be advanced, that the best method for defending a place is always to present

* Sallust. Bell. Jugur.

† Mem. de M. de Feuquieres, ch. 4.

fresh obstacles to the enemy, which will fatigue him, occasion the loss of his forces, abate his eagerness, and at length entirely discourage him: besides, the more the enemy is stopped, either by exterior intrenchments or trenches that are pushed on towards him, as was practised at the siege of Prague in 1742, the greater time is there to fortify the place within. Rhodes would still have belonged to its defenders, had they not been betrayed: equally fortified within and without, every intrenchment became an obstacle to the enemy more difficult to be surmounted, as it was defended by soldiers glowing with honour, and zealous for their religion; and every intrenchment to be forced, was the occasion of a fresh battle. Whilst the exterior fortifications kept back the enemy, and breathed nothing but slaughter, and whatever is most terrible in war, the inside of the town remained in tranquility; the general there assembled his council, and struck out fresh lights; the fatigued soldier there found an asylum to recover his strength and spirits, while confusion reigned only amongst the enemy. But as these kind of intrenchments relate rather to sieges than camps, it is foreign to the present purpose to say more of them.

When an army is in an open country, it generally continues in the same camp for some space of time; because it is certain the enemy cannot conceal his designs so effectually from the general, but he may be able to circumvent them; but in a mountainous country it is uncertain whether an army will continue in the same post till morning, that it occupied over-night. A general must then encamp in such a position, and after such a manner, that in case the enemy comes to attack him in force and with advantage, he may be able, without danger, to proceed to another post, and evade the enemy's designs. When Lucius Minutius * commanded the Romans in the war against the Æqui,

* Tit. Liv. Dec. i. Lib. 6.

he, by endeavouring to avoid them, shut himself up in defiles, and had his flanks and rear covered by mountains. The Æqui got possession of the only pass by which he could extricate himself from that difficulty: by this position of the Æqui, his provision and forage were cut off, and he must have laid down his arms without fighting, had not Cincinnatus, who came to his assistance, contrived to get the Æqui between the two armies.

It requires great skill in a general to judge when it is proper or improper to make choice of places which have a great many avenues on one side; because if he should be attacked in a camp enclosed by rocks, or deep in a valley which hath but one or two passes open, it will be very difficult for him to disengage himself from the enemy: on the contrary, if there are many small passes or avenues to the ground of which he is possessed, and by which the enemy may easily invest his camp, it will require a great number of men to guard them. But on these occasions a general should be ever careful to make a good disposition of his troops, to maintain strict order and discipline in his camp, and to send out his patrols with the greatest regularity; by which means he will free himself from all apprehensions of being surpris'd.

There ought to be no difference between a well governed town and a well ordered camp; the exactest order should be observed, and the strictest discipline kept up: if a soldier is at liberty to quit or enter it at pleasure, the enemy's spies will not fail to make their advantages of it. If the camp is unhealthy or distressed for provision, water, wood, or forage, and the soldier hath real cause of complaint, every method should be tried to avoid the danger that will attend his being discouraged. It is often owing to the little order existing in the camp, that the soldiers are seized with a panick, occasioned by the absurd and groundless reports that are diffused throughout it; troops thus terrified, are in a manner vanquished before they come to action.

In a mountainous country, such places should be avoided as are subject to be overflowed, either by the melting of the snow, or by torrents which, at some seasons, appear no more than trifling rivulets, but which, at others, swell and carry off every thing they meet with in their way: of this nature were those mentioned by M. de Feuquieres *, which he found near the rock that he attacked and took in 1690, from the Badouais. Situations in the neighbourhood of woods are generally to be feared, because the enemy may set them on fire, and the flames be communicated to the camp. The general ought also to satisfy himself with regard to the nature of the springs, which may agree very well with the inhabitants, but prove very unwholesome to strangers: such, according to the reports of the French, is the nature of the springs in many parts of Italy. The water belonging to certain streams or rivers will be pernicious, while that belonging to the fountains and wells in the same country will be very wholesome and salutary.

The reader may see in Vegetius, Santa-Cruz, Montécuculi, and Puy-fégur, the kind of order necessary to be observed in a camp, whether intrenched or not: it is impossible to use too many precautions for its security; they depend upon the general's ability, and upon the discipline he causes to be observed.

* Mem. de Feuquieres, Ch. 84.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Method of escorting Convoys.

THE conducting of convoys is one of the most important and most difficult of all military operations. In the escort assigned them, and the number of horse and foot of which this escort is composed, the general ought to be guided by the distance of the town from whence they set out; the dangers to which they are exposed from the different parties they may meet; the distance and strength of the enemy; and the extent and nature of the country they have to travel over, whether an open or a mountainous one; the number of waggons, and the quality of the convoys, whether they consist of money, or ammunition for war or provision; and whether they are extraordinary or daily. When escorts are too numerous, the troops are fatigued, and no end answered; and when they are too weak, they are liable to be beaten. M. de Puyféguir observes, that it is as dangerous to give an escort of two thousand men to a convoy where only a thousand are requisite, as to give but five hundred to one where a thousand are absolutely necessary; in the first place the troops are unnecessarily fatigued, and in the second the convoy is exposed to the danger of being carried off.

All these considerations suppose the general to be a man whose natural parts are matured by experience, and who is sensible that, without a thorough knowledge of the country, the foundation of all conduct, it will be impossible to make a proper disposition of troops. If a general is ignorant of the places most proper to form ambuscades; of those where there are bridges and fords; of the passes which are most dangerous

gerous, and those which will favour the enemy's approach, in order to attack, and whether in head, flank, or rear, he acts but as chance directs, and his dispositions will have no meaning, either with respect to the situation of places, or the nature of the ground; the orders will be ill executed, the evolutions performed without exactness; and the disposition of the troops will be faulty; the separate bodies being, consequently, unable to sustain and assist each other, will soon be beaten and dispersed, and the convoy carried off.

The general officer commanding the convoy ought, for its security, to distribute his troops after such a manner that they may be a mutual assistance to it. The choice of the troops to form the escort is undetermined, as it is by the nature of the country their quality should be decided. In mountainous and woody countries, only infantry, hussars, or dragoons can be made use of; the hussars or dragoons are to march in the front and on the flanks, to scour the woods, examine the avenues, and make sure of the defiles: in an open country, the escort should be composed of infantry, cavalry, hussars, or dragoons. But whatever may be the nature of the country, the convoy ought never to advance without first sending out detachments to reconnoitre at a distance.

If the convoy marches through a mountainous country, a large body of cavalry would not only be useless, but also an embarrassment, as it would be unable to act, except with great difficulty; whereas in an open country, cavalry is very serviceable. In any kind of country a convoy can be escorted with infantry, especially when the enemy can only act with his; but as in an open country, it is necessary for the infantry to be supported, the cavalry must be used for that purpose; in a mountainous country, infantry can carry on war alone.

In this last case the officer commanding the escort ought to place a body of infantry at the head, another in the center, and a third at the rear-guard; to distribute small bodies at proper distances on the right and left, and he should be particularly careful to possess himself of the heights; the hussars must be distributed to the advanced and rear-guards, and, in order to be more certain that every part hath been strictly examined, as the convoy advances, notwithstanding the hussars of the advanced guard have already scoured the avenues, woods, valleys, villages, and hollows, the hussars belonging to the rear-guard should again look into those places, to see whether any thing hath escaped the notice of the advanced guard: these precautions are never without their use, and do not in the least retard the march of the convoy.

The small detachments should advance as far as possible into the country, without exposing themselves to the danger of being cut off, the hussars with pistol or musquetoon, and the dragoons with their carbine in hand, in order, that if they should meet the enemy, they may by firing give the officer commanding the escort notice of it, so that he may have time to make his dispositions for defending and preserving the convoy. The convoy may continue marching on, till the enemy is discovered; but on the first notice of him, it must stop, and the officers belonging to the convoy should park their waggons; or, if the ground will not admit of that, they should cause them to keep very close together, and double them up with the distance of four paces, which should be filled with infantry, between each waggon. By this movement the length of ground taken up by the waggons will be contracted, the troops will be brought closer together, and will form a stronger and heavier body, capable of assisting each other with more ease.

In a mountainous country it is very seldom, and almost impossible for the enemy to attack the advanced and rear-guards and the center at the same

same time : nevertheless, if he should find an opportunity of forming these three attacks at once, by following the dispositions above mentioned, he will find troops at every part to receive him ; neither will he be able to make himself master of the heights without attacking them, and the troops already in possession of the ground will easily repulse him ; and by the assistance which the officer commanding the escort should endeavour to send them, they will be enabled to maintain themselves in them, to protect the convoy, and the enemy will be unable to attack by more than one or two passes.

If the enemy forms but one attack, only a part of the troops must be opposed to him, because it is to be supposed this attack may be made only with a design to draw the whole strength of the detachment to that part, and which, by being all together in that one place, will give the enemy concealed in ambush an opportunity of falling with ease upon that part of the convoy that is unprovided with troops, and which will of course be incapable of making any defence. The troops of the center should never march to the assistance of the advanced guard, if it is that which is attacked, nor those of the rear-guard to the assistance of the center, but a party from those troops which cover the flanks of the convoy should be collected in a body, and sent to assist the part that is attacked. However narrow and confined the country may be, a convoy may be easily conducted by infantry, when it would be impossible to do it with cavalry.

When any pass or avenue crosses the road on which the convoy marches, it should be covered by a body of infantry, which will remain there till the rear-guard is come up ; then it will fall into the post assigned it for conducting the convoy ; it is always to be supposed, that this pass hath been examined by the advanced detachments. If the escort is composed of infantry and dragons, the latter should be dis-

mounted, in order to give an additional strength to the guards, and their horses may be tied to the waggon; the hussars, if the nature of the country renders them unserviceable on horseback, may also be dismounted; by which means, instead of being an embarrassment to the infantry, they will become useful to it. The nature of hussars is such as will admit of their being employed on every occasion; and although the difference of their arms will not permit them to be as serviceable as dragoons, they may nevertheless amuse a party of troops belonging to the enemy in such a manner as to enable the infantry to beat them, or at least to oblige them to retire.

Hussars are more particularly necessary in the escorting of convoys, because they scamper about on all sides, and are very active and ready in scouring a country thoroughly; they leave no place till they have perfectly examined it, unless the thickness of the woods or any other unavoidable obstacle should prevent their penetrating as far as they would otherwise do; and even then they protect the infantry, who can with greater ease pass into those places where the hussars cannot. Whatever country the convoy passes through, there should always be hussars with it; otherwise the officer commanding the escort cannot be certain that the country is thoroughly surveyed, because for want of hussars he must employ cavalry on that service; not that there can be any doubt of the cavalry's exposing itself to danger with as much cheerfulness and courage as the hussars, but as the horses belonging to the cavalry are naturally heavier than those of the hussars, and often encumbered with forage, they cannot venture to a proper distance, without running the danger of being taken, because they cannot retire with that expedition which is requisite; on the other hand, the hussar being more active and more accustomed to reconnoitre, knows how to go over a country with proper caution and care to himself: besides, the trooper who is used always

ways to march in a body and to be under command, will have a very imperfect idea of the method of scouring a country. Altho' the disposition of the troops should always be regulated by the nature of the country thro' which the convoy marches, and by the nature and number of the enemy by which it is liable to be attacked, yet the general should never neglect, whatever his situation may be, to secure the head, center, and rear: before the convoy begins its march, the disposition in case of an attack should be settled; by which means the commanding officers of different corps will know where to post themselves, and after what manner to act at the time the attack is made. By the knowledge which the commanding officer ought to have of the country, he will form a judgment of those places where it is most probable he may be attacked, and of course make his dispositions accordingly. In any disposition that may happen, a general should always foresee in what manner the attack, defence, and retreat will be conducted.

As there are always some small plains in a woody country, where the dragoons and hussars can act with greater ease, they must be posted in them. If the attack is made in a woody country, the same dispositions must be observed as have been mentioned with regard to a mountainous one, only with this difference, that a more considerable front can be presented to the enemy, and the troops will be more together, as they will not be under a necessity of separating to occupy heights.

When a convoy marches through an open country, the advanced and rear-guards should consist of cavalry sustained by infantry; the infantry in the center should be continued on the right and left of the waggons, and the cavalry divided into troops should be distributed on the flanks, at an hundred or an hundred and fifty paces from the infantry; squadrons of horse, intermixed with platoons of infantry, should be placed at proper distances on the flanks of the remaining part of the convoy.

By

By this position, if the convoy should be attacked in head, center, or rear, these squadrons and platoons should have orders to march immediately to the assistance of the part that is attacked. See the NINTH PLATE. FIG. I.

The advanced detachments of hussars, and those upon the flanks, by giving notice that the enemy is at hand and coming to attack, will furnish time for parking the waggons and uniting the troops; in which case the infantry must form in the park, and the cavalry post itself on the flank of that front which expects to be attacked, and the hussars place themselves upon the flanks of the cavalry.

The attack of a convoy is always sudden and rapid, and the success of it is generally decided in the first onset; and as the enemy, whether he succeeds in his attempt or not, must retire with great expedition, for fear of any succour that may arrive, it is evident that it can be attacked only by cavalry, hussars, or dragoons; there have indeed been some instances where the cavalry have brought infantry behind them. If the convoy has had time to park itself, the effort of the infantry can only be turned against that which is intrenched behind the waggons. The enemy's cavalry and that belonging to the escort attacking each other, will fight upon equal terms; but with regard to the infantry, it will be different; that which is sheltered by the carriages having a great advantage over that which attacks it. On the contrary, if the enemy's infantry is sustained by hussars only, they will be briskly attacked by the cavalry and hussars belonging to the escort, who will take them in flank and rear. The enemy's hussars being hemmed in, his infantry, for want of being sustained, will be easily beaten: part of the cavalry and hussars belonging to the escort, should be left in pursuit of the enemy's hussars, and the remainder ought to take his infantry in flank. If the enemy is beaten, as it is probable he will, his retreat seems

seems impracticable; or at best very difficult; because, being deprived of his cavalry, he will be forced to make head against the infantry that attacks him in front, and to repulse the cavalry that harrasses him in flank. See the NINTH PLATE. FIG. II.

If the convoy, in an open country, is obliged to march upon a causeway, these precautions will still become more necessary: the hussars which are advanced, ought to examine the country very exactly; for it may happen that the country not allowing the carriages to be taken off the causeway, in order to be parked, they must consequently be obliged to remain upon it; in which case they can only be doubled up, the extent of ground contracted, and the troops drawn nearer to each other in such a manner as to become stronger, and more closely knit together. The dispositions will then, in a great measure, depend upon circumstances; but they should nevertheless be so managed, that each corps may mutually contribute to the preservation of the convoy; and that from the resistance which the enemy shall find in every part, there may be time sufficient to send succour where it shall be most needed.

If the enemy gives ground, the general should be cautious of pursuing him too far, lest, if he should receive a reinforcement, the troops in pursuit of him, finding themselves at too great a distance, will not only be beat, but also be deprived of every method of retreating.

There are some occasions on which the enemy must not be pursued at all; such as when the armies are very close to each other, or the convoy draws near to some of the enemy's posts; because then, by the nearness of the army, the enemy's infantry can come to the attack without being under the necessity of mounting behind the cavalry, as it happened in 1747; when the French convoys which set out from Antwerp for Bergen-op-Zoom, were continually attacked by the infantry that was posted from Breda quite to Voude: in which circumstances the same dispositions should.

should be used for its defence; and in case the enemy should be forced to retire, the commanding officer ought to be contented with having saved the convoy, and not pursue him, for fear he should find advantage from the nearness of the quarters, and receive assistance that may prove fatal both to the convoy and its escort. A general to whose care a convoy is intrusted, should never seek any other advantage than the conducting it in safety, even though he should be sure of beating and taking a detachment belonging to the enemy; a real advantage is often given up by endeavouring to follow an uncertain victory. There is less shame in being beat, when an officer hath done his utmost, and acted with propriety, than there is glory acquired in conquering, when he hath exceeded the limits of his duty. An officer is no longer praise-worthy, than whilst he acts up to the orders he hath received with exactness and discretion; whereas he who, depending too much on his own courage, rashly suffers himself to be drawn on by the appearance of success, is not only charged with, but ought to be answerable for the consequences.

If the convoy hath a bridge or a defile to pass, it is not only sufficient that the country, as far as the bridge or the defile, should be known, but also necessary that the hussars should pass over it, and take a survey of the country a great way beyond it. The time in which the hussars are reconnoitring, should be employed in making the waggons double up by four, eight, or ten in front, if the ground allows of it, in order to unite the troops belonging to the escort. The troops in the center must join the advanced guard, and cover the carriages; the rear-guard form in order of battle, and face toward the country they have marched over; and the squadrons and platoons of infantry which marched on the side of the convoy, place themselves on the flanks, in order to cover them. When the country in front shall have been thoroughly examined, the advanced guard and the troops belonging
to

to the center, covered by hussars, shall pass over the bridge, and advance far enough on the other side to give room for the carriages, either to double up or to be parked. The corps of cavalry and infantry which marched on the sides of the convoy must be placed on the flanks to protect them. As soon as the convoy and the escort have passed, the wag-gons must proceed, and the troops fall into the same disposition they were in before the passage; that is, if there is no alteration in the nature of the ground to make another disposition necessary: in that case the commanding officer must give such orders as he shall find necessary. For the greater security of the convoy, a detachment of hussars should be left near the bridge, or the opening of the defile, till the rear-guard hath marched to some distance, which detachment will afterwards join the escort. See PLATE THE NINTH, FIG. III.

There still remains another disposition to be made in an open country, whether the convoy marches on a causeway, or in the high road, which is to divide the escort into many equal parts, with troops of every sort belonging to each; the first body should set out an hour before the convoy is to begin its march, the second half an hour after, with orders to the commanding officers to scour the adjacent country with great exactness, and to be careful not to be cut off by any detachments the enemy may have in the country; for which reason these two bodies should never be more than three quarters of a league distant from each other, by which means they will be within reach of assisting each other. The body which sets out last should never be more than half a league before the advanced-guard of the escort.

As the convoy is supposed to march through an open country, the above mentioned distances are allotted between the first and second bodies, and between the second body and the advanced guard of the convoy; but if the country should grow rough and unequal, these bodies should draw

closer together, and always keep sight of each other, so as to be able to assist one another in case of an attack.

When these bodies are set out, the general must put the convoy in motion, and form the advanced guard of one of the divided detachments belonging to the escort; the infantry of which detachment will remain at the head of the waggons, the cavalry shall march by troops three hundred paces in advance, and the rear-guard must be formed equal to the advanced; but besides this rear-guard, there should be a body of hussars and dragoons reserved, to march a quarter of a league or more, according to the nature of the country, in the rear of the convoy; the remainder of the infantry shall be distributed at proper distances on the sides of the convoy, and the remainder of the cavalry shall be placed on the flanks of the convoy about three hundred paces distance.

The commanding officer should take care to keep some hussars with him, to scour the country round about the cavalry that are on the flanks and the rear-guard; and thus by running over the country again, that hath already been examined by the advanced detachments, the commanding officer will be certain there is no enemy at hand.

There have been often instances of a swarm of hussars falling upon the rear-guard from woods, which have been reconnoitred, and where no enemy hath been found, and where they themselves were not half an hour before.

When a convoy happens to be of such importance that its being taken may influence the operations during the remainder of the campaign, the general should not only assign a stronger or more numerous escort to it, but he should also send off detachments, which, without having order to attack the enemy, should keep between him and the road that the convoy keeps, in order to oppose and baffle any designs the enemy may have formed to carry it off. The two examples with which the last war furnishes us with will shew both the security and necessity of this method.

During the campaign of 1746, marshal Saxe, being encamped on the Orne, was in expectation of a considerable convoy from Judoigne. As its safe arrival in the camp was of great consequence, he caused the marquis d'Armentieres, then major-general, to set out with a large detachment, in the night preceding the day on which the convoy was to begin its march, with orders to march on the side of Ramillies. At the same time he caused another detachment to set out from the camp of his serene highness the prince of Clermont, with orders to march on the side of the abbey of Ramé: these two detachments, by amusing the enemy on one side, and by entirely concealing the march of the convoy on the other, enabled it to proceed in security, and it arrived in the camp without having been at all molested.

In the beginning of the campaign in 1748, the same general having a design to lay siege to Maestricht, and consequently having occasion for all his troops, was willing to throw a supply of provisions into Bergen-op-Zoom, as he was going to a distance from that place, and could no longer be in a situation of assisting it. For that purpose, he ordered a considerable convoy, which set out from Antwerp for that town under a good escort; but, in order to prevent an attack, which circumstance had often happened during the winter, and that with loss, the allies at that time occupying a chain of quarters from Breda as far as Voude, he detached the count d'Estrées with a considerable body of cavalry to march on the side of Breda, with orders to push on detachments almost to Voude. This detachment had two objects in view, one of which was to keep the allies in suspense with regard to the siege that was to be formed, and the other to cause them to remain near Breda. This large body of cavalry kept the allies, who were in the neighbourhood of that town in suspense; during which interval, marshal Saxe marched to Maestricht, the allies not daring to attack the convoy, because they would have put themselves

between the escort and the troops under count D'Estrees. From these two examples may be concluded the necessity of covering convoys of importance by detachments independent of the escort assigned them. In short, a general should do every thing that will contribute to the security of his dispositions; and precautions ought never to be thought superfluous when they are managed with prudence, and have for their end the success of a well-concerted plan.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Detachments for forming a Chain of green Forage.

THOSE operations whose object is the subsistence of the troops require the exactest precautions; for famine, as Vegetius says, proves often times more destructive to armies than battles, hunger being more fatal than the sword. A general can defend himself against an enemy, however superior; but when forage and provision are wanting, there can be no hope remaining.

It is very difficult to provide a large army with forage; and a general often exposes it to inevitable danger, if he is not thoroughly experienced in this operation, or if he is destitute of that knowledge which at once presents all the wants of an army, and the means of supplying them, to his view.

Foraging parties, like convoys, are attended with a greater or lesser degree of danger, according as the country is more or less accessible, and the forage at a distance or near at hand. The disposition for the chain in an open country is different to what it must be in a mountainous one: when forage is within reach of the camp, and the enemy at a distance, fewer troops and attendants are required, because, in case of an attack,
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there is assistance near at hand ; but in proportion as the forage is farther from the camp and nearer to the enemy, the precautions should be encreased, and more troops should be allotted to the chain, which should also sometimes be furnished with cannon.

A general should never forget that maxim which says, The enemy must always be opposed by troops of the same nature as those with which he makes the attack ; if the forage therefore is in an open country, the chain, as it is certain the enemy will be more numerous in cavalry than infantry, should consist chiefly of cavalry, and only have infantry sufficient to occupy such posts as are necessary to be guarded : in a mountainous country the dispositions will be quite different ; because, as it is impossible for cavalry to move easily, the chain should be strongest in infantry. In short, the number and quality of the troops for the chain should be regulated in the same manner as in regard to the convoys ; in proportion to the nearness or distance of the enemy ; by the extent of ground to be foraged ; and by the nature of the country : and as marshal Puysegur observes, before the ground to be foraged is examined, there should be a calculation made of the number of horses to be fed, and of the fertility of the ground that is to be foraged ; for if it is a plentiful spot, a less extent will be sufficient ; if it is not plentiful, a larger must be taken ; but in either case the chain must be always proportionable.

Before a forage is undertaken, the ground on which it is to be performed should be always thoroughly known, in order for which the general should send out in the evening or the day before, the officer who is to command it, with a detachment to survey the situation of the country ; the places where he must post his troops of cavalry and dragoons ; the posts which the infantry must occupy ; the ground necessary for the foragers ; that where the corps of reserve must be posted ; and what part in the front of the chain it will be necessary for the hussars to scour.

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After having examined all these particulars, the officer makes his report to the general, who, from the account given him, will order the troops necessary to secure the forage, and render the execution of it easy. The chain of forage should be in proportion to the number of troops that are to forage, as well as to the quantity of sown fields and the thickness of the grain. Besides the horse, dragoons, and infantry, there should be hussars to scour the country in the front of the chain: the number of them is undetermined, as it will be sufficient for them to cover and protect the front, and give the commanding officer immediate notice of every thing that makes its appearance.

If the forage is to be made at a distance from the camp, the troops destined for the chain should set out at day-break, or the evening of the foregoing night, as was done by marshal de Coigny in the campaign of 1735. This general being desirous of foraging under the cannon of Mentz, the troops taken from the army to form the chain, one body under the command of the count de Belleisle, now a marshal of France, and the other under the command of the marquis de Dreux, set out after retreat-beating, and at break of day the chain found itself properly placed. When the distance is not so great, it is sufficient that the troops set out at day-break, and the general will have time enough to establish his chain; especially as the ground and the posts necessary to be occupied, have been surveyed two days before. The commanding officer must take care to establish the chain before the foragers arrive, and also that the hussars have scoured the country; first, because the foragers should not, by waiting, fatigue the horses, and secondly, that no trooper or servant shall pass; which will undoubtedly be the case, if there is any vacancy where troops are not placed.

The whole of the troops should be disposed after such a manner, as to be able to see one another; and the vedets also that are placed between
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the troops, to prevent the foragers from passing, should be within hearing. The infantry should be posted in hollows and villages, and behind hedges, with horse or dragoons to sustain it, and support the flanks; and the disposition of the chain will be still better, if these troops can be mixed with it, provided the infantry can be sheltered by any hollows, hedges, or bushes.

Grenadiers sustained by horse and cannon, if there are any, should be posted on those sides which, either from the situation of the country, or the nearness of the enemy, are most liable to be attacked; but in reinforcing these posts, the commanding officer must be careful not to weaken the chain too much in any particular part. When an enemy attacks a foraging party, he generally attempts to penetrate at different parts; but if he forms only one attack, the disposition of the chain becomes useless, as all the troops must be brought to that part where the attack is made. But as it is naturally to be supposed the enemy will form many attacks, particularly if his general acts like a man understanding his business, he must be strong in every part: the reserve, which is in the center, will, with expedition and speed, send assistance to the parts which are attacked.

Before the commanding officer fixes the chain, he should detach some hussars to survey and scour, with great exactness, the woods, villages, hollows, and all such places, for at least three quarters of a league or a league in front, as may be capable of containing ambuscades: and during the time of this surveying, the troops destined for the chain will remain in order of battle, in the front of the ground that is to be foraged, in order to cover it and protect the hussars, in case they should be attacked.

When this examination is finished, the commanding officer may begin to establish his chain, and the hussars will remain in the front till the foraging is finished; and will detach small bodies to march round
about

about the chain crossing each other, halting at times, and sending some hussars before them to patrol.

If the hussars gain intelligence of the enemy's being either in march, or placed in ambuscade, they will send immediate notice of it to the commanding officer of the chain, who should always fix himself in a particular spot, that there may be no time spent in seeking him; his post should be in the rear of that part of the chain that is nearest to, and most in front of the enemy, and he will regulate the dispositions for his defence according to the report made to him. When an ambuscade is discovered, and troops marching to attack, a general should always suspect there may be more ambuscades and more troops in march to form different attacks; he must therefore, instead of weakening the chain in any part, strengthen it as much as he can, by causing either the whole reserve, or part of it, to march where circumstances shall require.

The avenues and the heights in a mountainous country should be occupied by infantry; the avenues, in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the valley or plain where the forage is made; the heights, in order to observe the enemy at a distance, and to prevent his getting possession of them, and flanking the troops which guard the avenues. In this case there should be a greater number of infantry than cavalry; no more of the latter being requisite than what is necessary to sustain and support the infantry, in case it should be attacked, repulsed, and obliged to retire through a valley or plain. Then if it hath no cavalry to support it, the wings will be intirely exposed, and the enemy being superior can, at the same time, attack the front and the flanks; whereas, by the means of horse, which can act with ease in a plain or a valley, this inconveniency will be prevented, and the infantry greatly assisted.

If the forage is made at a distance from the camp, and in the neighbourhood of the enemy, the infantry guarding the avenues should throw

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up some intrenchments in its front, which will be soon done ; and it is then cannon becomes necessary, as there should be two or three pieces planted at each avenue. The heights also must, on every occasion, be occupied, which should be constantly observed as a general rule, whether the enemy is at a distance or near at hand, in every disposition that is to be executed in a mountainous country.

When the forage is made in an open country, the chain should be more numerous in cavalry than infantry ; but some infantry is absolutely necessary to guard villages, hollows, and such other places as it would be difficult for cavalry to guard. In short, the number of the troops should always be in proportion to the extent of ground to be encompassed, and their species determined by the nature of the country that is to be foraged : and as it is generally known with what troops the enemy will attack, he must always be opposed by those troops from whom the best defence may be expected ; and it would be still better, to force him, in some measure, to use troops of the same kind as those by which he is opposed.

If the enemy forms one or more attacks, the small escorts belonging to each regiment must join on the first order, and cover the foragers as much as possible, who should at the same time assemble in the center by regiments. The foragers should always be provided with their carbine or sword ; and although they may not be very formidable against troops completely armed, yet there have been instances where they have charged with success.

If it is in a plain, and the enemy having formed but one attack, charges the chain in one particular part, the troops of horse and dragoons which are opposite to him should march up resolutely and sustain his efforts : if they are repulsed, they will be supported by the infantry that hath remained in its post ; the hussars which were in front

will unite, and place themselves upon the flanks of the troops which are attacked in order to cover them, and endeavour to defeat the enemy by charging him in flank and rear. If the general is certain that the whole of the enemy's troops is engaged in this one attack, he may then bring up all the troops belonging to the chain, both cavalry and infantry, in order to oblige him to retire the sooner; which if he does, some hussars, sustained by horse and dragoons, should be sent in pursuit of him, till his retreat becomes certain; but with caution not to pursue too far, lest he should rally upon those troops, who, being too far from the chain, cannot receive assistance so soon as would be necessary; and besides, the making and accomplishing the forage being the grand object, the commanding officer should be contented with succeeding in that, without seeking for any other advantage unconnected with the original destination of the troops.

As soon as the enemy is retired, and the commanding officer is certain of his retreat, for he may return in greater force and with fresh troops, he will re-establish the chain; at the same time neglecting nothing that may contribute to its security. But if the enemy, instead of being forced to retire, should break into the chain, the commanding officer who, on the first notice given him that the enemy was marching to attack him, had caused all the foragers to assemble in the center, and to retire in good order, the small escorts forming their rear-guard, will then assemble his troops as readily as possible, and oppose them to the enemy, in order to cover the retreat of the foragers; always taking care to regulate his dispositions by the enemy's, and according to the nature of the ground.

If the enemy forms more attacks than one, the foragers who, as hath been already observed, must be assembled in the center, should have orders to take the road to the camp, and will re-enter it covered by the

the small escorts who form the rear-guard: but as a forage should never be abandoned till the last extremity, they should be ordered to draw up in order of battle, when they are within a quarter of a league of the camp, in order to return and complete the forage on the first order. But if the enemy is in force, and by his superiority all hope of continuing the forage is destroyed; or if it is made at so great a distance from the camp, that the troops belonging to the chain cannot expect to be readily assisted, the commanding officer ought to make a retreat, with every disposition a good officer is capable, and to join courage and vigilance with knowledge and experience.

If, on the contrary, the enemy is weaker, or of equal force with the chain, he should be charged without hesitation; because the enemy, regulating his attack by his defence, will be obliged to contract himself, in order to make his attack heavier and more considerable; so that the troops being united, will charge the enemy; and if, by the assistance of the hussars who are advanced, and act after the manner already mentioned, the enemy is forced to retire, he must be pursued in the manner above directed; after which the troops must return and complete the forage.

As a commanding officer is, in case of a forced retreat after being beat, obliged to submit to circumstances, and regulate his dispositions by the enemy's; he must retire with the greatest order possible, causing the infantry to march in the center, either in columns or in order of battle, as the situation of the ground will best allow; the horse and dragoons upon the wings, the hussars upon the flanks, that they may not confuse the dispositions, but serve as a support for the chain, and prevent its being taken in flank; and the disposition of the troops should be so managed, that the enemy shall not be able to present a larger front than that which is opposed to him: and although it is impossible for a general to foresee, for certain, what will be the dispositions for an at-

tack and a retreat, because they must be changed according as those of the enemy alter, or as the nature of the ground varies; they should nevertheless be so ordered, that each body shall be supported, and capable of acting without confusion. It is only on occasions thus pressing, that the commanding officer should suffer the forage to be abandoned; and even then it will be some satisfaction to the commanding officer, that he hath been able to place the foragers and their horses in a state of security.

If, during the retreat of the chain, it should receive assistance from the army, it should charge the enemy, notwithstanding it may be too late to go on with the foraging; and if this charge should prove successful in either beating, or causing the enemy to retire, he should be pursued without intermission, in order to deprive him of all desire for repeating the attack. In order to improve this advantage to the utmost, it seems probable, that the commanding officer should leave a large detachment, consisting of infantry, cavalry, dragoons, and hussars, to continue all night upon the spot, and the next morning betimes, the foragers, properly escorted, will come to take away the forage; and as soon as the escort is arrived in the front of the chain, the detachment which hath remained there all night, must return to the camp.

There still remains many other precautions to be taken for the security of foraging parties; if the nearness of the enemy renders the execution of them difficult, a greater number of troops should be employed to form the chain. Forages thus considerable should not be often repeated, because the army must necessarily be fatigued, by the number of troops absolutely requisite to form the chain, and the great distance will harass the horses, particularly on their return, as they will then be heavily loaded.

These forages are not usual, except in cases where the general is willing to spare the forage in the neighbourhood of the camp, that he may,
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in the end, be provided nearer home. As a general cannot be certain how long he shall remain in the same camp, M. de Montécuculli *, in this state of uncertainty, always advises foraging at a distance, and so by degrees to come nearer and nearer home ; because, in proportion to the œconomy used with regard to forage, an army is enabled to remain longer in the same camp, and the troops less under a necessity of making fatiguing and fruitless movements : by foraging at a distance, the enemy is deprived of the means of subsisting, and is often obliged to quit an advantageous situation, in order to supply his necessities elsewhere.

Care must also be taken, that the foragers, in entering the ground they are to encompass, do not occupy more than is absolutely requisite, and that they do not spoil more grain than they carry away with them ; first, because by extending the chain it would be weakened, and become easier to be forced, and in the second place every prudent officer should be an œconomist in the article of forage ; the officers commanding the small escorts which march at the head of each regiment should be charged with the care of this. These officers will cause their troops to march as much as possible through roads and over grounds which are untilled, till they arrive at the place intended to be foraged. If all the grounds are sown, the commanding officer must cause the cavalry to dismount at the place where the chain halts, and part of the troopers furnished with scythes must go and cut the grain, while the remainder hold the horses, and when there shall be no farther room to fear damaging the forage, the cavalry will remount and take it up. Each place should be marked out for a brigade or a regiment, which distribution should be made by the staff-officers before the troops arrive.

The general officer commanding the chain should not assemble his troops till such time as all the foragers are gone off the ground ; but ne-

* Liv. i. Chap. 4.

vertheless in proportion as they retire, he may contract the chain, in order to give himself greater strength : the officers commanding the small escorts are not to depart without leave of the general, nor till the regiment they belong to hath compleated its forage ; then they will form the rear-guard, and on their arrival at the camp go and make a report of the forage to the brigadier and their colonel.

As soon as all the foragers are gone, the general commanding the chain will assemble all the troops of it, form a rear-guard, and cause the remainder to march with as large a front as possible ; the rear-guard to the whole will be composed of some troops of hussars, and will keep at such a distance as not to embarrass the rear-guard in case it should be attacked briskly and repulsed ; the remainder of the hussars will be placed on the flanks of the rear-guard, which must be composed of infantry, horse, or dragoons ; those hussars which form the rear-guard of the whole should have orders to retire, in case they are attacked, to those upon the flanks of the rear-guard, and not to the infantry that forms it. By this disposition, if the general should be attacked in his retreat, the troops will be able to perform all the necessary evolutions, and to sustain each other, without the order of march being in the least destroyed. See PLATE the TENTH.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Detachments for forming a Chain of dry Forage.

IF there is great exactness and knowledge required in the conducting of parties for green forage, those for dry forage perhaps require more ; and, in general, every thing that regards foraging parties, whether green or dry, excites a particular attention in the commander in chief ; and, according to the chevalier Folard *, all success in war depends upon secrecy, diligence, activity, and the thorough knowledge of the country.

The dispositions for forming a chain of dry forage, which differ from those for forming one of green, will direct the means for extending the chain in proportion to its strength, and at the same time place the foragers in security ; although in parties of dry forage, the foragers generally take up less ground, according to the distance of the villages, that are to be foraged, from each other.

The dispositions for a chain of dry forage are also varied according to the nature of the country ; but whether it be open or mountainous, each different body should be placed in that part where it can act with the greatest facility ; the infantry therefore should occupy the villages, and the cavalry the plain in front, and should be disposed after such a manner as to be able to retire easily to the protection of the infantry. Before the foraging is put in execution, the commander in chief should mark out the villages to the general officer who is to command the foraging party, and regulate their number by the quantity of troops who are to forage. The first dispositions will be the same with those mentioned in the foregoing chapter in relation to green forage ; therefore the ge-

* Liv. 3. Chap. 22. Sect. 2.

neral who is to command the forage, ought to set out with a detachment in order to examine the ground ; the posts necessary to be occupied ; the villages which are to be foraged ; their situation ; the rivers which cover or run through them ; the bridges to be guarded ; the distance from one village to another ; and with what degree of ease the communication with them may be secured. After having thoroughly examined into these particulars, he can with ease form a judgment of the number of troops that will be necessary to form the chain and secure the foragers : after having done this, he will order the bailiff or burgo-master of every village to come to him, and enquire of them the number of husbandmen, and how many ploughs each husbandman hath belonging to him ; by which he will be able to calculate the number of sheafs reaped by each husbandman.

The general may, for every plough, reckon about thirty acres of ground, and, in proportion to the fertility of the ground, every acre will produce from ten to fourteen dozen sheafs : by this method may be computed the number of sheafs reaped by an husbandman who hath three or four ploughs ; and from this calculation the general will judge whether the number of sheafs, supposed to be in each village, will be sufficient for the troops coming to them.

Let every acre of ground be supposed to yield twelve dozen sheafs ; then a husbandman who hath three ploughs, will have reaped twelve thousand nine hundred and sixty sheafs ; so by reckoning twelve sheafs to a truss, and every truss to weigh six hundred pounds weight, this husbandman will supply sufficient for one hundred and twenty-four trusses : it is true, that some deduction should be made from the number of trusses that every acre may yield, as the husbandman or farmer may have preserved or consumed some, either for daily use or for feed.

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It is very necessary the general should take care to leave sufficient grain, not only to enable the husbandman to live, but also to sow his grounds; particularly if he foresees a probability of the next campaign being carried on in the same country.

Nevertheless, as this manner of reckoning may be attended with inconveniences, because there are some villages which keep up a particular trade of forage and grain, and therefore the granaries and barns may sometimes be found empty, yet the quantity of sheafs and grain remaining in the village, may be calculated by the number of inhabitants to be subsisted. Marshal de Puyfégu's method, which consists in informing himself of the number of horned cattle and horses, and by deducting the time they graze, is a very good one; but still there must be some deficiency in this calculation, as it will be impossible to fix, with certainty, the time of their grazing.

When the general shall have arrived at a tolerable certainty of the quantity of forage; the ground where to establish his chain; the posts which the infantry are to occupy; and taken a note of the quantity of forage; he will carry away one or two of the bailiffs or burgo-masters, as hostages for the security of the forage: he will also direct them to inform the inhabitants, that if they conceal or purloin but even a single sheaf from the whole, he will cause their village to be first pillaged, and afterwards set on fire; so that the peasants, on whom these threats have often great effect, will scarcely give the enemy information of the intended forage. The general must leave some companies of infantry, sustained by a detachment of hussars in every village, who, by constantly patrolling on the outskirts, will stop all comers and goers; while the infantry will keep a strict guard on the inside of the village, and permit no person to go out of it; nor suffer the bells to be rung, colours to

* Part i. Chap. 6. Art. 5.

be hoisted upon the steeple, or fires to be lighted; and will put a stop to every thing that may be supposed to be a signal agreed on with the enemy. When the general hath completed all these dispositions, he will return and give an account of them to the commander in chief.

The same general shall, upon the day appointed for the forage, set out at day-break, with the troops destined for the chain, and the staff-officers. As soon as he shall be got within sight of the villages, he will not fail to have them examined, notwithstanding he left troops in them the foregoing evening. When they are all examined, he will leave them in the rear, march on into the front, and draw up in order of battle; after that he will form the chain, regulating the dispositions of it by the situation of the ground, and of the villages examined over-night. The hussars will advance three quarters of a league or a league, in order to scour the country; during which time the staff-officers, instructed by the general of the quantity of sheafs contained in each village, will, attended by the bailiffs or burgo-masters, make a distribution of the forage by regiment or brigade, and assign a barn to each, or one to two. When this distribution is made, the staff-officers will make a report of it to the general commanding the party.

In forming of the chain, the infantry must occupy the villages, hollows, and hedges, which may be found in the circumference of the chain, and the horse and dragoons will be left in the plain in the front of the villages, but within reach of being assisted and supported by the infantry; and care should be taken to have a reserve of such troops, as can, with the greatest ease, transport themselves to those parts where assistance is needful: this reserve should be placed in the center, or nearest to the part that is most exposed, or most liable to be attacked.

As all the villages marked out to be foraged, are not in the same line, those which are in the rear, and covered by others in which there is infantry,

infantry, and by the chain of horse and dragoons in the front, require but a small number of troops; and if a detachment of infantry is posted in them, it is more with a view of preventing the troopers and servants from marauding than any thing else.

The escort belonging to each regiment, commanded by a captain, should remain upon the spot where the regiment forages, and, with the assistance of the infantry, prevent disorder among the foragers, and send off those who are loaded. As soon as a regiment is set off, the captain commanding the small escort, must report it to the general officer commanding the forage; after which he will follow, and form the rear-guard of it.

As soon as the general shall be apprized by the staff-officers, and the captains commanding the small escorts, that a village is evacuated, he may contract his chain, and draw it nearer together, till the foragers are gone; which when they are, he will assemble his troops, and detach as many platoons of infantry as there are villages, or rather the body of infantry posted in each village during the forage, should leave a party to make a strict search after all stragglers and marauders; the first they should keep with them, and make the others prisoners, and punish them severely on their return to the camp. When all the different bodies shall be re-assembled, and the officers commanding them have made the report, the general will order the hussars to be called in, and form a rear-guard according to the manner directed in the foregoing chapter, and return to the camp in the same order, and with the same dispositions, as if he expected to be attacked. See PLATE the ELEVENTH.

There still remains another disposition that will be executed with greater expedition, and prove more secure for a dry forage; that is, to observe exactly the same precautions which have been already mentioned, with regard to the detachment's setting out the evening or two beforehand, in

order to get information of the quantity of forage, of the nature of the ground for the disposition of the chain, and the enemy's distance.

If the forage is to be performed at a distance from the camp, the general commanding it, should set out in the evening at retreat-beating, with the troops destined for the chain, the staff-officers, and the majors or adjutants belonging to the regiments which are to forage: but if the forage is to be performed near to the camp, it will be sufficient for them to set out at break of day, and the commanding officer should always take care never to advance quite up to the villages, till they have been examined, notwithstanding troops have been left in them the preceding evening; these precautions are always necessary, and can never prove useless. As to what remains to be done, after the same precautions which have been directed for the first manner of foraging, must be observed.

These first dispositions being made, the general, from the knowledge he hath acquired the evening before of the quantity of forage contained in each village, will allot one to one or two brigades, or in proportion; he will next send the staff-officers, with the majors or adjutants, to every village, and order them to make the peasants take all the forage out of the barns, and lay them in one or more heaps on the outside of the village; not in front, but in the rear of it, in order for the greater security, and every heap will be for a brigade. If the villages are so nigh each other, as to admit of the heaps of forage being placed together in the same field, the disposition will certainly become better; because the chain being more united, and taking up less ground, will undoubtedly become stronger, and that with fewer troops. But if the nature of the ground will not allow of this, the second method is in appearance the best; that is, to cause the forage to be placed in as many heaps, on the outside of the villages, as there are brigades; taking care, as in the first disposition, to have the hedges, hollows, avenues, &c. occupied

cupied by the infantry, while the horse and dragoons remain posted in the plain: the forage will be sooner completed, confusion avoided, and all marauding prevented; and if any information should be received of the enemy, the foragers can assemble with greater ease than if they were distributed in the villages. All the troopers and servants should have express orders not to enter the villages, under pain of being treated as marauders, and the general should be very strict in punishing all those who break through this order. Which ever method the general makes use of, whether that of leaving the forage in the barns, or that of placing it in heaps on the outside of the villages, it is necessary the distribution should be made before the foragers arrive; and great care should be taken not to make them wait, which fatigues the horses more than the burthen they carry, although it is six or seven hundred pounds weight, the trooper included.

If this forage is made in a mountainous country, the disposition should be changed: the villages of mountainous countries are either in the avenues, at the entrance into the vallies, or very much enclosed in them, or bordering upon the mountains. There are some mountains where villages are more frequent than in many plains, but in others they are scarce to be met with, and are more dispersed; therefore, in the first case, the extent of the forage will be less, but in the last it will be increased: but in either of these situations, a great deal of infantry is required, because, besides its taking possession of the villages which are to be foraged, it must also occupy the avenues leading to them, and the heights and roads in the front, which may be in these avenues. Among mountains, it is unnecessary to have any cavalry in the chain, unless there should be some plain where it can act and support the infantry, supposing it should be repulsed by the enemy's. None of the precautions abovementioned should be neglected; and if the general can pursue the method the last
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proposed, and, by means of waggons, transport the forage of many villages into a valley, or small plain, and then divide it into as many heaps as there are brigades, there should not at most be more than three hours taken up in the performance of it, and then it will be unnecessary to leave troops in the villages which are in the avenues, and already foraged; and it will be sufficient to place infantry in the entrances of the avenues, which may be in the plain, and on the heights by which it is overlooked.

When the foragers are gone, the general commanding the chain will assemble the troops, and march toward the camp in good order, as hath been already mentioned with regard to foraging in an open country. It is impossible to repeat too often, that an officer, entrusted with a command of any kind whatever, whether a convoy, a forage, a detachment, or any thing of like nature, should never depend upon the enemy's distance, but always be equally upon his guard, as if he was in expectation of being attacked, that being the method for him to succeed, and to be but seldom disappointed in his designs. It is the general's exactness and quickness in judging of, and seizing on opportunities; in foreseeing them, bringing them about, and profiting by circumstances, that shews his superior genius, and firmly establishes his reputation; it is both the dependance and the life of the troops, and the best lesson for those officers who aspire to glory, and are desirous of attaining to the knowledge of their profession.

C H A P. XI.

The March of a Detachment of Infantry and Dragoons, in an open Country divided by Rivers.

ALthough the dispositions and operations of a detachment do not take in so many particulars as the march of an army, it is nevertheless necessary to lay down the rules which must be observed, in an accurate manner, and how they vary, according to the country through which a detachment is conducted.

A detachment is liable to be attacked upon its march, because it is impossible to be always certain, that the enemy, by their spies, have not received intelligence of it; neither can the commanding officer always foresee by what forces he will be opposed. The objects for detachments are many; they are sent either to carry assistance, to guard a communication, to prevent the enemy's foraging too near the camp, to hinder him from raising contributions, to keep him at a distance from the army, or, in the end, to bring him to action: if the intention of a detachment is to carry assistance, it should avoid meeting the enemy as much as possible, that the march of it may not be retarded; if to guard a communication, it must also avoid the enemy, till it shall be arrived at the post it is ordered to occupy; if to hinder the enemy from raising contributions, to keep him at a distance; or to bring him to action, it ought to try every method for finding and fighting him, at the same time not neglecting such precautions as are most safe and necessary. A detachment is much less exposed to danger in an open than in a mountainous country, because the enemy cannot so easily form ambuscades, and are sooner discovered.

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When the commanding officer of the detachment shall have made his disposition, and considered circumstances properly, he will form small troops or parties, to march in the front, on the flanks, and in the rear, and to examine the country. These parties, of which there should be many, will scour the whole country, and send out scouts, who, although they do not keep any particular road, must nevertheless be careful not to lose sight of the troops from which they are detached, that they may join them and the gros of the detachment immediately after having discovered the enemy.

The scouts will stop at every village or hamlet that falls in their way, and endeavour to gain intelligence; and if they should chance to receive any, they will give immediate notice of it to the officer commanding the party from which they were detached, who will immediately report it to the commanding officer of the detachment.

Before the detachment begins its march, the commanding officer of it should form an advanced guard of dragoons sustained by infantry, exclusive of the small parties which are detached, and the main body of the detachment should follow at about two hundred paces distance; by which means it will be within reach of sustaining the advanced guard, and will also have ground enough, and time sufficient to form in order of battle; the rear-guard, which must also consist of the same troops, must be ordered, in case it is attacked, to march up to the infantry, and post itself to the right and left upon the flanks, in order to flank the enemy at the same time that he shall be attacked in front by the infantry. A detachment, by using these precautions, may advance without fear of being surprised.

If the detachment is intended to carry assistance, or to take possession of a post, it must not be divided, excepting those parties which it is necessary to detach in order to scour the distant country; but if it is intended to examine the country, and force the enemy out of it, and the extent

tent of country should also be great, the detachment must then be divided, in order to scour and examine the country with greater exactness; and whenever this is necessary, the detachment should consist of troops sufficient to admit of each separated body's being strong enough, either to attack the enemy, or retreat with order to the main body, without being exposed to the danger of being cut off. Before any body is sent off from the detachment, a place of rendezvous should be appointed, in order that it may know where it is to be on a day fixed, and it will also be certain of a place to retire to, in case it should be attacked by a very superior force. If the country is less extensive, and each detached body can remain in sight of one another, there should be one posted in the center, a little toward the rear, by way of reserve, in order to sustain those which attack, or to enable them to retire into the rear, in case they are repulsed.

If the detachment should come up with the enemy, its disposition for action should be regulated by the enemy's, by the sort of troops he hath with him, and according to the nature of the ground he occupies. If the enemy's detachment consists of infantry, he must be opposed by infantry, and the dragoons must be posted after such a manner, as to be able to flank him during the attack; if there should be any hussars with the enemy's infantry, the disposition must be the same, taking care to have a reserve, to prevent the hussars falling upon the rear of the detachment. This reserve should consist of infantry formed in a column, with its head to the center of the infantry that is in order of battle; by this position the center will become stronger, and the flanks and rear of the detachment guarded; neither will the hussars dare to attack the detachment in rear, because they must sustain the whole fire of the column in reserve: this detachment, when formed in the order proposed, will be in the figure of a T, which is a disposition strong in all its parts, and does not pre-

vent the detachment either from advancing or retiring. If either of the flanks can be supported by an hollow, a morass, or a rivulet, the commanding officer should take advantage of that position, and the dragoons may sustain the flank that is exposed; but if this advantage is not to be had, the dragoons, by being divided on the right and left, must supply the want of it.

If the detachment consists but of five or six hundred men, the infantry should be told off by divisions, and be formed in order of battle, so as to be able to keep up a continual fire: it may also remain in a column, that position being stronger, whether for advancing or retiring. As to the cavalry, the distance should be almost equal in the front of the troop; that is to say, there should be almost as much void space between each troop, as a troop takes up. There must be very little ground more allotted for the cavalry, than for the infantry, to move in; these troops can act within themselves: neither is it to be supposed that the cavalry must perform great movements, which are always faulty, in the presence of the enemy, the shortest that can be made being always the best: at the same time care must be taken to make it keep its intervals, so that the second line may be able to march to the assistance of the first, and to avoid the confusion that must certainly happen in every troop, in a retreat where the lines must retire one after another.

These intervals are also as necessary for the cavalry, when it would attack; because, if the first line gives way, the second can, by passing through the space that is between every troop, charge the enemy, and abate his eagerness. These intervals are not less necessary in a retreat, because the intention is always to keep marching, which cannot be done, unless half of the troops remain to cover those which are retiring. The methods by which troops are made to retire, are various; some cause squadrons of cavalry to retire, by making a wheel to the right or left about;

about; others, by facing each man singly to the right about; others, by wheeling by half troops, and others, by fours.

Wheeling the entire squadron hath many inconveniencies: 1st. It must be allowed double the ground that the front occupies. 2^{dly}, It is a very great movement, and, consequently, the performance of it will be tedious. 3^{dly}, It is a favourable moment for the enemy to attack it, when it hath wheeled half the circle, and, consequently, presents the flank to him. 4^{thly}, When the squadrons make their retreat by wheeling about entire, those of the second line ought necessarily to be in their rear, and opposite to the intervals: without this precaution the wheel made by the troops in the first line, will consequently bring them into the front of the squadrons of the second, which will certainly throw them into confusion. 5^{thly}, If, by the disposition which is absolutely necessary for the troops, when they are to retire by wheeling about, the enemy should press the first line briskly, the second cannot give any assistance, as it is positively in the rear of the first.

A single horseman facing about hath also great inconveniencies, and requires three movements; the first is, if the squadron is in three ranks, it must be formed upon six; if in two, it must be formed upon four, because the odd files must advance; the second is, facing about each trooper singly; the third is, to form again on two or three ranks: if, during this evolution, the enemy should charge the squadron, the same movements must be made to come again to the proper front, which would take up a more considerable time than the enemy would allow.

Retiring by half troops may perhaps be a good method, but the evolution is still considerable; and the troop requires half as much ground as its front to perform it, and the motion being great, more time will be necessary for performing it. It is therefore imagined, that the simplest and shortest movement is to retire by wheeling each squadron

to the right about by fours ; then the troops will be in the rear of the intervals of the first, because each squadron performs the evolution within itself, and the doing it takes up but little time ; and there is also nothing to prevent the second line from advancing to protect the retreat of the first : by this method the retreat is made without interruption or confusion.

It is an established rule never to depend upon the consequences of war, and it seems that, by performing this movement by fours, they must be depended on ; but it is easy to prove that is not at all necessary : every squadron or troop is told off by divisions of four troopers, before leaving the camp, the trooper reckoning himself. Four men are but as one ; if there should be one, two, or three killed, the remaining one can perform the disposition as well as if there were the four ; if the whole four are killed, the division no longer exists, and there will be no confusion among the others.

With regard to the infantry it is different : that can perform the disposition by a single man ; and it is indeed the only one it should perform when it retires : at the same time it hath no occasion for intervals like the horse, being itself formed in two lines ; and it can also retire under the protection of its own fire, without any occasion of being sustained by its second line ; and if, by the briskness of the enemy's attack, the first line is obliged to make a quick retreat, it may, by joining itself to the second line, form a heavy and deep body, and, by charging the enemy with bayonets, oblige him to retreat. In a detachment, infantry should have no intervals, unless the detachment consists of many battalions ; but it is different with an army, when drawn up in order of battle, for then intervals are necessary, although not so large as those of the cavalry. The reason of these intervals being established for an army, when in order of battle, is only that, in case the battalions of the first line are forced

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to retire, they may do it without confusion or mixing together; but the troops of a detachment being less numerous, and consequently taking up less ground, there is not so much reason to apprehend their falling into confusion. If the country grows narrow, the detachment should be formed into columns, which is imagined to be the strongest disposition, as it is suitable to all countries; and when once the retreat is begun, there should be no farther occasion for giving fresh orders.

The different dispositions which may be used by a detachment when retreating, will be shewn in the thirteenth chapter of this book; but in whatever disposition and order the detachment doth retreat, the commanding officer of it should by all means avoid giving out many orders; the shortest, provided they are clear, being always the best; for if they are often repeated and changed, the soldier is astonished, the officer embarrassed, and they are executed with sloth and impropriety.

If the detachment consists of three or four battalions, and squadrons of dragoons in proportion, it should not be told off in divisions, unless that in firing it may again be divided into platoons; but it should be disposed by battalions or half battalion, according to the nature of the country, and there must also be intervals: the disposition of the detachment, as well as the number of lines in which it is to march, must be regulated by circumstances.

Although the disposition of the detachment for an attack should, in general, be regulated by the enemy's, it would nevertheless be better to derive, if possible, such an advantage from the order of the troops and the situation of the ground, as would force the enemy to alter his disposition, and take another conformable to that which is presented to him.

When there is a necessity for passing a bridge, the detachment must be drawn up in order of battle, and the banks of the river on each side of the bridge must be lined with infantry, whilst the dragoons pass over to

examine and scour the country on the opposite side; when they are returned, the passage must be begun by the center, and the troops when they have passed will form themselves in order of battle, and maintain the same order in which they were before the passage. During the time the dragoons are examining on the other side of the bridge, the rear-guard must face toward the country they have marched over, and not pass the bridge till the detachment hath began its march on the opposite side. While the troops are filing off upon the bridge, the dragoons who have been examining should remain in the front, and cover the detachment. When the whole detachment shall have passed, the march of it will be continued with the same precautions, and the disposition of the troops changed according as the nature of the country alters; if the detachment is to return by the same road, a body of infantry should be left at the bridge, in order to secure the retreat. See the TWELFTH PLATE.

If the enemy should have troops on the opposite side to dispute the passage with the detachment, and the commanding officer hath not positive orders to pass, he should be directed by the strength and superiority of the enemy, and according to that either attempt the passage or retire. If the bridge is intrenched, it will be in vain to attack it, because the passage being undoubtedly of consequence to the enemy, he will either be in great force, or within reach of being speedily reinforced, and the detachment will be unable to attack him without cannon, or a very superior force; and it is very uncommon for a detachment to be furnished with cannon, when it is sent out to gain intelligence, or to keep the enemy's parties at a distance from the army.

If this post is of consequence to the enemy, it ought not to be unknown to the general, who, if he had a mind it should be attacked would consequently have furnished the commanding officer of the detachment with the troops and means necessary for carrying it; but if the bridge is not

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entrenched, every thing seems to indicate that the passage of it may be attempted, and that it is wholly owing to accident that a detachment belonging to the enemy is on the opposite side, and that it is neither a post of his army or within reach of assistance; nevertheless, the passage should not be attempted but according as the general's orders are for going beyond it. If the commanding officer of the detachment is at liberty to act as he pleases, he ought to pay a proper regard to these obstacles, and be careful of sacrificing his troops when there is no occasion.

If the passage is positively ordered, and the enemy drawn up on the opposite side, with an intention of disputing it; supposing the detachment to be deficient in infantry, half of the dragoons must be dismounted, and their horses sent into the rear, out of the reach of the small arms. The troops will advance by forming a column in the center of the breadth of the bridge. The dragoons which are dismounted, with some piquets of infantry, will be formed in the nature of wings to the column: in this order the troops, keeping up a continual fire, will advance to the banks of the river. As soon as the head of the column hath approached near the bridge, the grenadiers in the front will rush upon the enemy with their bayonets, protected by the fire of the dragoons and piquets of infantry, which are upon the wings. In proportion as the column advances, those troops who have passed the bridge will keep a constant fire upon the two flanks. When the head of the column shall be advanced about an hundred paces, the files of it should be doubled, by which means it will become a weightier body, the front will be encreased, and the passage for the remainder of the troops enlarged. The dismounted dragoons, remounting and joining those who held their horses, will pass the bridge to cover the flanks of the detachment, and sustain the infantry; the piquets who line the banks must pass the last; then the infantry being reunited, sustained, and covered upon the flanks by the

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dragoons, will either remain in column, if the nature of the ground will not allow it to present a larger front, or spread itself in the plain, in order to attack the enemy in front at the same time the dragoons attack him in flank, which certainly ought to end in his defeat, more particularly as he will be intimidated at the resolution and vivacity with which the passage was effected. See the same PLATE, FIG. II.

If the passage is disputed on the opposite side by hussars or cavalry, they will never wait the approach of the infantry, some companies of which placed on the bank of the river would soon drive them to a distance; at which time the center should begin to pass, and when half the infantry is over, the dragoons must pass to sustain it, the remainder will follow, and each body fall into its former position: in passing a bridge, confusion must be particularly avoided, and as Santa-Cruz * observes, all officers and soldiers should be expressly forbid advancing upon the bridge before their troop or company. The instructions he gives in the fourth and fifth chapters, for the method of throwing a bridge over a river, either secretly or in view of the enemy, may be of great use to a detachment, notwithstanding he speaks of the march of an army.

Before a detachment passes a bridge or a defile, the commanding officer should always cause it to form in order of battle on the side it is then of, till the country on the opposite side hath undergone a thorough examination, which is but a slight fatigue to the troops, but a very necessary precaution for a detachment, which cannot be too cautious in its march; and the officer who neglects this, betrays the confidence reposed in him by the general, exposes himself to the danger of being beat, and to the disgrace of owing it to his own negligence.

* Chap. 2. Of the Passage of Rivers.

C H A P. XII.

Of the March of a Detachment of Infantry and Hussars in a woody and mountainous Country.

ALTHOUGH there are many more particulars to be attended to in the march of an army than of a detachment sent out only on some particular occasion ; nevertheless, the ability of the officer commanding it is not less conspicuous ; for the strength of the latter being small in comparison to that of the former, the commanding officer hath greater occasion for multiplying precautions, and practising the stratagems of war.

It is not so difficult to conduct a detachment composed of infantry and hussars through a woody and mountainous country as through an open one ; but nevertheless as the enemy can with greater ease form ambuscades in a country that is covered, the detachment can only advance slowly, and not till after having thoroughly examined the country.

The precautions necessary to be used are the same with those mentioned in the foregoing chapter, at least as far as relates to the dispositions before the beginning of the march, with this difference, that the country in front will be scoured by hussars instead of dragoons. It is unnecessary for these patrols to be strong, as they will be unable to make head in a mountainous country against the infantry that will attack them ; but by being dispersed about in small parties, they will easily retire to the main body of the detachment. These parties should make the strictest examinations, and endeavour to go round the mountains as much as possible, and never quit any avenue or pathway before it is thoroughly examined. If the avenues only are examined and the heights neglected, the detachment

will still remain in a state of uncertainty; and as it will be very difficult for hussars to reach the tops of the mountains, some corps of infantry should be detached not only to examine and scour the country, but also to occupy the heights, and dispute the possession of them with the enemy.

In case the hussars who form the rear-guard are attacked by infantry, they should have orders to join that belonging to the detachment, as hath been already said with regard to the dragoons; but if they are attacked by hussars, they are upon an equality with them, and should stand their ground, and some platoons of infantry should also be distributed upon their flanks, which will certainly give them an advantage over the enemy. There is scarcely any ground whatever so narrow as not to allow a body of infantry to be posted in it sufficient to cover the hussars of the advanced and rear-guards. It is not to be supposed that hussars will expose themselves to the danger of sustaining the fire of infantry, particularly in a country where they can only attack on one side; and therefore, as the march of the detachment can be stopped by infantry only, it ought to be superior in that to the enemy; and the commanding officer should have judgment sufficient to pitch upon a spot where he may be able to form many attacks at the same time.

A detachment should never set out till the dispositions requisite either for an attack or a defence are settled, nor before having secured the country in its rear, in case it should be attacked and obliged to retire by the same road; but a detachment will always find its advantage of returning, if possible, by a different one, and the officers of every different corps should cause all orders to be punctually observed.

If the officer commanding the detachment is thoroughly acquainted with a mountainous country, he will march with great security through it, as he will have a perfect knowledge of the places, where it is most probable ambuscades will be formed, and of those where he himself can
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have an opportunity of attacking the enemy. It is very certain, that in a confined country the enemy cannot present a larger front than the detachment, which cannot be flanked, particularly if care has been taken to secure the heights.

An officer commanding a detachment should never imagine himself superior in ability to his adversary; he should rather imagine he hath been beforehand with him in taking the advantage which the nature of the ground hath presented; that he is so posted as to attack when he pleases; and that his troops are divided after such a manner as to enable him to form the attack by such dispositions as seem most convenient to him, and to charge the detachment in front and flank. To avoid the inconveniency arising from this, the commanding officer should always cause the detachment to march as if in expectation of being attacked, and to pass by no height or avenue before it hath been thoroughly examined by the detached parties; and when they are returned, a body of infantry ought to be left at the mouth of each avenue, till the whole detachment hath passed it, as hath been already mentioned in the seventh chapter, which treats upon the method of escorting of convoys.

When the detachment arrives at the entrances of any small plains or valleys, the commanding officer must cause it to halt, and not suffer it to pass over them till all the hollows, woods, avenues, and every thing that can conceal an ambuscade hath been thoroughly examined. During the time necessary for this examination, the detachment must be formed in order of battle, the disposition of which must be determined by the nature of the ground, and the posts that must be occupied to avoid being flanked or surrounded.

If the flanks of the detachment can be supported by a rivulet, a mountain, or hollow, that position must be chosen, taking care to secure the rear of it. When the observations are finished, the march will be con-

tinued, observing the precautions already mentioned; and if they are not neglected, it will be difficult for the detachment to be surprised; or if it should, it is at least in a condition to receive the enemy. If the detachment is attacked by infantry, the commanding officer will judge by the enemy's force whether to make his dispositions for an attack, a defence, or a retreat. A commanding officer should not expect success so much from numbers as from the justness of the dispositions of his order of battle, and from the confidence of his soldiers, when they see his countenance animated by courage and resolution, and from the presence of mind they know him to possess, as well as his ability of taking advantage of any false motion made by the enemy, and from his diligence in sending speedy and proper assistance to the parts where the attack is hottest, or to those which are weakened: therefore, if the enemy is of equal, or not of great superiority in force, he ought to attack him; but if the enemy's superiority is so great, or his situation so advantageous as to leave no hope of beating him, it is much better to retire than hazard the defeat of the detachment by coming to an action, the consequences of which may prove fatal.

It was a rule among the Romans never to decree the honours of a triumph to a general who had accepted of, or offered battle in a disadvantageous situation, although he returned a conqueror. These wise and warlike people, as well acquainted with the principles of the military art, as convinced of the share chance had in their success, always recommended prudent and wise dispositions to their generals, rather chusing they should gain victories through knowledge and experience than owe their success, however considerable, to the caprice of fortune.

* Sp. Servilius was blamed for having pursued the enemy, and losing some Roman soldiers in that pursuit, after having gained a complete vic-

* Dion. Halicarn. Book 9.

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tory; for however his courage might be commended, his want of prudence was disliked.

Although a detachment may be harrassed by hussars in a hollow way, it may nevertheless proceed in its march, by disposing the advanced and rear-guards after the manner already mentioned.

When the detachment is in a small plain or valley, and by that means more connected, and able to make use of the hussars belonging to it, the infantry should remain in a column, with small detachments of hussars, intermixed with platoons of infantry upon the flanks, in which situation the enemy's hussars would never dare to approach it: but as there may be reason to apprehend these hussars are only the advanced guard belonging to a detachment of infantry, concealed in ambuscade, into which their design is to draw the detachment, the commanding officer must act with the greatest precaution; and if his orders are to go beyond this place, he must charge the enemy's hussars with his own, and, in proportion as the enemy gives way, advance very slowly, and with great caution.

The march of a detachment cannot be executed with so much dispatch, when the country in its front is concealed, such as a woody or a mountainous country, as in an open one: if the design of the detachment is to annoy the enemy, and hinder him from approaching too near the army, the dispositions of it are different, and the infantry should be concealed as much as possible. If the country is proper for forming ambuscades, not altogether, but in different parts, the commanding officer must seize that advantage, and disperse a great many troops of hussars over the country, with orders, if they meet the enemy, to endeavour to draw him upon the troops in ambuscade: but if the enemy should proceed with caution, and discover the ambuscades, the commanding officer must of course give over all thoughts of defeating him

him entirely, but charge him vigorously, and distress him as much as possible, by attacking him on different sides, which will be the easier effected, as the infantry is distributed in different posts, which cannot have been all discovered.

The instant of the attack is the time for the troops of an ambuscade to succeed, particularly if they attack the enemy with vivacity; but they must be careful not to be drawn on by over-eagerness, or engage themselves in a country that hath not been thoroughly examined.

If a detachment is sent out only to prevent the enemy from approaching too near the army, its end will be answered by keeping him at a distance; and if the officer commanding it cannot reap any greater advantage from his vigilance, he hath at least the satisfaction of having completely answered his general's intention: but if the enemy should pursue the hussars with precipitation, and fall into the ambuscade, he must then be surrounded, and all possible advantage drawn from that situation; and when the expedition is over, the detachment must retire with speed, but in good order.

There is more address required to carry on war among mountains, than in a plain, although a general can never employ too much in either; if, in the former case, a general finds more opportunities of forming ambuscades, he is also more liable to be surpris'd; and if any precaution, however trifling, is neglected, the troops are in danger every step they take. A commanding officer should always know what is doing in his front, which knowledge if he cannot attain, either through his own means, or by means of detachments, he should endeavour to form conjectures of, which may be equivalent: the caution with which Fabius Cunctator proceeded against the Carthaginians, was never imputed to him as a crime.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the March of a Detachment composed of Cavalry and
Hussars, in an open Country.

IT is very astonishing that the generality of authors, who have wrote upon the military art, have neglected treating upon the evolutions of cavalry, notwithstanding it, in a great measure, constitutes the strength of an army. Vegetius* informs us only of the method practised by the ancient Romans for teaching their troopers the art of riding; and the qualifications which Xenophon requires in his scouts, are more applicable to hussars than to heavy cavalry.

The moderns have regarded the evolutions of the infantry as only worthy of their attention; and as the whole bent of their instructions is to bring them to perfection, they mention the cavalry but in a very superficial manner. It is most undoubtedly true that cavalry cannot be used in all countries, but in an open one it is able to prosecute a war without assistance, and secures and covers the wings of that infantry it is capable of attacking.

It would be very dangerous to give into the opinion of the chevalier de Folard, who seems to hold cavalry in no great estimation, and who also pretends that it only serves to embarrass an army, unless he had added, that too numerous a body of cavalry would be too expensive, and would also be exposed to great inconveniences from the difficulty of procuring sufficient forage.

Marshal de Puysegur is the only one of the present times who hath enlarged upon this branch, and he hath even confined himself chiefly to the

* Book I. Chap. 2.

dispositions and evolutions by which it is to be exercised, and hath neglected mentioning how it may be serviceable in the field, or after what manner they are to act in presence of an enemy. The chevalier Melzo, and George Bastia, count of the Holy Empire, and who lived in 1576, in the reign of Rodolph II. are the only two who have treated fully upon this subject, or the only persons known to have established cavalry as necessary for carrying on war.

It is, in general, as essential for an army to have cavalry, as for the infantry to be furnished with arms: the whole consists in knowing how to dispose it properly in action, and using it as circumstances require. In order to make the necessity for cavalry appear, and to shew how far useful it may be in carrying on war, a detachment of horse and hussars shall be supposed marching in an open country, and as particular and clear a detail as possible given of the dispositions which it ought to take in such or such circumstances.

When a detachment of cavalry marches in an open country, it must, as well as all other detachments which have been spoken of, have parties in the front, the rear, and upon the flanks, and scouts detached from these small parties to examine the country thoroughly. The disposition for the march of this detachment, which will depend upon the nature of the country, should be by troops, taking care to preserve the intervals necessary for forming in order of battle, by wheeling about, or rather by fours, in case the detachment should be attacked upon one of its flanks: if the head of the detachment is attacked, the second troop is to join the first, and take post on its left flank; the third and fourth in the second line, opposite the intervals of the first; the fifth and sixth marching on a trot, shall post themselves on the left of the two first troops, forming the first line; the seventh and eighth shall join the third and fourth; and so on with the remainder. By this method of proceed-

ceeding a thousand horse will be formed in order of battle in a very short time, without disorder or confusion ; and it will also be performed with so much more ease, as the commanding officer shall have been informed by his advanced parties, whether the enemy hath formed an ambuscade, or is marching with a design of attacking the detachment.

This detachment can also be formed by making it present a large front to the enemy, which is very necessary when the enemy is so near as to render an immediate attack probable ; in which case the four first troops will form the first line directly, as the four last will the second ; always taking care to preserve the necessary distance between the first and second lines, as well as the intervals between each troop. See the THIRTEENTH PLATE. FIG. I.

If, in consequence of the advanced parties having neglected to scour the country, and of course to examine it, the detachment should be surprised by the enemy, the troops of cavalry should then make the same movement already mentioned, in case of the attack being made either in head or on the flank. The evolution upon the flank is executed at once, a motion to the right or left being as soon performed as ordered ; but as the second movement to form the two lines in front cannot be so soon done, the first line should be immediately formed, and charge the enemy with resolution, without waiting for the second, which will soon be in a condition of following.

If the detachment is attacked by hussars, and the commanding officer is ordered to proceed either to carry a reinforcement, or examine the ground for a forage, the hussars should by no means become an obstacle to the designs of well conducted cavalry.

If the detachment is attacked in flank, it will make the movement already mentioned, to oppose the enemy ; but after the commanding officer hath carefully examined the enemy's troops, and the number of

them coming to attack, he will again, by the same motion, cause the detachment to proceed in its march; taking care, as it advances, to make it observe the proper distance from one troop to another; the commanding officer of each troop being also ordered to make it keep close together in its march. Before the movement is made for the detachment to march, the commanding officer will detach the lieutenant or cornet of each troop with a section*, to advance ten paces before the troop from which it is taken; then the movement for proceeding on the march may be made, and each section will serve as a guard to the flank of the troop from which it is detached: beside this disposition, the hussars should be distributed to the front and rear-guards, and some of them should be kept to cover the flanks of the sections. In this position, it is certain the detachment will always keep advancing; and although the enemy's hussars may perhaps retard the march, they will never be able to stop it entirely, particularly if each officer commanding a troop is careful to keep it united and close together; for if the enemy can only put one troop in disorder, and break through it, the whole detachment will be in danger of being beaten. See the THIRTEENTH PLATE. FIG. II.

If only one troop is beat, the alarm soon spreads among the rest; the trooper, incapable of reasoning like the officer, seldom sees into the consequences, or knows the design of the evolutions he is ordered to make; the trooper seeing one troop beat, is apt to imagine that his own safety, which, in that critical moment, consists in keeping close together, can be effected only by flight; therefore, deaf to all command, he shifts for himself; and the detachment whose march, at most, could only have been retarded, without the danger of being cut off, is lost, because the enemy found an opportunity of penetrating it easily.

* A troop is divided into four equal parts, each of which is called a section.

If the detachment is ordered to continue its route, the commanding officer must be careful not to engage it too far in the pursuit of the enemy, should he give way; and should only detach some hussars, sustained by two or three troops of horse, to be assured of his retreat: the hussars shall not pursue above half or three quarters of a league at most, and the troops of horse which sustain them, not farther than a quarter of a league from the detachment; especially if the attack was made by hussars, because their intention might only be to draw part of the troops into an ambuscade. But should there be even nothing to fear from an ambuscade, the hussars should never advance farther than the distance just now mentioned, for fear of being cut off, without the hope of being assisted.

There is again another disposition by which a detachment may be formed in battle, and by which it will be closer together, and consequently stronger; that is, to form from the flank in two lines, which is done after the following manner:

The commanding officer of every troop (suppose eight as above) will march to the right or left at one word of command, according to the flank attacked: if the whole detachment is formed in order of battle upon one line, then, in order to form two, the first, third, fifth, and seventh troops, by a second word of command, shall march into the front to a proper distance, and form the first line; the other four will remain in their first position, to form the second. By this disposition, the order of battle will not only become stronger than when upon one line only, but the troops will also be more together. If, by the situation of the ground, the detachment is liable to be surrounded, the troops, by forming two columns, by a motion to the right or the left, by troops or by fours, will take up much less ground, and at the same time have what is necessary for them to act as circumstances will require; and it will be stronger and more capable of advancing, if ordered to continue

the route ; or of retiring with ease, if the design, for which the detachment was sent out, is effected.

Whether the intention of the detachment, when in column, is to advance or retire, there should be sections upon the flanks of each troop, and hussars again upon the flanks of the sections. The advanced and rear-guards should be placed opposite the interval of the two columns, in order to cover it. If there are no hussars belonging to the detachment, horse should be employed in their stead, and the same use made of them, with a caution not to go at too great a distance from the detachment ; because, as they cannot retire so speedily as the hussars, they will be more liable to be cut off. See FIG. III. of the THIRTEENTH PLATE.

It must here be observed, that a detachment of cavalry will in vain pursue hussars, who will not wait its coming up ; they will harass the detachment, but will never expose themselves to the danger of sustaining the charge of it. The commanding officer of the detachment should always be contented with following them in order, and endeavouring to make them retreat, but should never expect to defeat them.

As the dispositions of the cavalry, very different from those of the hussars, require it should never march but united and in close order, so the hussars are employed every where ; sometimes, together and in close order ; at others, scattered and riding about, provided they have a body in their rear to sustain them ; and as often as circumstances require it, they dismount. One advantage the hussars have over the cavalry is, they never run any risk in attacking it, because, if they cannot break through it, they can, with great ease, retire ; whereas the cavalry will be in great danger, if it is broken by the hussars.

If the commanding officer of the detachment, not ordered to the contrary, should attack the enemy whenever he meets him, and beat him, he should

should take all possible advantage of his defeat; and it is at that time he must act with great precaution. If the enemy's resistance has been obstinate, there will be no danger in pursuing him with vivacity; but if he made but a weak defence, and retreated after a slight attack, there is always reason to suspect and apprehend the retreat is only feigned, in order to draw the detachment into some ambuscade: nevertheless, the charge should be continued as long as the country, in front of the detachment, is clear. But care should always be taken to keep some troops in reserve, that in case the enemy receives assistance, the detachment shall have troops ready to receive him, and to protect those which are on before, in case they are obliged to give way; for if the commanding officer employing all his troops at the same time, should be repulsed, either by the enemy he first attacked, or by help he has received, he can then no longer expect to beat him, but may at the same time be almost certain his own retreat will not only be attended with trouble, but that it will be with difficulty he can avoid being beaten; whereas, if only part of the detachment is employed, and the rest left behind in order of battle, should the troops in front be broken, there may still remain hopes, that, by means of the troops which are behind, and in good order, and who have not yet charged, the face of the action may be changed, by giving time for the broken troops to reunite, to retire in order behind the troops in reserve, and return to the charge.

If this detachment meets another of infantry, the order and dispositions must be entirely changed; for the advantage would turn on the side of the cavalry, more active in an open country, unless that the infantry should find any hedges, hollows, or any other support where it can shelter itself; and from thence, by keeping up a continual fire, prevent the cavalry from approaching: but if the infantry is not supported, and they should meet in a plain where nothing can prevent the cavalry from

from acting and taking every advantage of ground, the detachment of cavalry ought to charge that of infantry, unless it should be so far superior as to render it rashness in the other to expect to get the better: but if the commanding officer of the detachment of cavalry and hussars perceives any irresolution in the enemy's commanding or other officers, any confusion or slackness in their dispositions, or any diffidence in the troops, he should, although inferior, attack with resolution and quickness, without giving the enemy time to recollect himself, and make new dispositions.

In this case, the whole detachment should be formed in one line only; it would be needless and even dangerous to form two, because the enemy's whole front and flank should be charged and occupied, if possible. A second line would add nothing to the strength of the first; and even when it joins it, it would not give fresh force to the charge, the vivacity of an attack consisting chiefly in the courage of the troopers who are in the front, animated by the example of their officers who are in the ranks with them: the rear ranks, without adding to the force of a squadron in an attack, only give it more space to act, and to avoid crowding together. A second line is said to be useless, because if the first is repulsed, it will but increase the disorder by falling back upon the second, and will of course overwhelm it in its flight, unless the second line should be at such a distance as to give the first line time to recover, and pass through the intervals of the second, in order to form again and attempt another charge. As it is generally thought when cavalry attacks infantry, the instant of the attack decides the success, and that its whole force should be employed at the same time, consequently the second line not being able to charge at the same time with the first, will become useless. This maxim, which seems to be right with regard to infantry, would be very faulty against cavalry; cavalry against cavalry should always have troops in reserve and in good order, because as the troops that are broken and beat will be closely

closely pursued, there should of course be other troops to support and protect them; whereas, if cavalry is engaged with infantry, it will always be able to keep at a distance, or return to the charge as shall be most convenient.

When the cavalry is formed after this manner upon one line with smaller intervals than usual, in order to give more weight to the charge, the hussars shall form themselves on the right and left sideways, a section must be taken from every troop, which shall march fifteen paces into the front upon the flank of the troop from which it is detached, with orders that as soon as they shall be within four and twenty paces of the enemy to rush upon him, after the manner of foragers sword in hand. These sections should be followed closely by the troops, who at first will march on a trot, and then on a canter; and when the sections are got near enough to give the first stroke, the troops will then follow full speed, but altogether, and charge the enemy, already staggered by the vigorous attack of the sections. The hussars on the right and left will at the same time attack the enemy in rear and in flank, an attack which must necessarily employ some part of the enemy's infantry, and consequently weaken the front which is vigorously attacked. It is to be observed, that the cavalry and hussars should make this attack without firing; and care must also be taken to make the sections retire through the intervals of the troops of horse, supposing they could not find an opportunity of breaking through the enemy. The retreat of the sections should not hinder the main body of the detachment from continuing its attack; it will, on the contrary, find more ease in penetrating the infantry, as it will have thrown away part of its fire.

If the enemy is inferior to the detachment, the horse should attack him, however resolute he may be in appearance. Whenever cavalry resolves to attack infantry, there should never be any hesitation or boggling about

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it; but the dispositions should be made at a distance, in order to fall vigorously upon the enemy, when within proper distance.

Whether the enemy's disposition for battle is in one or two lines, or in a column, the disposition abovementioned will undoubtedly be proper; for the country being even, and void of obstacles that can prevent the horse from acting, it will be enabled to attack which ever of the columns shall be judged most proper, and which attack being upon the flank, it will be obliged to present a front; then the infantry, notwithstanding every endeavour to the contrary, will be in the disposition already supposed. But by what dispositions will infantry be enabled to retire from before the cavalry in an open country? As this objection particularly regards the chapter relative to retreats, the reader is referred to it; the object of this chapter being only to direct the means how cavalry may attack every sort of troops in an open country, by profiting by the situation of the country, and making use of the advantages it presents, without paying any regard to the strength or dispositions of the enemy.

If the detachment meets another of cavalry of equal, or very near the same force, the success will then depend upon the goodness of the evolutions, the propriety of the dispositions, a well chosen situation, and upon the prudence of the precautions, which will consist in avoiding being flanked; in presenting a front equal to, or even more extended than the enemy's, if it can be done without weakening it; to be able to attack the flank and the front at the same time. Success often depends upon the quickness with which the detachment marches up to the enemy; in knowing how to avoid being attacked; and by always giving the first charge. It is generally imagined, and even demonstrable, that between two bodies equally strong, that which strikes the first blow, should make the other give way; therefore, if an inferior body can find an opportunity of attacking another that is superior first, it should be done with such vigour, as to break through it entirely.

This very thing was seen performed at the battle of Leuze, in 1691, where twenty-two squadrons of M. Luxemburg's army beat seventy-two belonging to that of the prince of Orange. At the battle of Guastalla, won in 1734, fourteen French squadrons, led on by the duke of Châtillon, beat twenty-eight squadrons belonging to the enemy; and in the last war, at the battle of Sae in Bohemia, five hundred carabiniers and two regiments of dragoons, making in all but two squadrons, broke through, and beat fifteen hundred cuirassiers belonging to the enemy. The reason of this great success was, that the French gave the first charge, sword in hand, without trifling away their time in firing, or waiting the approach of the enemy: therefore, if so small a body of troops has been able to beat another so considerable, it is evident that a detachment, supposed equal in force, or nearly so to any other it shall meet, will carry it, if it gives the first charge sword in hand.

When measures are properly taken, orders carefully given, and the disposition of the troops regulated, it is the quickness, the resolution, and intrepidity wherewith the attack is made, which determines the success of it. An action where cavalry only is concerned should be decided in the instant, and at the first charge: it is much easier for infantry, when broken, to rally and return to the fight, than for cavalry; because the foot soldier has only himself to bring up, but the trooper has his horse, whose warmth and fright will not always allow him to be managed: besides, horse when beaten by horse, is closely pursued; and it is with the utmost difficulty it can ever rally, unless some troops are drawn up in their rear, to stop the impetuosity of the enemy; whereas infantry is never so closely pursued by other infantry, but it may keep it at a distance by its fire. It also seldom happens but what there are some troops who have firmness to stand, while those which have been broke, can rally, which is a most difficult disposition for the

cavalry; because their evolutions, without taking up much more ground, are still more difficult, and, consequently, confusion is more to be dreaded; and it very often happens, as has been just now said, that the trooper is unable to manage his horse, and a whole troop hath been frequently broke by a horse that is fearful and skittish. If the first line is beat, it will certainly be briskly pursued; and then it may happen, if it is not very careful in passing through the intervals of the second, it will hurry it along with it, and this second line, without having been once attacked, will be carried away in the torrent.

Cavalry cannot move so easily as infantry, which takes every different position necessary for it, whether in order of battle, in columns, in a square, or any other disposition; by which means it can defend itself, whether attacked in front, in flank, or in rear. A column of cavalry is neither strong in head, flank, or rear. A squadron disposed in a square, is bad in every respect; it can neither move, nor change that disposition, without giving the enemy an opportunity of breaking through it; especially if it is attacked on the four angles: it can neither advance or retreat like a battalion in a square; and if it is surrounded by superior forces, it has no other resource, but to endeavour to cut its way through the enemy's troops, and by that means, at least, avoid the shame of surrendering without fighting. If the cavalry is posted back to back, the flanks will be unguarded. On these occasions it seems, that the shortest and wisest way is to retreat in as much order as possible; in observing the dispositions which have been spoken of in this chapter, on the subject of cavalry and hussars attacked by the like troops; and also that this detachment, if obliged to make its retreat by force, shall put itself in order of battle, in two lines by troops, and not by column; that the sections shall be on the flanks of each line, and hussars upon the flanks of the sections. The advanced and rear-guards should consist of hussars, to keep the enemy at a distance by their fire, with two troops of horse to sustain them.

CHAP. XIV.

The Retreat of a Detachment of Infantry and Dragoons, in
an open Country divided by Rivers.

THE conducting of a detachment obliged to retreat, supposes more talents and skill in the officer charged with it, than are often required in operations which, to appearance, are more important : he hath not only a superior enemy to avoid, but he must also raise the drooping courage, and dissipate the terror of his soldiers. The retreat of an army undoubtedly requires still greater knowledge in a general, because the number retreating is more considerable, and the extent of ground which the troops occupy, greater ; and, consequently, being unable at once to perceive all the motions of the enemy in such a manner as to oppose them, he must remedy that inconvenience by an unbounded activity and foresight : on the contrary, an officer leading a detachment has all his troops together immediately under his eye ; he distinctly sees those belonging to the enemy, and consequently can, with greater ease, counter-act his dispositions ; but nevertheless the smallness of number is a new cause for terror to the soldier, whose fear always magnifies his danger, and entirely destroys those reasons which should induce him to take fresh courage.

War is apparently more difficult to be carried on in a mountainous than in an open country. In the latter there is nothing to perplex the dispositions, only trifling obstacles are to be encountered with, and the roads are all open for a retreat ; whereas a mountainous country presents nothing but rocks to be surmounted, torrents to be passed, heights to be

occupied, and, in short, obstacles to be overcome in every part: nevertheless, these very obstacles may, on many occasions, prove useful resources, which a general would be happy in meeting with in a plain. In a mountainous country, the infantry may with ease be formed into ambuscades; by whose assistance a detachment may retreat in security, and even draw the enemy into them, and beat him, if he pursues with too much precipitation, and without much precaution.

In an open country, the whole of the troops are exposed to the enemy, who constantly sees before him; therefore, one improper disposition, or a movement not executed with the necessary exactness, furnishes the enemy, who hath nothing in view but the detachment that is retiring, with an opportunity of breaking through it; and the enemy having nothing to fear from ambuscades, as in a mountainous country, there will be nothing to divert his attention from profiting by the most trifling advantages: whereas, in a mountainous country, his march is interrupted by the windings of the rocks, the fatigue of the troops, and by the continual apprehension of falling into some ambuscade.

An offensive war is carried on with greater ease in an open than in a mountainous country; but in a defensive war, the latter offers many expedients and resources not to be found in the former. An army acting on the defensive, whether owing to the superiority of the enemy, or to some misfortunes it hath sustained, either in the foregoing, or in the beginning of the campaign it is then engaged in, supposing the opposite generals to be of equal skill and ability, will maintain and carry on the war in a mountainous country, with more facility than in an open one; because in this last, the enemy can reap great advantages from number, being able to make use of all, or at least the greatest part of his forces; but in the first, art often prevails over number, and frequently over courage itself: not that art and address are useless in an open country, war

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consisting wholly in courage directed by art, but it is more difficult to employ art effectually where the least stratagem is liable to be discovered.

The safety of a detachment retreating in an open country depends greatly upon the care which has been taken during the march to secure all the places in its rear, and to leave sufficient posts upon the road by which it seems probable he will be obliged to return. In all manœuvres there are generally two sorts of dispositions to be observed; the interior disposition, and another which is exterior. The interior disposition consists in the arrangement of the troops for escorting a convoy; for a chain of forage; for the march of a detachment; for action; the pursuit of the enemy after the action, and at length for the retreat. The exterior disposition consists in the advanced detachments, those upon the flanks, and those in the rear, in leaving troops to guard a bridge, a defile, and the avenues through which a detachment must return. The first things necessary for an officer commanding a detachment obliged to retreat from before a superior enemy to observe, are the situation of the ground and the quality of his troops. If the detachment consists of infantry and dragoons, he should be always ready to lay hold of every advantage which the ground may offer to him; to profit by the bad dispositions of the enemy; and to oppose his good ones by the best in his power. In an open country the detachment can either march in order of battle or in column; and it is the commanding officer's business to make choice of that which seems most suitable and best adapted to the number of troops composing the detachment.

The proper disposition for a detachment, supposed to consist of three hundred foot and four hundred dragoons, seems to be in drawing up these two different bodies in order of battle upon two lines. In this case the foot must be told off by divisions, with intervals between each, that they may be enabled to retreat alternately: the dragoons should be posted upon
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the wings by troops; and supposing each division to consist of twenty-five men, there will be six in the first line and as many in the second; and the dragoons when divided by troops will form eight of fifty men each, of which four shall be in the right of the first and second lines, and the remaining four on the left. By this disposition the detachment will be enabled to retire alternately; that is, the six divisions the nearest the enemy will face about to the left, pass through the intervals of those in their rear, and place themselves at fifty or sixty paces distance, and by wheeling again to the right present a face to the enemy. As soon as they shall be placed, those of the second line will retire by the same evolution, always observing that the line which stands fast is to keep up a constant fire, till that which is retiring has passed thro' the intervals. While the foot are performing this evolution, the dragoons on the right and left of the first line must remain till the infantry has passed the intervals of the second, before they make their half wheel by four in order to retire; and so in proportion as the infantry shall retreat.

There is again another disposition for this detachment, although drawn up in order of battle, which is by placing the infantry on one line only three deep; for if it was four, it would be with great difficulty the rear-rank could fire, especially during the retreat, where the evolution ought to be quick, and the fire brisk and continual: whereas, being only three deep, the fire will be kept up with more ease, and even without the front rank being obliged to kneel; which should always be avoided in the presence of an enemy, because it is not certain that a soldier will rise after having fired, with all the alacrity that is necessary. The infantry should be told off in divisions; but in close order, that is, without intervals: the dragoons ought to be placed upon the flanks of the right and left in two lines, part covering the flanks of the infantry, and the rest a little advanced, to form a reserve, and prevent the enemy's hussars or dragoons from taking
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the detachment in the rear as it retreats. By this disposition, the infantry will retire by degrees, keeping up platoon firing. The troops in order of battle should always keep moving on, and the divisions who are to fire making a wheel to the right will fire, and recover their place by wheeling again to the left, as soon as they have fired: these divisions will be succeeded by others, and after this manner the troops will keep up a constant fire without retarding their march. When a division has fired, the men should load their pieces as they march, and every piece should be loaded before the division joins the main body, which constantly keeps going on. The dragoons should retire in proportion as the infantry marches, one troop presenting a face to the enemy, while the other retreats, always observing to cover the flank of the infantry. Those who are in reserve should march in the front of the detachment, and take care to prevent the enemy from turning it.

This disposition appears to be better than the former, because the troops being more together, form a stronger body, present a more considerable front, and are better able to sustain a brisk attack; they constantly keep marching, their fire is heavier and more continual, and there is a reserve to carry assistance wherever it is needful, an advantage wanting in the first disposition, where all the troops retiring one after another can be formed only on two lines. Being divided after that manner they cannot have so much strength; neither can the fire be so brisk, because as soon as the line which retreats has passed through the intervals, it will be no longer able to fire, and consequently the enemy has but half the detachment to cope with.

The reason for mentioning the disposition here condemned, is to shew with greater clearness wherein it is defective, and also to prove it should never be made use of, unless when the nature of the ground or any other obstacles may render a better impracticable; neither can it be made in

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a retreat of less than eight or ten battalions, and even then the disposition by column is the best.

If the detachment is stronger in infantry, and can form one or even two solid columns, the disposition will be excellent; and it is also necessary the flanks should be guarded by platoons of infantry intermixed among the troops of dragoons. The great advantage of the disposition by column is, that it can be adapted to all kind of countries, and to every sort of ground; it is strong in every part, and can march on without giving the enemy an opportunity of breaking through it, an advantage which neither the disposition upon one or two lines, or the square, can have, both one and the other being of course obliged to break, if the nature of the country requires it; and it is very certain the least movement of a detachment to alter a position in presence of the enemy is very dangerous, particularly when it is briskly pursued: whereas, a column sixteen deep or more in front, can easily be lengthened by being formed into eight deep, in case the country becomes enclosed and contracted. If the enemy should divide in order to surround the column, the platoons of infantry mixed with the troops of dragoons which are placed upon the flanks, ought to charge the one sword in hand, and the other with bayonets fixed, that part which appears to be weakest. If the rear-guard, which ought to be fifty paces from the detachment, is attacked, its chief attention should be to repulse the troops attacking it in rear, because its flanks will be guarded by the platoons of infantry, which may be joined by others in a case of necessity.

If there should be two columns, the advanced and rear-guards shall cover the interval between them; and then the platoons and troops of dragoons shall be placed upon the flanks which are uncovered, and not between the two columns, where they would be useless. The troops which cover the flanks, shall observe the march of the columns, in order

der to retreat at the same time. By this disposition the fire will become brisker, because that the rear-guard, only covering the interval of the two columns, does not prevent them from firing; and by it they are so protected, that the enemy cannot take them on their flanks; and the front of defence is more considerable.

If a rivulet, a hollow, or any like advantages occur, which may serve as a support to a flank, whether the commanding officer causes the detachment to retreat in order of battle, or in a column, he must take advantage of it, and cause the flank which is exposed, to be strengthened with infantry and dragoons, which will serve as a cover to it.

If the detachment, whether it retires alternately, or together in one line, has a bridge to pass, the commanding officer shall have established a post there, in order to guard it; and being, by this means, master of it, he ought to perform that evolution which M. Saxe calls the Chaplet; that is, the two first troops of dragoons upon the right and left march through the intervals of the second line, pass the bridge, dismount, and line the river on both sides the bridge; the two others follow; and the same must be performed by the second line. The first division on the right of the first line, and the sixth, will perform the same evolution, and join the dragoons lining the river; the second and fifth will do the same, as well as the third and fourth. When the first line shall have passed, the second that was formed in six divisions, will form but in three; so that, by reducing their front, they will not conceal the infantry and dragoons on the other side of the river, who ought, by a constant fire, to cover their retreat. These three divisions will draw near the bridge, and being sustained by the fire of those already passed, the enemy will be unable to attack them in flank: in this position the first, by wheeling to the left, will march towards the bridge and pass it, and the second will follow it. As soon as they shall be got over, the last division will approach still

nearer to the bridge and pass it, being the whole time protected by the fire of the troops already passed. The enemy, seeing the whole detachment got on the other side, all except the last division now drawn near the bridge, covered and sustained in the rear by a column of grenadiers, will never expose his troops to the fire of the infantry lining the river, as he can have no farther hope of cutting off the detachment. In this position the detachment should remain till the enemy retires, and should also cease firing, unless the enemy comes too near; but if his retreat is real, the detachment should, as soon as he is at a certain distance, break down the bridge, if a wooden one; but if a stone one, it should stay till the enemy is got so far, as to make his retreat sure, and render it impossible for him to come up with the detachment again; and it will also be proper to send two or three troops of dragoons to observe his motions: when the return of the enemy shall be no longer apprehended, the dragoons will return, and the detachment proceed on its march toward the camp. These two or three troops of dragoons should remain at least a quarter of an hour near the bridge, drawn up in order of battle, to observe whether or not the enemy will return: during that time, the detachment, by marching on, will gain so much ground of the enemy, as to avoid being molested by him a second time. The dragoons who remained at the bridge will join the detachment after the time abovementioned, and form the rear-guard of it. If this detachment, instead of retiring alternately, marches only in one line, it must observe the same dispositions, and pass the bridge after the above manner. See the FOURTEENTH PLATE. FIG. I.

If the detachment retreats in column, the dragoons must also pass the bridge first, dismount, and line the river; after which the heads of the columns shall advance to the bridge, leaving the necessary distance for those ranks who have fired to pass. If there are two columns, they shall
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join and form but one; by that means rendering their force more considerable: then the head, as far as the third part of the column, will pass and join the dismounted dragoons who are posted to the right and left of the bridge; during this time the rear-guard, supported by the picquets, will keep up a continual fire. As soon as there shall be infantry enough passed to protect the flanks of the column, the rear-guard shall be divided into two, and be placed upon the two flanks of the columns. Then the three rear-ranks of the column must fire, and afterwards retreat by dividing in two, the one to the right, and the other to the left; and must pass the bridge marching on the outside of the column: the rear-guard, composed of four bodies, two of grenadiers, and two of piquet, will retreat one after the other, according as the length of the column is reduced. When the whole column is passed, the grenadiers and piquets will join; the two piquets will pass first, one after the other, and last of all, the grenadiers. As soon as all the troops shall have passed, the commander will observe the dispositions before-mentioned. See the FOURTEENTH PLATE. FIG. II.

The dispositions for a detachment of infantry retreating in a plain from before cavalry much superior to it, will be different: cavalry has a very great advantage in a country where there are no obstacles to prevent it from acting, and where the infantry has not the shelter even of a bush. On these occasions, the safety of a retreat from before brave and well conducted cavalry, depends upon the propriety and strength of the disposition which is given to the infantry.

Suppose five hundred foot retreating from before a thousand horse: the foot may retreat in a square, the four angles being covered on the outside by grenadiers; these grenadiers should preserve their fire till the horse come so near, that they are in danger of being broke in upon, unless they can keep them at a distance by firing upon them. The fire of

this square should be carefully managed and given by the platoons, when the horse is within the distance of thirty paces; for if the enemy is permitted to come nearer, the soldier, incapable of reasoning like an officer, is often more frightened at the horse than the man; and being too much confused to present his piece, and fire properly, will fall back, and, consequently, make an opening in the battalion, through which resolute cavalry will not fail to enter; whereas, when the enemy is at thirty paces distance, he is not yet near enough to intimidate the soldier, but is at a proper distance for the fire to have the wished effect. But even suppose, for a moment, that the soldier is not frightened at this great body of cavalry coming down upon him, and waits for it till it is almost within reach of his bayonet, in order to make a surer fire, and at the same time to thrust his bayonet into the horse's breast; as it is the nature of a horse when killed, to fall forwards, or when wounded, to push upon that part from whence the blow came, the soldier is of course obliged to give way, to make room for the killed or wounded horse; therefore, if only one horse, dead or alive, gets into the ranks, the square is broke; which is one of the reasons for not suffering the enemy to approach nearer than thirty paces; and the fire, if well directed, will have its full effect at that distance, and the killed or wounded horses will not be within reach of breaking the square. The reason why the square should not fire by divisions is, in case any troops of horse should remain unbroken, and continue the charge, they will find a fire from every part, which will, in all probability, at last force them to retire in disorder, to a distance from the square. But notwithstanding, for many reasons abovementioned, the disposition in column is always preferable to that of a square: five hundred foot will form a column sufficient to retreat with safety, and keep up a constant fire.

If the detachment is stronger in infantry, and the enemy proportionably

ably superior, a column is best, because the column being full, forms a body that must act together, and of which all the evolutions are uniform; an advantage not to be found in a square, as there will be a great void in the center, and one side of the square may march faster or slower than the other three, which may cause an opening at two of the angles, although guarded by grenadiers.

Suppose a detachment of twelve hundred foot, retreating in an open country, attacked by two thousand horse; the disposition in column is imagined to be the best it can take. This column shall have sixteen men in front, and sixty-two in depth; the remaining two hundred and eight, supposed to be grenadiers, shall be divided into four parts; two of which will support the two flanks at the head, the two others those of the rear-guard: by this disposition it is imagined the infantry will be enabled to make a good retreat. If the enemy should attack but one side, by firing in the manner above directed, he will certainly lose great numbers before he will be able to come near the column: besides, the depth of the column occupying far less ground than the enemy's cavalry, unless he forms himself in four or five lines, the infantry can never be engaged but with the first line. Those in the rear not adding to the weight of the charge, it must be impossible for rear-ranks of cavalry to add to the force; the success of the attack chiefly depending upon the quickness with which the troopers in the front-rank charge: thus the column of infantry is stronger in itself, than the line of cavalry by which it is attacked.

If the enemy should attack the two flanks, then the column, by making a motion to the right or left, will be formed in eight ranks on one side, and eight on the other; and if the advanced or the rear-guard is attacked, it will then be, the grenadiers inclusive, thirty-four men in front. Thus it appears that on whatever side the column is attacked, it will be in force, and capable of resisting so superior an enemy.

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The detachment should be caused to observe a profound silence ; so that the firings when ordered may be executed with the utmost exactness. It is the officers' duty to make the platoons they command obey, and to prevent them from firing till they judge proper ; for it is very certain, if the soldiers are left to themselves, they will be firing continually ; and the column having thrown away its fire would present so favourable a moment for the enemy to make the attack, having nothing to fear but the bayonet, that he would scarcely fail seizing the opportunity : but if care hath been taken to preserve the fire, and to fire by platoons only, it is morally certain that a column in this disposition can retreat safely from before a body of cavalry very superior. If the enemy can be prevented breaking into the column at the first charge, it is very certain his ardor will be greatly abated in the second, and still more in the third, till at length he shall be repulsed with great loss, and the detachment perhaps escape without losing a man.

It is often more difficult to make a fine retreat than to beat an enemy ; one false motion, or too much precipitation, may give the enemy an opportunity of penetrating at some part or another, particularly if he is active. It is the authority a commander hath acquired over his troops, and the confidence they have in him, which will ascertain the exact performance of every disposition he shall order : ability in the commander of course produces confidence in the soldier ; that gained, authority soon follows, always more to be depended on when produced by love and esteem, than when it is the effect of force and power.

A soldier's judgment is formed rather upon affection than upon a rational knowledge of the merit of his officers ; in which case it is difficult to deceive him : under the command of one he marches with pleasure, when perhaps were he commanded by another, his arms would be ready to fall from his hold. A general should be considered as the soul of his troops ; a brave commander communicates his courage to them, whilst a fearful one renders them timid and irresolute like himself.

CHAP. XV.

The Retreat of a Detachment of Cavalry and Hussars, in a woody and mountainous Countay.

ALTHOUGH all military operations of course present difficulties, and require deep consideration in the person to whose conduct they are entrusted, there are still some more difficult than others, and where the least oversight, either in the disposition of the troops, or in the exactness of the evolutions, may be productive of an entire defeat.

An officer commanding a detachment obliged to retreat from before a superior enemy, ought to be more particularly possessed of that quickness of eye by which he will be enabled to turn the mistakes of the enemy to his own advantage, and to oppose art to number, as well as great coolness in judging of the dispositions proper to be taken to avoid being deceived; and a thorough knowledge of the country, to prevent his falling into places which may retard his march, or to be drawn into any ambuscades the enemy may have prepared for him.

In order to avoid inconveniences in retreating, the retreat should always be foreseen and provided for before any detachment sets out for any country of what kind soever. The commanding officer should know what places are in his rear, and cause them to be secured; and he should always make his detachment retire slowly and with great order.

The rear-guard, which by being most exposed, hath therefore more occasion for strength and courage than any other part of the detachment, ought to be composed of grenadiers sustained by piquets. The grenadiers are the flower.

flower of the troops *, it being well known that no soldier can gain admission among them who is not remarkable both for his courage and honesty.

In a mountainous country the enemy cannot present a larger front than that opposed to him; and the country also being narrow and enclosed, there will be no reason to fear his attacking the detachment in the rear, which also having already marched over the road through which it retreats, ought to be thoroughly acquainted with it, more particularly as it hath been carefully examined by the hussars advancing; in consequence of which the commanding officer will have caused all the passes and avenues in the road to be occupied after such a manner as to avoid being cut off in his retreat. Although the commanding officer has, and seemingly ought to have no other view in taking these precautions than the enemy who attacks the rear-guard, nevertheless the defence of the flanks should not be neglected, as they may be attacked by the enemy getting possession of the heights, which the detachment ought to occupy by detachments drawn from each different body. It is in the moment of a retreat the posts should be reinforced and defended with the greatest obstinacy; for should the enemy, who will leave no means untried, get possession of them, the retreat will become very dangerous and difficult to be executed.

It is certain that as cavalry will find great difficulty in acting in a mountainous country, the enemy's detachment will consist chiefly of infantry, to which perhaps some hussars and dragoons may be added, for scouring the country in front and upon the flanks. The detachment retreating

* The French do not choose their grenadiers, as we do, for show and stature; the admission of a man among the grenadiers is always looked on as the reward of some brave action; even that is not sufficient, if the soldier hath not also the character of an honest man. It is very rare to see a French grenadier punished; for whenever one of them is guilty of a crime, his comrades expel him the company, scorning to herd with a man, who, by a mean action, disgraces their body.

should

should also be supplied with some for the same purpose; but these troops in either detachment will be of no service in the action, the pursuit, or the retreat, because as the country will be so enclosed and narrow as to allow the enemy to employ his foot only, the detachment must oppose him with the same troops, and send the hussars into the front.

The troops of the detachment ought to fill the road; but the rear-guard, composed of grenadiers and piquets, should leave an interval sufficient for two men on each side, that when the three first ranks have fired, they may, by dividing, march on the right and left, to the head of the rear-guard to load their pieces again. While the rear-guard is performing this, the detachment should continue marching slowly on; and must never be above sixty or eighty paces before the rear-guard, that it may be ready to give it assistance if briskly attacked.

The troops which occupy the heights must regulate their march by that of the detachment, keeping the same pace, because if they should march faster, the flanks will be uncovered, which will enable the enemy to attack with an advantage that may perhaps prove the ruin of the detachment. If the heights are so impracticable, that the detachment cannot get possession of them, there will be no reason to be apprehensive of the enemy from them, as the difficulty of possessing them will be equal; but should it be in the detachment's power to occupy them, the troops posted there must have a place of rendezvous given them, which will be appointed by the commanding officer; and the thorough knowledge he ought to have of the country, will direct his choice in fixing upon that which will be most secure. The troops occupying the avenues which are in the road through which the detachment retreats, can abandon them more speedily, provided they stay at the entrance of the avenues, where they should also remain till the detachment is almost passed, when they will join it, and fall into their ranks.

There is yet another disposition by which a detachment may retreat. In the one above-mentioned, the rear-guard is supposed to sustain the whole force of the enemy, and the body of the detachment to be out of danger, unless from some random shot; but if the retreat should be a long one, the troops of the rear-guard will not only be greatly fatigued, but will also have expended all their ammunition. In order therefore to divide the danger and fatigue equally amongst the whole detachment, to render the defence more considerable, and the fire heavier, it is imagined that if the three rear-ranks of the detachment were divided in two, and placed upon the flanks of the rear-guard, which would make four divisions, and perhaps more, the rear-guard being capable of forming two or four, according to the breadth of the road; the fire would by that means become rolling and continual. When the two divisions detached from the body of the detachment have fired, they will make an half wheel to the left, and retreating along the side of the detachment to regain the head of it, will be succeeded by others. This evolution may be continued till the country enlarges, and then it can be executed with great ease; but to perform it well and readily, the side-step must be made use of.

If the road is so large as to admit of two companies being drawn up in order of battle, the retreat will be effected with greater ease; because these two companies, forming eight platoons, can keep up a continual fire as they march; which is nearly the same as the disposition above mentioned, except that the troops in the body of the detachment must support it, without marching upon the flanks of the rear-guard. This disposition is easily executed; it requires but one general word of command, and it is the business of the officers commanding platoons, to take care the firing is executed with great exactness. There is no other movement to make, but to march, to come quickly about, to fire, and march on again.

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It is a principle, the goodness of which has often been confirmed by experience, that every movement where telling off is required must be faulty, because it takes up a considerable time, occasions delay, and produces confusion: whereas this manner of retreating, by dividing the troops in divisions, requires no calculation; and the retreat once begun, no alteration in the disposition will be necessary.

If the enemy makes a brisk attack upon the rear-guard, it should endeavour to sustain this first shock, in order to give time for the troops of the detachment to come up; then, without waiting for the enemy's second charge, it should fall upon him with fixed bayonets; which resolute proceeding will greatly astonish him, and abate his eagerness. If it startles him, the detachment will continue its retreat in the manner above-mentioned, unless any irresolution on the enemy's side should present an opportunity of beating him, although superior: if he should not give ground, the detachment should endeavour to give the first charge with the bayonet, because, as has been already said, between two bodies of equal strength, that which receives the first blow should in consequence of it retire: then the depth of the detachment, although not equal to a superior enemy, ought still to give it strength and weight enough to bear him down, if it charges first. On every occasion where the enemy presses and attacks briskly, resolution should supply the place of number, and render the detachment equal in force, and, if possible, superior.

If the country enlarges, the detachment must present as considerable a front as possible; in which case the retreat may be made in one line without intervals, taking care to fire by divisions: and also, that every part is well defended, and that the flanks are supported by some hill, hollow, or rivulet, to prevent their being turned.

AN ESSAY ON THE

Hussars are of no use upon these occasions, because they are unable to act against infantry in confined countries; but in proportion as the country enlarges, they become useful; and as the enemy will certainly embrace the opportunity of employing those belonging to him, they must be opposed by those of the detachment, the ground being equally the same for the detachment which retreats as for that which attacks: but if the enemy has none, and the country grows large enough to give room for the hussars to harass his flanks, the infantry should seize that opportunity of charging him in front with bayonets, while the hussars attack him in flank and rear sword in hand. At this time the infantry should by no means fire, because the hussars attacking on all sides will be as much exposed to it as the enemy. The reason the detachment attacks the enemy, although superior, is because his superiority in these circumstances is reduced almost to a level with the detachment by being destitute of hussars to oppose those employed against him. This attack must be vigorously and expeditiously executed, which is seldom to be done by firing, that serving rather to amuse than to decide the enemy's defeat.

In a brisk and vigorous attack the sword or bayonet only should be used; the brave man remains firm, whilst he who must be forced to his duty, is terrified at seeing the enemy so near, and often, without making the least attempt to defend himself, seeks for safety in flight. The nearer a body of troops is to the enemy, the more formidable it becomes; for a coward may, at an hundred paces distance, kill a brave man, whose looks, if near, he would not dare to encounter. It was this which occasioned the following saying of the chevalier Bayard, when the French first began to use fire arms: "Adieu to French valor; henceforth the bravest man may be slain by the greatest coward."

If the detachment meets a defile, as the commanding officer, who is supposed to have secured his rear, has undoubtedly left a post in it
 suf-

sufficient to guard it, the hussars should pass first, then the infantry of the wings, that is to say, the division upon the right, then that on the left, and so on, till the whole detachment shall be passed.

During the retreat of every division, those next the enemy shall keep up a continual fire, always drawing nearer to the defile, and leaving sufficient room for those which are retreating to pass. Those who retreat first will possess themselves of the heights, if practicable, in order to protect those still retreating, and those making head against the enemy. When there remains no more than two divisions to pass, they should join, in order to form a more considerable body, and cover the entrance of the defile: these troops, when joined, will perform the same evolution mentioned in the foregoing chapter.

If the detachment retreats through a woody country, the commanding officer should be careful to suit his dispositions according as access to the woods is easy or difficult, as they are continued or intermixed with small plains. When woods are easy of access, the infantry, who has the same advantage for retreating as the enemy hath for attacking, can take whatever disposition will be most convenient to oppose the superiority of number, make up for its own weakness, and contribute to the order necessary for a retreat: if the access should be difficult, the enemy's infantry will reap no advantage from number. The flanks of the column should be covered by platoons of foot, thirty paces distant from the column, placed at proper distances from each other, with orders not to lose sight of the troops they are intended to cover.

If these woods are continued, the commanding officer of the detachment will cause the same order of march, and the same dispositions to be observed; but if they are intermixed with small plains, the infantry shall march always in a column; the hussars in front, unable to act against infantry whilst in a wood, shall be divided on the right and left by detachments,,

detachments, intermixed with platoons of foot, but for no longer time than the troops continue in a plain. As soon as they enter the woods again, the hussars will resume their former posts in the front.

If the detachment is sufficiently strong to form two columns, and the situation of the ground allows it, the disposition will be still better; for the troops, by taking up less ground, will be more together, and consequently stronger.

If, instead of hussars, the detachment hath dragoons with it, part, or even all of them should be dismounted, according to circumstances and the country through which the detachment marches, to render it as near equal as possible in infantry to that of the enemy; especially as they are of no use when mounted, and obliged to retreat through a mountainous or woody country: the dismounted dragoons shall sustain the grenadiers, who will again be supported by the piquets. If the country enlarges, the dragoons must be ordered to remount, and guard the flanks and rear of the infantry, which may be harrassed by the enemy's hussars; if the detachment is obliged to pass a defile, they will again dismount, and join the infantry: those who hold the horses will pass first, and the detachment will observe the same order in the passage, as hath been directed above.

War in a mountainous and woody country is very difficult, and the nature of it absolutely different from what it is in an open one; neither can it be carried on without great trouble, and a thorough knowledge of the country. The operations are more embarrassing, because the ground will not allow a general to act as he would chuse; therefore an officer should, during a peace, by study, reading, and examining the maps, endeavour to instruct himself in the method of making war in a mountainous country, that he may not be at a loss when called upon; which may often happen, as a war on the frontiers of France must be in a mountainous

tainous country, except in Flanders, or in the Palatinate. It is true that theory alone will not prevent an officer from committing many faults, which he will avoid, when the experience of many campaigns is joined to it: theory will nevertheless assist practice, correct the officer in his dispositions, and make him less liable to commit mistakes, than if he was unacquainted with either.

Santa-Cruz, in his Military Reflections, strongly recommends reading; and mentions the example of Alexander, who always carried the works of Homer about him, which he stiled a collection of all military discipline, and heroic actions. Charles XII. of Sweden, directed by the same impulse, always carried a Quintus Curtius in his pocket.

In effect, reading the history of great men elevates the mind, enlightens the understanding, and assists the presence of mind of a judicious officer in giving ready and immediate orders, which cannot be done even by a man of understanding who has not read. On every occasion he practices the principles wherewith reading hath furnished him, and which enables him at once to see the intention of any of the enemy's marches or movements; and his conjectures being frequently confirmed by experience, his judgment will become more ready and solid.

CHAP. XVI.

The Retreat of a Detachment of Cavalry in an open Country.

CAVALRY, when in an open country, can defend itself against, or attack any sort of troops; it has the ground necessary to perform its evolutions, and can take the properest dispositions either for attacking or retreating. In an attack, the success depends upon the disposition and the expedition with which it charges the enemy; and the success of the retreat will greatly depend upon the order, silence, and exactness of its motions; it can even, if of superior force, attack a detachment of infantry, with the expectation of beating it. It is very certain that, at the battle of Rocroi, in 1643, the cavalry could not break through what remained of the Spanish infantry, which had formed itself in a square; and the great Condé, then duke of Engheim, was obliged to break that body with cannon. But this is one of those few examples of firmness and courage, which cannot be laid down as certain rules, because they are so very rare, and even exceed any maxims that can be given for their practice.

It is true that those troopers who make the first attack upon infantry, whether in order of battle, in a column, or a square, are exposed to great danger, and may be called a forlorn hope; but if they charge with resolution, vivacity, and expedition, and one or two can break into the battalion, the remainder of the troops who follow, may certainly penetrate at the same place.

A detachment, whose march is stopped in an open country by another detachment of the same nature, but of superior force, ought to retreat by
troops

troops or squadrons, according to the force of which it consists; but as cavalry in detachment generally marches in troops, and never in squadron, except when the standards march, it should be formed in two lines, with intervals; the troops of the second line being placed opposite to the intervals of the first.

Suppose a detachment of six hundred horse is divided into twelve troops of fifty each; by which means the first line will consist of six troops, and the second of the same number. As soon as the commanding officer shall have ordered the retreat, the first, third, and fifth troops of the first line shall retreat by wheeling to the right, by four; and passing through the intervals of the second line, shall post themselves eighty paces distance in the rear; and shall, by wheeling again to the left, by four, make a face to the enemy. The second, fourth, and sixth will perform the same evolution, and take their place on the side of those already retreated, if the ground will admit of it; but if it is straightened, they must march fourscore paces farther, and make a face towards the enemy, after the manner of the first: the second line will perform the same evolution by three troops at a time. It may easily be seen by this disposition that, if the ground should grow narrow, the detachment must be formed upon four lines, instead of two; it should nevertheless continue upon two as long as possible, in order to present a more considerable front to the enemy. The reason of the first, third, and fifth troops being ordered to retreat first, and not the whole six together, is, because it may happen that, although in an open country, there is not always room sufficient for six troops to march in front; besides, if the first line was to retreat together, it is a movement which would give the enemy a very favourable opportunity of charging it at the instant its back was turned towards him; whereas, by only three retiring at once, there still remains three others, who make a face to the enemy, and keep

him back; and with so much the more ease, as they are sustained by the second line. Again, if the ground grows narrow, a fresh order must be given to make the three first halt, that the three others may march on to a farther distance; at which time the enemy could fall upon the second line, it being unsupported by that which is retired. There is still another reason for imagining this disposition to be a good one; and that is, if the first line retreats together, the enemy need only to wait till it is upon the point of passing through the intervals of the second; at which time he would be sure of beating it, by charging it briskly, because the first line of necessity turning its back to the enemy, he would have only the second to engage with; which would not only be unable to resist his impetuosity, but would also be greatly embarrassed by the line that was retreating. The above disposition for twelve troops can be equally made with more or less, according to the nature of the country.

If the detachment consists of cavalry only, without either dragoons or hussars, the commanding officer should cause a section to be posted upon each flank of the two lines, to cover, and prevent the enemy from attacking them. These sections should be placed thirty paces distant, and must not retire till the whole line hath retreated; that is, after the three first troops are retreated, the sections should remain till the three last have passed into the intervals of the second line; after which they will retreat, and place themselves upon the flank of the line they are to cover; and those covering the flanks of the second line shall act after the same manner.

If the detachment is obliged to retreat in four lines, instead of four sections there must be eight, that the flanks of each line may be covered; but as each line, in this case, will consist only of three troops in front, and the retreat will of course be very tedious, if they are obliged to retire one after the other, two troops of carabineers should therefore be formed;

formed ; which being divided into four, will always leave troops sufficient to sustain those which are retiring. The distance of these four troops from the main body should not be above sixty or eighty paces at most ; and they will make their retreat chequerwise, two and two ; that is, the first and the third, then the second and fourth : they must be careful not to mix with the detachment, but must form the rear-guard of it. The two troops which retreat first, should not march more than forty paces into the rear, when they will halt, and present themselves to the enemy ; the others proceeding in the same manner. On this occasion, these troops of carabineers should fire, but should manage their fire in such a manner, that it may be just sufficient to keep the enemy at a distance ; and they should always be ready, in case they are too hard pressed, to have recourse to their swords, and charge the enemy together.

If the detachment has any hussars belonging to it, part of them should be posted in the rear-guard ; of which part, one half should be formed into two troops, and the other should be dispersed, in order to slacken the pursuit of the enemy, by keeping a continual fire upon him. The two troops of hussars which are in order of battle, must retreat one after another, because one should always continue to sustain that which is retiring, and which ought to retreat in proportion as those, in order of battle, follow the detachment.

The hussars which are dispersed, and those forming the two troops to sustain them, should take care never to be at too great a distance from the main body of the detachment. These hussars should have orders, in case they are briskly attacked by the enemy, to divide in two, and place themselves on the flanks of the detachment, instead of retreating to it ; first, because they are not well enough mounted to bear the shock of the cavalry ; secondly, if they retire upon their own cavalry, they will not only prevent it from marching up to the enemy, but will even

help to break it, if they are not careful in passing through the intervals of each troop; therefore, to avoid this inconvenience, it is thought better for them to retreat to the two flanks, which will not prevent the cavalry from marching, and by a brisk charge, sword in hand, seconded by the hussars, abating the impetuosity of the enemy: the remainder of the hussars ought to be placed, instead of sections, by troops on the right and left flanks of the two lines, to cover them. The hussars designed to cover the flanks, should not fire, but should have a small troop or section, drawn from their own corps, upon their flank, to keep a fire upon the enemy, if he should approach too near.

If there are six troops of hussars belonging to the detachment, four should be distributed after the following manner: two to the rear-guard, one dispersed, another divided into two; the remaining two should be posted upon the flanks of the two lines, their own flanks being also covered by sections detached from them. If the detachment retires in four lines, four troops will form eight; in which circumstance there can be no sections upon their flanks, as each troop will consist only of twenty-five men; therefore, if necessary, they must keep up a fire upon the enemy. If there are dragoons with the detachment, and the country an open one, they must perform the same service as hussars, with this difference, that there shall be none placed in the rear-guard; but their disposition being the same as mentioned for the two troops of carabineers, they will divide into four troops, and retreat after the same manner: the others shall be placed on the flanks of each line, after the manner of hussars.

If there should be any hedge, hollow, or hollow-way in the road by which the detachment retreats, a party should be dismounted, and posted in it, that the detachment may proceed in the retreat, protected by their fire. The enemy, whose detachment is supposed to consist only of cavalry, not chusing to expose himself to the fire of the dismounted dragoons, will, in all probability, give over the pursuit.

If there should be infantry in the enemy's detachment, it would be useless, being unable to keep pace with the cavalry, and, consequently, the enemy can pursue with horse only. In this situation, the cavalry and dragoons should continue retreating, without the latter being dismounted, which will prevent the enemy's infantry having time to join his cavalry; which it would otherwise have, if the dragoons were dismounted to stop his cavalry, which certainly would remain quiet till joined by its infantry, and would immediately make a very brisk attack upon the dismounted dragoons, while the enemy's cavalry charged that belonging to the detachment. If, by the prudent and proper conduct of the officer commanding the detachment, the enemy's cavalry is separated in such a manner from his infantry, as to offer a favourable opportunity, and time sufficient to attack him with advantage, it should undoubtedly be done; but the commanding officer should have made his dispositions with such propriety, and should be possessed of such an exactness of eye, as to be almost certain the charge will not prove ineffectual, nor the infantry have time to join the cavalry during the action.

It would be presumption to assert, that an officer, by following the above directions, will be entirely secure from being worsted, as the measures proper to be employed for preventing it, and the means of retreating in order, and without confusion, can only be pointed out. Rules for succeeding can only be given; for it may happen that a retreat may miscarry, notwithstanding the goodness of the dispositions, or the exactness with which the orders are executed; there can be no real certainty of success where chance and circumstance have any influence. The enemy's superiority, an enterprising general, and troops who will second his endeavours to the utmost, may prove unsurmountable obstacles to the retreat of a detachment, although composed of very good troops, and commanded by an intelligent and brave officer: and even should these
troops

troops be beaten, they will have nothing to reproach themselves with, they having performed and executed, to the utmost of their power, the dispositions and orders of a skilful commander; the ill success should therefore be considered not as a fault, but a misfortune.

A brave and good officer may be beat even by his own fault, if he hath neglected to take proper advantage of any circumstance, or hath not been careful to conceal his designs from the enemy. Such a man certainly deserves blame, but there are different methods to remind him of his errors, which not only give him a proper sense of them, but will also correct his judgment, and encourage him to do better another time. Severity is not always successful; it dispirits an officer, and renders him timid, the consequence of too much circumspection: too much attention to the minutiae of his duty, frequently causes him to neglect matters of importance. The effects of severity are still more dangerous, when carried to too great a length among the soldiers: although too much forbearance makes them indolent, yet too much severity renders them perfidious and cruel. A general should not overlook essential faults; on the contrary, he should cause them to be punished, but not in such a manner, as to drive the criminal to despair. Before M. de Turenne reprimanded any officer who returned unsuccessful from an expedition, he enquired of him the reasons to which he attributed his miscarriage; if in his answers he discovered intelligence, and he made an honest avowal of his faults, so far was that great man from upbraiding him, that he encouraged him by a promise of soon giving him an opportunity of retrieving the disgrace he had sustained. An assurance so flattering, of course inspired the officer with courage, and produced all the good, but none of the bad effects of a reprimand. A conduct so remarkably humane, could not fail of rendering the general beloved, of gaining the confidence of the soldier, and of forming excellent officers.

Vige-

Vigetius has particularly laid down the precautions necessary to be taken in a retreat, although they depend chiefly on the sagacity of the commanding officer, whether he retreats to avoid an action, or whether the enemy's superiority is so great, as to make it impossible for him to maintain his ground; he also mentions the proper methods of deceiving the enemy's vigilance.

He also observes, that there should be some reason for retiring, assigned to the soldier; not that he should know it is on account of the enemy's superiority, for that would tend only to discourage him, and encrease the enemy's confidence: on the contrary, he should be persuaded it is to draw the enemy into an ambuscade, or to gain some advantageous post. The same author also advises a general to conceal all his motions, as much as possible, from the enemy. The method practised by the Romans to conceal the number of their infantry was, by extending the horse in the front of it; behind which cover the troops retreated one after the other, beginning with the first divisions, and so on with the rest: but the inconveniences arising from such an evolution, in presence of the enemy's infantry, may have been seen in the foregoing chapter.

In the same author may also be seen many other methods of retreating on like occasions. In a word, whatever may be the nature of a country, or the kind of troops retreating, and capable of acting in it, the commanding officer of them should oppose the enemy's dispositions by such others, as may entirely destroy his intentions. It is on these occasions an officer must have recourse to his own genius for expedients; more knowledge being required to keep back an enemy, when retreating before him, than ability necessary for harassing him.

The END of the FIRST BOOK.

ESSAYS
ON THE
ART OF
WAR
BOOK THE SECOND

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ESSAY
ON THE
ART of WAR.
BOOK THE SECOND.

JUSTICE and humanity having been considered, in this work, as the first principles of war, the chief intention of the first book hath therefore been, rather to convey maxims for a just defence, than to lay down rules for attacking. According to the original laws of nature, man, weak and fearful, was not desirous to attack, peace and self-preservation being in that state, according to M. de Montesquieu *, the first natural law ; but that timidity hath by degrees, and by the prevalence of the passions, been converted into fury, and man now imagines the security of his own being to depend upon the destruction of his fellow-creatures, his liberty upon their bondage, and his grandeur upon their depression. It is even possible that the authority which some have usurped over others, and the desire of appearing formidable, was originally owing to sollicitude for their own safety ; neither would it be impossible to prove, that the bravery and courage which have immortalised so many heroes, were, in reality, nothing more than the specious coverings of fear. This truth, seemingly paradoxical, is not less striking, if the cruelties, which

* Liv. i. Chap. 2.

have been at all times exercised against the conquered, are properly considered. If conquerors fought only in defence of justice, and to punish vice, why should they be so strongly bent upon the destruction of their enemies? It is because, blinded by passion, they dread becoming themselves the victims of their revenge another time. Thus even attack may be proved to be only a necessary precaution for avoiding those dangers with which a man imagines himself threatened, and it may also be said to differ from defence only in superiority of force. This is one reason why the subject of Attack has been reserved for the second book. By observing the various operations from the opening to the closing of a campaign, it may be seen, that the whole is nothing more than a series of defence; and that the fear of being attacked is the real source from whence these precautions for attacking, spring. Why does a general endeavour to surprise his enemy, or penetrate into his counsels by means of spies? Why is he watchful to draw him into ambuscades, or desirous of surprising him in his camp; of taking his convoys, and of opposing detachment to detachment? Do not all these operations naturally suppose, that the general who attacks, mistrustful of the toils which are spread for him, seeks to discover, to destroy, and defend himself against them? Even in the day of battle, the greatest part of those soldiers who are most inured to service, think not of victory, till after having recollected that the enemy's success must prove their own destruction.

CHAP. I.

Of Spies.

IT is impossible for a general, or even for any officer, charged with the command of a detachment, to act with certainty, if they have not spies or secret intelligence dispersed about in the enemy's army; they will have the mortification to see all their designs miscarry, and all their precautions will become useless, because they will be improperly taken.

Strada, Turenne, and Vauban, strongly recommend having them, whatever expence they may occasion: Vauban * also adds, that a general had better be in want of many particulars, however necessary, than be destitute of spies. Nothing, says M. de Puysegur † should be spared to procure them; and even the promises made to them should be observed with the most inviolable integrity.

M. de Feuquieres ‡ observes, that spies are of many sorts; they are to be found in the cabinets of princes, in the closets of ministers, amongst officers of the army, and in the councils of generals; in towns belonging to the enemy, and in monasteries: some offer of themselves, others are formed by the generals, or by the ministers; but the desire of gain is what chiefly encourages and tempts them to undertake this business.

Besides the spies of the cabinet, there are again others who make it their business to go from one camp to another, and give an account of all the enemy's transactions. Care should be taken that they are unacquainted with each other, and particularly that they are not known to any gene-

* *Traité de l'attaque & de la defence des places.* Chap. 2.

† *Tom. ii. Chap. 8. Art. 3.*

‡ *Mem. de Feuquieres.*

ral or officer: they should be always spoken to alone, and never be suffered to meet each other.

The general should study their character, and prove them by repeated trials; he should sound them by degrees, beginning with things not difficult to be explained, and which, if discovered, will not be of great consequence; he should engage them in long conversations, thereby to form a judgment of their parts and comprehension; and he should also employ them often in bringing him intelligence.

Although a general should always be upon his guard with a spy whom he hath cause to suspect of treachery, he may nevertheless draw great advantage from him, provided he knows how to deceive him properly; because he may be very certain he will inform the enemy of all the resolutions which have been taken.

The emperor Leo, in his *Tactic* *, advises a general, who hath reason to imagine his counsels are betrayed to the enemy, to conceal his real designs, by speaking in a manner quite opposite to them; for, says he, in the maxims at the end of his book, an enemy must be deceived, who receives intelligence from spies or deserters directly contrary to what is actually resolved upon; and should not the enemy give credit to their reports, he will of course neglect their intelligence, and then the general may take his precautions accordingly: but should the enemy repose confidence in them, he will be deceived, and consequently fall into the snare laid for him. But, adds he, should these spies be entrusted with the general's real intention, he should, by some alteration in his operations, endeavour to persuade the enemy they have deceived him; upon which he will grow mistrustful of them, and be obliged to look out for others, no longer daring to confide in the former.

If a spy employed by the enemy is discovered, and brought to the ge-

* Sent. Milit. Summ. Chap. 20.

neral,

neral, he ought to take him in private, question him with mildness, speak to him with a sort of confidence, and, instead of threatening, should promise him a reward, if he will discover to him what he knows of the enemy's intentions. If the general finds him intelligent, he should endeavour to engage him in his service; and, provided he can gain him over by force of money, a thing not difficult, he may derive great advantage from him; but he should be careful how he employs him; till he hath very good reason to be assured of his fidelity.

There are many different methods of trying the veracity of a spy; if, for example, the general receives information, that, on such a day, a detachment of the enemy is to set out on some expedition, he should then send out troops to double the number of those detached by the enemy; by which means, if the spy's intelligence is true, the enemy will not only be baulked in his design, but may also be beat by the superior detachment: if the enemy's detachment has but a trifling object in view, it will be sufficient to send just troops sufficient to examine into the truth of the spy's report. The general may also pretend to appoint a foraging within two days, and order but few troops for the chain; in which interval, if the spy is false, he will find an opportunity of giving the enemy notice of it: but, instead of the few troops publicly ordered, the general will privately add another body to them, which will be placed in ambuscade behind the place where the pretended forage is to be made. If the enemy, in consequence of this information, should come and attack the chain, it should immediately retire, as if too inferior in number to continue the forage, toward the troops in ambuscade; when, being joined, they will fall upon the enemy on all sides, who will certainly be surpris'd at seeing the troops which he attacked, so prodigiously increased, and attacking him in flank, front, and in rear: if this attack is made with vivacity and resolution, there may be great reason to expect it will terminate in a complete victory.

If, on the contrary, the spy does not appear intelligent, or affects stupidity, the general should punish him with death, and cause him to be hanged in the sight of the whole army, in order to deter others, which may be dispersed in the camp, by his fate. It would be needless to question him concerning the enemy, because it would appear inhuman to execute a man who had given intelligence of importance, whether extorted from him by fear, force, or perhaps a promise of pardon.

Spies are as necessary to a general, as arms are to an army; but it is money only that can secure their fidelity; and if a general finds himself ill served, it is because he has been too sparing of the funds intended by his sovereign for that purpose. Notwithstanding it is the duty of a good subject to manage his master's finances as much as it is in his power, yet there are intelligences of so great importance, that it is scarcely possible to pay sufficiently for them. A man is sufficiently indemnified when, by means of the intelligence he has received, he has concerted his measures in such a manner, as to beat the enemy, gained some marches over him, or to be beforehand with him in some enterprize.

The emperor Leo*, in his Sentences, says, that spies should be resolute, industrious, and active. Spies thus qualified will be exact and true in their reports; but if they are trifling, vain, and timid, it is to be feared they will never be able to relate the truth.

Spies, when discovered, should not always be punished with death; great advantage may be made of them, by pretending ignorance of their real quality, especially if they are not sufficiently disguised. Tacitus†, in his Annals, says, that Vitellius's party got information of Otho's designs by means of his spies, who, by endeavouring to dive too minutely into their enemy's secrets, did not sufficiently conceal their own.

Vigetius's‡ method for discovering spies, who are suspected to be rang-

* Art. 34.

† Annal. Lib. 3.

‡ Liv. 3. Chap. 5.

ing about in a camp, is to order all the soldiers and servants into their tents during the day, and the spies will be taken immediately.

The general should be careful that the spies are unknown to each other. Those of Pausanias occasioned the death of that great captain, because Aristides, who shared the command with him, discovering by his spies the understanding between Xerxes and Pausanias, caused the throats of all those whom the traitor sent to him, to be cut, to prevent their contrivances being known at Sparta. Such practices deservedly meet such a fate; but it would be difficult for them now to meet encouragement, the generals and officers making part of the legislative power; but, nevertheless, spies having a knowledge of each other may occasion great inconveniences, that may be very prejudicial to the schemes of a general, or any particular officer. When spies are strangers to each other, a general is better served, and he can depend with greater security upon what they say, because, by being unknown to each other, he can try the fidelity of one, by comparing what he says with the reports of others; and if they all agree in the same story, their intelligence should be looked on as certain; whereas, if they know each other, they can with ease cook up a tale among themselves, and not vary in their relation: besides, a spy conscious of being known, always fearful of being sold, acts neither with confidence or resolution.

When a general is ignorant of the enemy's designs, he should always affect a knowledge of them; but whenever he is informed of them, he should, on the contrary, pretend to be ignorant of them; by which means the enemy, being easy with regard to his spies, will not alter his designs, or suspect the general of having any knowledge of them.

If the general can procure such spies as, by their employment, are near the person of the enemy's general; as, for example, a secretary, or any others who are near him, and who consequently can give intelligence,

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more to be relied upon than those who are constantly passing from one army to another ; and as it is very often by means of these people of consequence that common spies gain their intelligence, their service may be turned to a very great account.

If a general discovers an enemy's spy to be one of those who, by their employment, are near his person, he can receive great advantage by forcing him to write a letter of false intelligence, thereby to divert the enemy's attention from the plan he would execute ; but he should cause him to be hanged immediately after, for it would be very imprudent to use him above once. The prince of Orange, when he came to attack M. Luxemburg at Steinkirk, having discovered one of his musicians, who gave the enemy intelligence of every thing he intended, made use of this stratagem ; and although it was rendered abortive by the vigilance of M. de Luxemburg, and the courage of his troops, there are nevertheless but very few instances where it hath failed : and even M. de Luxemburg would have been beaten, if he had not had timely notice given him by his advanced detachments ; by which means he had time sufficient to make his dispositions, and to avoid being surpris'd.

There is a stratagem which may be made use of when spies are wanting, and which is less expensive ; that is, to send supposititious letters by the first peasant that comes in the way, who will have nothing to fear ; and so far from concealing himself, he must take a road where he will be sure of falling into the enemy's hands : these letters should be directed to the general officers commanding a body of troops, or even to the general of the army, supposing they come from an advanced body. They should contain schemes that are good, and practicable in their execution, but quite opposite to what is intended, and will really be undertaken : it often happens that the enemy, too credulous, abandons his original designs to pursue chimerical ones, which to him appear very good, and do
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not present any obstacle to those which the general designs to execute. Prince Eugene succeeded, by this stratagem, in raising the siege of Coni, formed by the French in 1691.

But nevertheless a general should take care that, through a fear of being deceived by supposititious letters, he does not himself too much neglect the intimations which are given him : a general ought, says Onozander *, to listen to every body at all times, and upon all occasions. Alexander †, when at a great distance from his own country, not being able to receive his couriers till very late, refused to give attention to a peasant, who came to inform him of a shorter route ; but soon repenting of what he had done, he sent to seek after him, but in vain.

The same reason that should make a general always have spies in the enemy's army, should also make him suspect that the enemy has some in his ; therefore he should endeavour to deceive them, he should keep his intentions secret, mention them to very few, and always talk openly, contrary to what is really designed. Onozander ‡ observes, that it shews great folly in a general to mention his designs publickly, especially when they are on the eve of execution ; for deserters generally go over to the enemy, at the time an action is unavoidable.

But if it is discovered that the enemy has received information, Vegetius says, that the dispositions must be immediately changed. Polybius §, on like occasions, particularly recommends silence and dissimulation ; he even stretches this rule as far as the thoughts themselves, which he says must sometimes be repressed, for fear our actions should sometimes betray and discover them. Metellus || answered one of his friends, who, on an important occasion, asked him the reason of certain dispositions, “ that if his shirt knew what he thought, he would burn it.”

* Chap. 17.

§ Lib. 9.

† Quint. Curt.

‡ Chap. 13.

|| Valer. Max. Lib. 7. Cap. 4.

To avoid the danger of treachery, sealed orders have been used with great success, which have been sent to officers, with express orders not to open them till at such a time, and at such a place: this is an established rule at sea, and can also be practised on shore, when employed in an expedition that it is essential to conceal from the enemy. In a word, it is as impossible to conceive stratagems sufficient to discover the designs of the enemy, as it is to use precautions enough to deceive his spies.

Montecuculli, in his Memoirs *, collects together, in a few words, the rules which have been now laid down. Spies are engaged and kept, says he, by force of money, but often they are false: it is therefore proper for a general to make sure of them, by having their wives and children in his possession: if they propose any enterprize, it must neither be known to the others, nor even should they be able to guess among themselves at the time of executing it: prisoners, trumpets, deserters, as well from the enemy's army as his own, peasants, couriers, soldiers in disguise, and messengers, may all be employed as spies.

There will never be any want of these sort of people; but, in order to engage their fidelity, they must be very well paid.

* Book. i. Chap. 2. Sect. 32.

CHAP. II.

Of Ambuscades.

A General who loses a battle, says Vegetius*, may attribute his ill luck to fortune, although these kind of events are generally the effects of art and skill; but he who suffers himself to be surprised, and who falls into the snares laid for him by the enemy, has no excuse to make, because, by his vigilance, and the goodness of his spies, he might have avoided them.

A design should never be formed for an attack upon marches, detachments, convoys, forages, or upon one or many quarters, without knowing the ways which are to be passed, and the places where ambuscades may be formed; whether to avoid, or whether to conceal troops in them, in order to facilitate a retreat, or to draw the enemy into it. A general, who receives information from his spies that some enterprizes are intended upon some bodies, detached from the army, upon one of his convoys, on a forage, or upon his quarters, ought also, on his side, to form ambuscades in the ways leading to it. The number of troops in ambuscade ought to be regulated by that of the detachment intended to be surprised; it should be sufficiently strong to attack the enemy on all sides, that is, in head, flank, and rear. The troops who set out to form an ambuscade should always march by night, unless it be in a country so covered, that the enemy cannot perceive them.

A general, according to Santa Cruz†, should endeavour to form as many ambuscades as possible; so that, if the enemy should not fall into

* Book 3. Chap. 5.

† Tom. V. Des Dispositions avant la Bataille.

one, he may not escape the others : they ought to be disposed after such a manner, that one can neither attack or be attacked without being heard, sustained, and assisted by the others : this junction is a stratagem which the enemy could not expect, and which will assure the victory. If, from the fewness of the troops, or the fatigues of the campaign, it is impossible to form many, there should at least be one sufficiently strong to resist the enemy it would attack ; but still it is not requisite that it should be as numerous as the enemy, because troops in ambuscade who charge a detachment, that is unprovided, on all sides, ought, by this surprize, to have a particular advantage, and consequently supply the place of number ; which will certainly be the case, particularly if the enemy falls into the ambuscade during the night, and that care hath been also taken to place a great number of drums and trumpets, that when the troops in ambush charge, they may serve to encrease the numbers in appearance, by the terror which noise always raises in the night-time.

In order to deceive the enemy who is in detachment, small bodies should be sent out towards him, with orders, to retire to the troops in ambuscade, as soon as they meet him.

Ambuscades should always have some object. Before they are undertaken, it should be known, whether the enemy is in the field ; if he intends either to attack or molest the quarters ; whether it is proper to wait for him, or to seek him : without these precautions the troops will be fatigued, and no end answered.

Ambuscades may be composed of infantry, hussars, or dragoons ; but it is the situation of the country that must determine which. These troops may be mixed together, or sent separately ; but that must be according to the design intended to be executed, or according to the nature of the troops employed by the enemy in his detachments.

If the design is to attack a convoy, all these troops are necessary, because
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cause the escort of it will undoubtedly consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons, and also some hussars to clear the march; if a green forage, infantry is very necessary, but it should always be left in the rear to secure the retreat: cavalry, with hussars or dragoons, is sufficient to attack a forage, to beat the escort of it, or at least to prevent the foraging being executed. If a dry forage is to be attacked, it must be done with infantry, because, as it can only be performed in the villages, it is certain they will be occupied by infantry, and that there will be a chain of cavalry in the front, which will be protected by it: if a detachment, it is according to the nature of the country through which it marches; if an open country, horse, hussars, or dragoons, must be employed; but in a woody or mountainous country, infantry must be made use of. After all that can be said, it is impossible to lay down fixed rules for the kind of troops which should be employed: there are some woody countries where hussars and dragoons can act with ease, and be of great service: there are mountains where they can act securely, because very fine plains, divided by woods, are to be found in the bodies of them, where they can place themselves in ambuscade; but care must be taken to secure their retreat. There are, on the other hand, plains so divided by hollows and canals, that infantry only are capable of acting; therefore, it is the general's business to discover from which kind of troops, in either country, he may expect the greatest advantage.

An ambuscade seasonably and properly formed may overturn the best concerted enterprize; it is a spring of great resources during the course of a campaign; it is by the assistance of that, a general attains the completion of those strokes which are owing to vigilance, and which will never happen when by a negligence to be condemned, or through pretence of consulting the ease of the troops, they are suffered to linger away their time in camp, or in quarters, without being sent out in detachment.

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Foreſight and activity are the firſt ſteps toward great actions; a general endowed with theſe qualities may accompliſh all, or at leaſt a great part of whatever he undertakes. The more difficult an enterprize appears, the more ſhould a general try his genius, to find out ſuch expedients as may do honour to the imagination of a great ſoldier. A general, with a genius and a liking for his buſineſs, will find reſources on every occaſion: want of ſtrength will be ſupplied by art, and ſtratagem will prevail over ſtratagem.

There is no country but preſents ſome place proper for forming ambuſcades; hollows, a rotten place, from which it is eaſy to fall, the leaſt height, woods, hedges, ruins, vineyards, ſometimes corn-fields, marſhes covered with reeds, all preſent expedients to a general, who knows how to take advantage of them; he muſt only be careful to place the ambuſcades after ſuch a manner that they ſhall not be diſcovered by the enemy's parties; and that they are not themſelves diſcovered by the inattention of any of the ſoldiers, by noiſe or by other accidents, ſuch as have been mentioned in the chapter of marches, relative to a march made with ſecrecy. It has there been ſhewn how highly dangerous it is to have dogs, by whoſe barking all may be diſcovered.

If the ambuſcade conſiſts of huſſars or dragoons, the horſes muſt not be together, their neighings may prove very prejudicial. Even a peaſant, attracted by the barking of a dog, or the neighing of a horſe, may go into a wood, diſcover an ambuſcade, and, often induced by the hope of a reward, will go and give the enemy information of the whole. Every perſon paſſing near an ambuſcade ſhould be ſtopped, and that without noiſe; the peaſants ſhould be tied to trees, and guarded by ſentries. If the ambuſcade is formed in an hollow-way, behind an high ground, or in any places whatever, the general muſt cauſe every body that is taken to be tied together, and well guarded.

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The troops in ambuscade must fall on all parties of the enemy that pass near them, unless when the design is to carry off a convoy, or to attack a large detachment. It should in that case continue silent, and let them pass; but if these parties, by making a strict examination, discover the ambuscade, as there can no longer remain any hope of attacking the convoy or detachment, it should fall upon, and endeavour to surround them, and, if possible, take them prisoners; and if the troops in ambuscade are so lucky as not to let any of the enemy escape, the ambuscade may remain in its first situation, and always pursue its first object, because there will be no reason to apprehend the enemy's having received intelligence of it.

The troops in ambuscade should attack these parties sword in hand, and not with their fire arms, and, if possible, prevent them from using theirs. From this manner of attacking, there will result two considerable advantages; the first is, that a brisk and unexpected attack astonishes, and scarcely gives them time to think of their defence; the second is, that by firing it is to be feared, that if there are any other parties farther off they will hear it, and send and give notice: it is true, that if those who have heard the firing come to the assistance of the first, and if the troops of the ambuscade find themselves the strongest, this would then be an advantage; but if the enemy's parties should be stronger, the advantage would then turn on their side. Again, should they not come, the enterprise on the convoy or detachment will fail, because there is no doubt, that being sensible of their inferiority, they are gone to seek fresh assistance: in this case, the ambuscade must change situation, and place itself in some other part, but not abandon its original project till the last extremity, and till there is no longer any hope of succeeding otherwise.

The least thing, as has already been said, may be the occasion of an ambuscade's being discovered. The fire of a pipe may be seen at a great distance in the night-time: besides, however small the number of soldiers

diers who smoke may be, the wind may carry the smoak, and the smell of the tobacco toward that part where the enemy patrols. The ambuscade should not be cumbered with servants, or any thing else that is unnecessary; orders should be given that the horses are tied with care, and that a profound silence is observed by every body. As it is very difficult for hussars or dragoons to march, without leaving marks behind them, by which means the road leading to the ambuscade may be discovered, they should try to enter it by some bye-way, or at least by as dry a one as possible. In order to efface the marks of the horses feet, eight or ten hussars or dragoons may tie branches of trees to their horses tails, and, by marching behind the detachment, in as large a front as the whole body, will destroy any marks that are made: as soon as they shall have entered the wood, they will close up the entrance with the same branches, of which they will make a sort of hedge.

If the wood is large, it may be entered at different parts, and the hussars and dragoons may also be made to enter it separately; the footsteps will be more trifling: although the marks which are left by the infantry are not so plain, it may yet practice the same method of entering the wood. If the detachment intended to form an ambuscade, whether infantry or cavalry, is obliged to march upon a high-way, as soon as it comes near the place appointed, the commanding officer should detach a body on before, with orders, to take up the same front as the whole detachment. As soon as it shall have proceeded a quarter or half a league, it will return by another way; and it should also make a large circuit, so that the enemy's parties coming the same way, will not perceive that they shall be stopped by any troops in that place. This body will rejoin the troops which are in ambuscade, by a road the most out of the enemy's view, never in a body, but scattered, so that they may leave fewer marks behind them. Sentries should be concealed behind bushes,

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in the front of the ambuscade, so that they may be able to see the country and ways about them, without being seen themselves: two or three soldiers should also be made to climb into trees, in order to see at a great distance, and give notice if they perceive any troops; the same method must be observed with regard to hussars or dragoons.

Before the commanding officer enters the wood where he would form his ambuscade, he should detach two or three patrols to scour it, for fear the enemy should happen to be there in ambuscade himself; after every part has been searched, the troops must enter the wood, and range themselves according to the order that shall have been given them. The commanding officer will form three bodies of his detachment, and place them at a distance one from another; one will be destined to attack the advanced-guard, the other the centre, and the last the rear-guard. If the detachment consists of cavalry, the half of each corps should be on horseback; no persons should slip or pass the sentries or vedettes under pain of being declared deserters. During the night, the cavalry should be mounted, and the infantry under arms: in the day-time, half those on foot will relieve those on horseback every three hours, and the same should be done with the vedettes, as well the infantry and sentries.

If the ambuscade is behind an height, or small mountain, sentries must be placed on the top, laying on their bellies, and without hats: in other respects the same dispositions ought to be observed, whether on the march, or for the conducting of ambuscades, always paying a proper regard to circumstances, and the situation of the country.

There are divers methods of drawing the enemy into ambuscades. The general commanding the army or quarters sends out a detachment under the command of an intelligent officer, to form an ambuscade, at the distance of one or two leagues, more or less, according as the country is fitting for those sort of dispositions, or according to the distance of the

enemy. The general must acquaint this officer that two hours after he is set out, he will send out another detachment, of less force, with orders to go on the side where the enemy is, to endeavour to meet him, and at first fight to make a feint of charging him; but, as if finding him too strong, he will begin his retreat, directing it toward the place where the troops are in ambuscade: furnished with these instructions he will set out.

Then the general will send for the officer intended to command the detachment that is to go in search of the enemy, and inform him of that which is set out to form the ambuscade, and of the place where it is; he will order him to advance as near to the enemy as he can, and to draw him by a feigned retreat upon the troops in ambuscade.

These two officers should be the only persons informed of the design: but nevertheless the commandant of the detachment which is to go towards the enemy, may communicate it to the principal officers under his command; so that in case he should be taken or killed in the retreat, he that succeeds in the command may be able to act according to the general's intentions. He must be particularly careful, that no soldier, trooper, hussar, or dragoon, penetrates into the design of the detachment, as it would then be in the power of a single deserter to make the ambuscade miscarry. It may, as has been already said, be composed of different kind of troops without distinction, or of one sort only: the situation of the country ought to determine whether it should consist of hussars, dragoons, or infantry; but the detachment which is to go and seek the enemy, in order to draw him into the ambuscade, ought to be composed of hussars, unless the country be of such a nature that infantry only is capable of acting.

During the time that the hussars are gone before, endeavouring to draw on the enemy, the troops in ambush will be on horseback, and waiting in silence for their commander's order to go out and charge. As soon as they shall have charged and beaten the enemy, for fear lest another detach-

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ment, at a little distance from that which has been beaten, should come to its assistance, they will take the shortest way, and march leisurely, but with order, towards the camp or the quarters. The detachment which drew the enemy into the ambuscade, must form the rear-guard of it, and will march slowly on, while the rest of the troops will retreat, conducting the prisoners with them. If the enemy sends any succours, as soon as the rear-guard perceives them, it will double its pace, but with order: there will be no reason to apprehend the enemy's coming too briskly upon it, because he will be fearful of falling into another ambuscade: thus the rear-guard will retreat with ease, and the troops who conduct the prisoners have time enough to reach the camp, without any molestation.

It is on these occasions that a man should know how to keep his courage within proper bounds, and be sensible that flight is glorious: the despair of an enemy that is surprised, and even beaten, is always to be feared, when he is not entirely defeated. A man should always be content with one victory, without attempting a second: he may, by pursuing the enemy too eagerly, fall himself into ambuscades more dangerous than that he has just drawn the enemy into.

Robert, count of Artois*, having discovered a ford, obtained permission from St. Louis to pass it, in order to facilitate the passage of the Christian army, with a promise of undertaking nothing till such time as it should be passed. He passed it safely, but, contrary to his word, he threw himself with eagerness upon a detachment of three hundred Saracens, who fled before him. Carried away by his courage, he followed them to their entrenchments, which he forced; and, not being content with this success, more glittering than solid, he still pursued them to a ruin which he saw open: he engaged himself in it, contrary to all the

* Hist. de Malthe, Tom. i. Liv. 3.

remonstrances of the most intelligent generals of the army; he entered, followed by his soldiers, who at length, busied in plundering, were charged in their turn by the Infidels, who had rallied. In short, the count of Artois, the generals who had not been able to stop him, the Hospitallers, and the Templars who accompanied him, perished on that unfortunate attempt; a loss which was the cause of the taking of St. Louis, brother to the count, and of the calamities which the Croises sustained in that campaign.

If there is reason to apprehend that the enemy, having notice from some deserters, are coming in full strength, the ambuscade must then change its situation, and draw nearer to the place from whence it set out; so that, if the enemy should be stronger than the ambuscade, it will have less way to retreat, because it is certain that he will march cautiously; that he will not go towards an ambuscade which he knows to be formed, but with design to attack; and his superiority cannot but prove fatal to the troops forming the ambuscade.

It may again happen that the enemy, not finding the ambuscade in the places pointed out by the deserters, will imagine it to be retired, and, in that belief, will neglect the precautions necessary in such a situation. In this case, the detachment must change place, and post itself a quarter of a league, at most, from where it first was, in order to fall upon the enemy, who will march on with confidence: but the detachment in ambuscade should be sufficiently strong, to be at least able to retreat before the enemy, if he is superior, and support itself by its own strength. Detachments of a thousand men have been often known to retire in order from before others of double or treble their number, which undoubtedly proceeds from the advantageous positions which the commander has known how to take; from the disposition he has made of his troops; the order he has established among them; and from the resolution with which

which he has inspired them : with these qualities, a commander may at least be certain that his troops will not be beaten, although they do not get the better, unless by a force so much superior, as to prevail over courage, and a wise and judicious conduct.

An ambuscade that is successful, may cause the destruction of a whole army. The example cited by M. de Feuquieres, in his Memoirs *; on that head, is striking. M. de Luxemburg, still attached to the prince, took all the baggage belonging to M. Turenne's army, because the lieutenant-general who commanded the escort did not foresee that the enemy, shut up in his lines of circumvallation before Arras, having two armies near his camp with a design of attacking him in his lines, could think of sending out a large detachment of cavalry on an enterprize of such a sort. In the mean time M. Luxemburg, who was in ambuscade, within reach of the column of baggage, seeing that the lieutenant-general was gone on before with the head of the escort, imagining the baggage in security, marched speedily to the head of that column, whose march he stopped, and turned toward St. Pol, where he conducted the whole baggage belonging to M. Turenne's army, without his knowing any thing of the matter. It is thus that, by the negligence of an officer, and by an ambuscade seasonably placed, an army finds itself stripped of all its baggage, and, as may be said, not in a condition of continuing the campaign.

If this lieutenant-general had been provided with spies, detachments in front and on the flanks, these detachments would have discovered the ambuscades, and, by the precautions usual on such occasions, he would have placed the baggage of the army in safety. Again, his spies would have given him notice, that a large body of cavalry was detached from the camp before Arras, consequently he would have been upon his guard;

* Remarques sur le Chapitre 72.

instead of which, being full of a false confidence, he marched as if in a champaign country, and, by this unpardonable remissness, occasioned the loss of the whole baggage.

An officer who commands a detachment, for any expedition whatever, cannot possibly take too much care to foresee the checks that may happen to him; if he is beaten, it should be wholly owing to a superiority of force. He who, after having taken all the precautions possible, is beaten by an enemy who has the advantage of number, has nothing to reproach himself with: but he who, with ability, has nevertheless neglected certain precautions, and is beat because they were not taken, is certainly culpable in the eyes of intelligent men. But if this check induces him to neglect nothing necessary to the avoiding of a second, he cannot pass for a bad officer; that appellation is only applicable to him who, suffering himself to be blinded by conceit, or the false lights which self-love makes him take for the effects of a superior genius, suffers the enemy to obtain an easy victory.

A general overcome, as Pompey was at Pharfalia, is not the less deserving of laurels and statues, provided that he does not suffer himself, to be discouraged, like that great man, after his defeat: but he who is beaten like Antony at Actium, raises compassion of none but a freed man, or a mistress.

Misfortune is an addition to the glory of an illustrious soldier, when he knows how to derive instruction from it for the future. The marshal de Créquy, before the battle of Confarbrick, was a great general, afterwards he was a great man. This was the judgment formed of him by the great Condé, who notwithstanding did not love M. de Créquy: "Sire, says he to Louis XIV. your majesty has just acquired the greatest man that ever professed the science of war."

CHAP. III.

Of the Attack of an Army on its March.

HOWEVER difficult certain operations in war may appear, they are nevertheless not impracticable, when a general knows how to take the necessary precautions for softening those difficulties. The attack of an army on its march seems to be above all reach of attempting; whereas the success of such an attempt depends only upon knowing how to take proper measures, on choosing the ground, and of seizing a favourable opportunity. It seems more difficult to surprise an army on its march, than to attack it openly: the number of the enemy's troops; the precautions which their general shall have taken, the order, the care, the secrecy which must be observed, present obstacles almost insurmountable; but yet, by taking the bye-roads, by concealing his march from the enemy, a general may attack him in force in the rear or upon the flank, at the same time that he causes his advanced guard to be attacked by some infantry, cavalry, and even cannon, to make him the less suspicious that the attack upon the flank is the real one.

When an army would attack another upon its march, it should endeavour to be beforehand with it, and, by the means of stolen marches, come up with it, before it can know any thing of the matter: some parties should be detached, who must place themselves in ambuscade, in order to stop all the comers and goers; so that the march and designs of the army may be kept secret from the enemy. Whenever a general hath determined to attack his enemy, he should send off all the baggage, both great or small, belonging to the army; and it should be left in the rear under a good escort, near enough to join after victory, without the army's being obliged to wait three or four days for it.

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The general should be well assured of the day on which the enemy's army sets out ; of the country through which it is to march ; whether it is an open, mountainous, or woody country ; if it is divided by rivers ; whether there are many bridges to pass ; and in how many columns it marches : he should also get all possible information of the disposition of it. In the third chapter of the first Book, relative to the march of an army in an open country, the disposition which it ought to make ; in case it presents its front or flank to the enemy, hath been laid down. The general designing to attack ought to regulate his dispositions by those which the enemy hath taken, and which he can only know from his spies ; but if the general cannot receive any information concerning them, the best rule for him is to suppose them good, and to form his own accordingly : it would be very imprudent of a general to suppose his enemy's dispositions are bad, when there is no danger in supposing them to be good, and acting in consequence of that supposition.

A general may march his army in six, eight, or ten columns, as the nature of the country will allow ; they should all arrive at the place appointed at the same time. The nearer the army is to the enemy, the brisker the attack should be ; because the columns having less way to go, the enemy will have less time to make his dispositions.

As in the case of a surprize there cannot be signals given, without running the risk of the enemy's discovering that he is going to be attacked ; it is therefore necessary, that every general-officer leading columns should have a watch, regulated by the general's, so as to march all at the same time, at the hour agreed on and ordered. The ancients, destitute of watches, regulated their motions by the course of the stars ; and it is, without doubt, on that account that Polybius, Onozander, Ælian, and many others, exhorted military men to the study of astronomy : but as it is not often that an army marches by night, this know-

knowledge would be very useless for an attack in the day-time; besides, the sun, by which they were also regulated, could be no way serviceable to them, should the sky be over-cast.

If the general's intention is to attack the enemy's army in front, he must detach all his light troops, sustained by a large body of cavalry and some battalions, with orders to harass the flanks, in order to perplex the enemy with regard to the real attack. It is impossible to give the enemy too many false alarms with regard to what is really designed: the hussars, from their readiness in retreating, and their quickness in passing from one spot to another, are the fittest troops for these sort of expeditions. The same rule ought to be observed, if the real attack is designed to be upon the flank; then the false attacks should be upon the front. In Santa Cruz* may be seen the dispositions which he has made to attack an army on its march.

Stratagem, and the means of surprising an enemy, are allowable in war, provided treachery is avoided. Whilst the law of nations is not infringed, successful stratagems add lustre to the genius of the general: however irreproachable the conduct of Scipio Africanus might be, the means made use of by him to surprise the army of Syphax, are by no means to be approved of.

The Roman general † amused the Numidian king with feigned propositions of peace, during which time he had his camp reconnoitred by officers, disguised like slaves, belonging to the train of the Roman ambassadors. There is no profession where a rectitude of mind is more necessary: a real soldier scorns to act by indirect methods; he abhors deceit, and considers treason as belonging only to mean spirits.

Attilius ‡, after the battle of Cannæ, came to Fabius, and offered to

* *Traité des Surprises*. Chap. 17.
Lib. 24.

† *Tit. Liv. Lib. 10. Dec. 3.*

‡ *Tit. Liv.*

deliver Arpi up to him, which he had formerly delivered up to Hannibal. Fabius having carried this proposal to the senate, they debated whether they should put Attilius to death as a runagate, who was neither a friend to the Romans, nor an enemy to the Carthaginians, and whose fidelity fluctuated according to the changes of fortune. Hannibal afterwards put the wife and children of this traitor to death.

Onozander observes, that promise and faith should be kept even with traitors*: a man may keep his word with them, and have nothing to fear, provided he knows how to mistrust them. The difference between stratagem and treason is very great; the one a man may guard against, but no degree of human prudence is sufficient to shield him from the other. When, as related by Virgil, by the contrivance of Sinon, the Trojans themselves introduced the enemy within their walls, they could cast the blame only upon their own imprudence and credulity; but when, in the Iliad†, Minerva is seen, in contempt of a sworn alliance, persuading Pandarus to shoot an arrow at Menelaus, one is apt to wonder how Homer dared to entitle Minerva, The goddess of wisdom.

In order to carry on a surprize by stratagem, one of the most certain methods is, to calculate what time is necessary for the army to arrive at day-break, near the road by which the enemy is to pass, so as to be able to examine the country, and make the necessary dispositions for the attack: in an open country the army may be concealed behind corn, or behind a rising-ground.

Prince Eugene, in 1702, after the battle of Crostolo, having gained some days march of the king of Spain, posted himself between the Zero and the Po. He so well concealed his army behind the bank of the Zero, that the combined army of France and Spain, which was on its march, and ready to enter into its camp, was obliged to range itself in

* Art. Milit. Chap. 35.

† Lib. 4.

order of battle, and to fight, without having scarcely time to make any disposition; and had it not been for those, which had been wisely foreseen by the king of Spain and M. de Vendome, it is probable the combined army had been beaten.

A woody country offers more expedients for the concealing of troops: but as it is to be supposed the enemy's advanced guard will be advanced at least half or three quarters of a league, to scour the country; therefore, if the general's design is to attack the enemy's flank, he must present some cavalry and hussars in the front of the enemy's army, so as to engage his attention. Some infantry should be placed in the woods, in the rear of these troops, in order to sustain them: this cavalry and the hussars should retire in proportion as the advanced guard advances, in order to induce the enemy to believe they are not sufficiently strong, and that the reason of their advancing was only to examine the march of the army. As soon as the enemy shall have reached the place agreed on by the generals leading columns that are to attack, the body of infantry that is in ambuscade in the wood, the number of whose columns should be regulated according to the situation of the country, will march silently, and near enough to the enemy, and will charge him with bayonets, without giving him time to recover himself: during this attack the cavalry, dragoons, and hussars, who keep the enemy's front in awe, will charge the troops who have passed the wood, and spread themselves over the plain. These troops of cavalry must be sustained by the infantry which was in their rear in the wood, and which should be furnished with cannon. These two attacks, made one after the other, but at some small distance of time, will render the enemy doubtful with regard to the dispositions he is to make; he will be undetermined where to send assistance, as the cannon which he will hear at the head, will induce him to believe that attack the real one: he will fly to that part, and will

consequently weaken the flank which is designed to be attacked by all the infantry. By this diversion the flank will, with greater ease, be broken through, and the enemy taken in rear: the enemy thus surrounded, and finding himself between two fires, cannot avoid being beaten.

It is more difficult to form ambuscades in an open country, particularly for a whole army, unless it should find a bank like that at Zero; then the general should consider, whether or not the attack of the army on its march is practicable. If the general by his superiority can, without weakening himself, divide his army, and find means to conceal it, he will attempt the attack, provided that each detached body is posted before the enemy has began his march, and that they can all join on the first order, without a possibility of being cut off, or finding any obstacle to prevent their marching up to the enemy: but, in order for a greater certainty of success, these first dispositions being made, great exactness in giving, and diligence in the execution of the orders, is necessary; each separate body should charge at the same time, and at different parts. But as it may happen the attack may prove unsuccessful, whether owing to the good disposition of the enemy, or whether because the attacks were not made together, or executed with equal vivacity, it is necessary that the general should have provided for a retreat, and that the officers commanding different bodies should know after what manner, and from what part it is to begin. For the greater security, the general officers ought to communicate their instructions to the commanding officer of each body composing that which they command, so that at the time of the attack or of the retreat, they may instantly comprehend the meaning of whatever they are ordered to perform.

If the army intending to attack the enemy on his march is weaker, or equal, either in number or in the nature of the troops, it is then only the situation of the country, and the facility with which the enemy may be
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surprised, that should determine the attempt of this grand enterprize : the prudence of the general ; his experience ; that of the generals who are under his command ; the quality of his troops ; whether they are well disciplined or not ; whether they are composed of one or of many nations ; the quality of the troops to be attacked ; and, in short, the genius of their general, are circumstances by which the attacking, or not attacking should be decided. It is impossible to be decisive upon these circumstances, which depend entirely upon the ground, upon the vigilance of the enemy's general, upon the order which he causes his troops to observe in their march, and, in short, upon the troops under his command. A general, at the head of a well disciplined army, composed of veterans and good general officers, will undertake and execute designs, which he would not even dare think of with a new-raised army, however numerous : it is also very difficult to surprise a vigilant general, who is besides a good soldier, and who is also assisted by the counsels of able and intelligent officers.

A general should also be guided in attacking the enemy on a march, by the country, and the nature of the troops of which his army is composed. If the enemy marches through an open country, and the general is equal to him in infantry, but superior in cavalry, he should make no hesitation in attacking him : but if the country is woody or mountainous, and the enemy's army is more numerous in cavalry than infantry, the general has still the same advantage with a superiority of infantry ; because the enemy's cavalry, in those kind of countries, is unable to act against infantry, and the infantry also, which the enemy may have, will never be sufficiently strong to maintain itself upon the heights against forces so superior : and if the heights are forced, there can be no doubt of the enemy's being beaten, of his cavalry being ruined and crushed to pieces, or that his retreat will be attended with great difficulty, and that he will lose the greater part, if not the whole of his army.

It is true that an army so weak in infantry and strong in cavalry rarely engages itself in a woody or mountainous country ; but it may happen that the enemy is obliged to pass through these countries, in order to transport the seat of war to a spot more favourable for the cavalry. On this occasion the general must endeavour to concert his measures after such a manner as to render it impossible for the enemy to molest him, to dispute any pass with him, or to attack him on his march ; if a general on any occasion engages himself rashly, it is a mark both of imprudence and want of capacity. If Amilcar Barcas had engaged himself in the streight of Hache with a greater number of cavalry than infantry, he would never have been able to overcome the African rebels, whose chief strength consisted in infantry. Hannibal would not have engaged himself in the Alps, without being much more numerous in infantry than cavalry, and yet the difficulty which he found in that passage was more owing to the trouble caused by the cavalry and baggage, than by the mountaineers by whom he was continually harraffed.

In a word, the attack of an army on its march should be foreseen before-hand. This operation requires the agreement of many circumstances, an inviolable secrecy, and an exact knowledge of the country : a plan should be laid relative to the precautions the enemy may be supposed to take in his march, as well as those necessary to be taken to steal marches of the enemy, to approach him in order, and for observing strict silence in the march. The general should also endeavour by all means to gain the inhabitants of the country over to him, to chuse a spot where he can march under cover, without which he can march only by night ; in which case it will be difficult to prevent some of the columns from straggling, which will be sufficient to cause the miscarriage of the enterprize. The general should have safe and intelligent guides, be certain of his troops, and have nothing to apprehend from deserters ; one of which is
enough

enough to baffle the best concerted measures. In 1693, prince Eugene, on receiving intelligence that the Turks had prepared a large convoy for the garrison of Temeswar, formed the design of carrying it off: he therefore put himself at the head of the detachment destined for the execution of this design; but a soldier who deserted to the enemy prevented the Turks from marching, and the prince was therefore obliged to return without accomplishing his design.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Attack of intrenched Camps.

THE principles of war among all nations and in all times have been still the same; but the little experience of the early ages of the world would not permit those principles to unfold themselves, as they have since done, and to which it is owing that new expedients both for attack and defence have been discovered.

In the fabulous times of Greece, the first conquerors were esteemed as Gods, because they, by their genius and valour supplying the want of art, were regarded as Beings superior to humanity, as mortals born for its destruction; but now, as arts of all kinds, and particularly the art of war, have soared to a pitch of almost perfection; these Gods of antiquity are no longer considered in any other light than as great men who made themselves superior to the rest of their cotemporaries. In proportion as posterity hath become more enlightened, it hath also become more just; it hath preserved the title of hero for those who have not made an ill use of their superior talents and strength; but hath given the detestable name of tyrants to those whose desire of revenge and rage have outlived their success.

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The first epocha, wherein the military talent became conspicuous, is the siege of Troy, although there were even wars prior to that. Homer *, when describing the shield of Achilles, mentions wars raised for the carrying off cattle. Horace confirms this; and in his Satires also mentions a war anterior to that of Troy, the occasion of which was the same †, and without mixing sacred authority with these profane ones: and those who know the passions can want no arguments to convince them, that men have been in a state of warfare, from the time they have been actuated by them, or, to use a better expression, as soon as mankind was formed into society. Even before the siege of Troy, Hercules and Theseus had already astonished the Greeks by their conquests; but although these two heroes have purged the world of many flagitious men, their victories are rather a proof of their strength and cunning, than of their knowledge in the military science. In proportion as Greece became polished by the laws of Lycurgus, the people more enlightened discovered, in the necessity of self-defence, the principles of attack. The Grecians gave birth to that science which the Romans extended, which succeeding ages improved, and which we have almost brought to perfection.

What a sensible difference is there in the military art, such as it at present is, compared with that, of which the rules are handed down to us by Onozander, Vegetius, the emperor Leo, Frontinus, Ælian, and many others? The towns, in their times, had no other defence than walls, raised at a great charge, flanked at little distances with towers, and a large ditch in front: it is true that the little force of their weapons contributed much to the advantages of their fortifications. Their entrenched camps had only a large ditch with some waggons placed behind it; and whenever the ancients were willing to practise all the art at that time known in war, they surrounded the camp with walls, in the same man-

* Iliad, Book 18.

† Nam fuit ante Helenam Mulier teterrima Belli Causa.

ner as they did their towns, with towers at little distances. Of this kind was Pompey's camp at Dyrachium in Epirus, the plan of which is given in the marshal de Puyféguir's Art of War: the wall by which it was surrounded, was fifteen thousand paces in extent.

The emperor Leo* was unacquainted with any other method of intrenching a camp, than by heaping fascines together, putting trees upon one another, and posting advanced guards.

The experience, which has been since acquired, hath, without abridging the labour, rendered the works of places stronger, and easier to be defended: the labour of the entrenchments for camps hath been shortened; they have taken a new form; and being constructed upon the same principles as the fortifications of towns, they are become more difficult to be forced. By this same experience the means of attacking them hath been discovered; and in proportion as offensive weapons have changed, and are become more powerful, the system of fortification has been new modelled.

The power and force of arms being become more considerable, it has been thought necessary to oppose them by such fortifications, as were capable of resisting them; and necessity has done that, which genius was, till then, unable to effect. It is for this reason that, in the latter wars, and in those of the present time, generals have not been contented with making ditches in the front of their camps, in order to entrench them, after the manner of the Romans, but have to them added lines, angles, and redoubts, at proper distances. Art hath been carried yet farther, by the addition of wells in front of the ditch: in short, M. Saxe in the last war, instead of making use of lines to entrench his camp before Maestricht, only caused redoubts to be erected at proper distances; each of which had a covered way, which was pallisadoed, and the redoubt fraized; and he also caused large and deep wells to be sunk in the ditch. Our

* Leonis Imperatoris Tacti.

posterity may perhaps discover something to add to the strength of these intrenchments ; the knowledge of a succeeding age being always encreased by that of the preceding.

A general should be determined upon the attack, and the manner of it, by the nature of the intrenchments, and the situation of the country. Such intrenchments as those of M. Saxe at Maestricht, are very difficult to be forced : nor can the design of it be formed without great superiority of force ; even then the success is uncertain. The strength of these intrenchments hath been seen in the sixth chapter of the first Book.

But a camp entrenched with lines may be attacked, although, at the siege of Philipsburg, Prince Eugene at the head of eighty thousand men, did not dare attack those which were erected by the duke of Berwick ; but this example should not serve as a rule. Two great men naturally fear and respect each other : prince Eugene being thoroughly acquainted with the duke of Berwick's ability, was therefore convinced that his rival had taken all those precautions, which he himself would have done in the same situation : the duke of Berwick, doing the same justice which all Europe did to prince Eugene's talents, had, to the prudence of his dispositions, added all the assistance of art. The prince having examined the lines, and finding them strong in every part, acted the part of a wise and experienced man ; the lines were not attacked, and Philipsburg was taken.

Camps entrenched with lines are not always equally strong in every part ; they are neither always commanded, nor even to be attacked by generals equal in talents, capacity, and experience ; and when they are, there are some occasions where force and resolution must be joined to the prudence of the dispositions.

Let an army be supposed entrenched behind lines, where art and nature are both joined ; whose flanks are sustained and secured, furnished
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with troops and artillery along the whole front, with more troops behind to sustain those which line the lines. The general who would attack, ought first to survey the situation of the lines himself, and, as much as possible, the enemy's disposition; he will examine the construction of the lines, how they are supported, their extent, and whether the soil is firm or light. As soon as he shall be perfectly acquainted with these circumstances, he may form his plan of attack, and cause his army to march in as many columns, as there are attacks to be made; but he should endeavour, as much as possible, to occupy the whole front of the enemy, whether for the strength, or whether to prevent the enemy from sending assistance to those places where the attack will be briskest. The head of each column should be well furnished with artillery; and as soon as it shall be within distance of cannonading the lines with effect, it should keep up a brisk and continual fire for the space of an hour at least, so as to beat down the earth of the parapet, and tumble it into the ditch, which will, in some measure, render the passage of it less difficult for the troops. The time of the attack should be an hour before day, so that the cannon may have fired, before the enemy shall know where to direct his artillery: after every discharge, the situation of the cannon should be changed either to the right or the left, in order to deceive the enemy's gunners, and prevent their knowing where to direct their pieces. If there should be any height within proper distance, the cannon should be planted upon it: if the cannon can be brought to cross each other upon the lines, the artillery will then have a very great effect.

The infantry should follow the artillery, furnished with hurdles, planks, fascines, pick-axes, and shovels; the fascines will serve to fill up the wells, if there are any before the ditch; or, if there are no wells, they will fill up the ditch, and the hurdles will be thrown over them. The cavalry should be formed in two lines in the rear of the infantry, in or-

der to sustain it. The general should endeavour to find some ridges, to conceal the cavalry from the enemy; but should there be none, it must be placed at such a distance, as not to be exposed to the cannon of the lines; for should it be placed too near, it will very soon be destroyed, without having it in its power to be of any service: the great fire which it will sustain, may strike it with terror, which may cause it to give back, and discourage the infantry, or at least deprive it of that resolution and vivacity which it had, knowing itself to be sustained; besides, it is great inhumanity in a general to expose troops which he can place in security. The enemy appears less formidable, when force can be opposed by force; but the bravest soldier will be often disheartened, when he sees himself exposed to blows which he has not in his power to return. Besides, as in the beginning of an attack of lines, the cavalry cannot be of any assistance, and cannot act till the infantry hath penetrated in some part, it would be useless to cause it to advance too near, provided it is within reach of marching readily when the infantry has passed, and hath made a passage large enough for it, by beating down the lines and filling up the ditch; the cavalry then will have no more to fear from the cannon of the lines, because the enemy's attention will be more engaged with endeavouring to repulse the infantry, than with firing upon the cavalry. As soon as the lines have been sufficiently cannonaded to beat them down, and throw the enemy into confusion, the infantry should march resolutely and together; and should take care to leave room for the artillery, so that it may advance at the same time, and continue its fire. The attack should be made by the grenadiers sustained by the piquets: they will protect the soldiers who fill up the wells and the ditch; and as soon as they find an opportunity of passing, they will endeavour to get over the entrenchments, sustained by the whole infantry of the column, which will then be disencumbered of the fascines, hurdles, &c. in order

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to drive the enemy from his lines. As soon as there are soldiers enough upon the lines to bear the resistance of the enemy, the soldiers who have the shovels and pick-axes, and who ought to be last, will finish the filling up of the ditch by beating down the parapet of the lines, and making an opening sufficient for the passage of a squadron in order of battle. Then the whole infantry of the column that has broke through, will pass and divide into two parts, to let the cavalry pass, which will form under cover of the fire of the infantry, and will not attack the enemy's cavalry, till it shall have collected its whole force together.

If one of the attacks succeeds, on the first news, which will soon be spread throughout the army, all the troops at that time ought briskly to attack the whole front of the line, in order to employ the enemy, and prevent his sending assistance to the part that is forced. The reserve, which is composed of infantry and cavalry, ought to join the troops that have broke through the lines, to sustain the cavalry charging that of the enemy, and cannot be sustained by the infantry who passed the first, because it is employed in taking the enemy in flank to the right and left. In this situation, when the reserve and all the cavalry which followed the column that hath passed, and to which others may yet be joined, shall have passed, it should attack the enemy; if it is repulsed, it can never be to any great distance, because it has infantry behind it, to sustain it, and by its fire to stop the enemy. If the lines are forced by many columns, the success and also the defeat of the enemy will be thereby rendered more certain.

This disposition appears to be good, because the lines having been partly destroyed by the cannon, because the enemy cannot but have lost a great number of men, and because part of his artillery has been dismounted, without the army that attacks having sustained much loss. The prince of Orange in 1639*, being posted upon the Ghete, at Nervinde, en-

* Mem. de Feuquieres, Tom. 3.

trenched his army after such a manner that it could not be surrounded, his right was supported by a river, and his left by the village of Romdorff, bordering upon the rivulet of Landen. M. de Luxembourg, being willing to attack him, could only get up with his cavalry in the evening, his infantry and cannon not being able to come up till night: that general during this time formed his disposition, and between five and six in the morning he put his army in motion, which formed in order of battle as it marched along, the infantry and cannon in front, and the cavalry in the rear.

When the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene *, still encamped between the town of Pianeza and la Venerie in 1706, marched to attack the lines of the French army that besieged Turin, they caused their armies to march in eight columns, the infantry formed the advanced-guard, the artillery distributed by brigades marched at the head between the columns, the cavalry was behind in six, and out of reach of cannon-shot.

The disposition of marshal de Coigny in 1744, in order to attack the lines of Wissembourg, of which the enemy were in possession, was like it, except that the whole of his army had not time to get up; but as the moments were precious he did not wait for it. The army which came from Landau divided itself into four, which formed the four attacks, one of which was at Wissembourg, the other at the mill between that town and the village of Picards, the third at the village of Picards, and the last was made above that village, which was entrusted to the Hessian troops. His cavalry, which was behind, passed after the infantry had broke thro' the lines; but the enemy were then almost either killed or taken, and those who could save themselves, retired to Lautrebourg, where their army had assembled after having passed the Rhine. It is difficult to determine which is most to be admired, whether the general's disposition,

* Hist. P. Eugene.

the quickness and exactness of his eye, and his coolness in a circumstance so delicate, or the courage of the French troops, who forced these lines in less than two hours.

As soon as the enemy is beat and abandons his lines, he must be pursued, but with precaution. The vivacity with which he should be pursued, depends upon the order with which he retires: if it is an open country, the general may follow him so long as he sees all clear before him; but if the country is divided with defiles and woods, it would by no means be prudent for him to engage himself in them, for fear of any ambuscades being placed there by the enemy, in order to secure his retreat: nevertheless, the general should endeavour to make the most of his victory, and should never be content to win a battle by halves; at least it should be carried so far, as to make the enemy sensible of his loss, and of rendering him incapable of continuing openly in the field.

But if the army that attacks the lines should be unable to force them, after many repeated attacks, and if the general perceives his troops are discouraged, he should immediately retire. If the retreat is made over an open country, he should begin it by marching off the cannon, the infantry next, and the cavalry will form the rear-guard in two or three lines; the hussars and dragoons will be upon the flanks of the cavalry: if there are any defiles or woods to pass through, the general should leave some infantry at the entrance of them, to sustain and protect the cavalry, which will retreat by files. If the enemy is in full strength, the general should leave some field-pieces with the infantry that is posted at the entrance of the woods and defiles, which will certainly stop the enemy's impetuosity: if, on the contrary, the enemy pursues the army with only a few troops, it will be proper to charge him, if he approaches too near. In this disposition an army may retreat easily, provided that order is observed, and the movements not made with too much precipitation.

CHAP. V.

Of the Attack of a Convoy.

THE same motive that ought to oblige a general to practise every resource of art, in order to conduct the escort of a convoy in safety, should also induce him to use the same expedients to carry off the enemy's subsistence, to oblige him to retire, if advanced into the country, into the neighbourhood of some one of his own towns, in order to find subsistence : to carry off the enemy's convoys, and deprive him of the means of subsisting, is, in reality, to overcome him without fighting. Vigilance, so necessary for all kinds of operations, becomes more particularly so for those which may decide the fate of a campaign. Whatever may be the nature of the convoys, a general should never neglect any opportunity of attacking them : if they consist of provision, the most numerous army in want of that, becomes its own destruction ; if of forage, the taking of that causes the ruin of the horses, and renders the cavalry useless : the ammunition necessary for carrying on war, cannot be transported to the army, nor the artillery conducted to it. Without ammunition the wisest and bravest general cannot have any resource ; and if destitute of money, the soldier is disheartened, and those very men, whom pay renders heroes, are converted into so many deserters : the bravest man who, without fear, exposes himself, insensible to the greatest terrors of war, cannot support even the appearances of famine.

If the escort of a convoy marches in a mountainous country, the officer who commands it should have a body of infantry at his advanced guard, another at the rear-guard, and a third in the center ; for it may happen
that

that he may be attacked in flank, particularly if the enemy, discovering any opening, presents himself in the road that the convoy keeps; and there should be also troops in all parts to oppose any attack that may be made.

An advantageous method for attacking a convoy is, by forming three attacks, one real and two false. Those attacks are called real, which the troops make with vigour and in full strength, and when their charging is provided for and determined; the false ones are when the general's intention is only to keep back the enemy, and prevent his sending assistance to the troops that are really attacked.

These attacks, true or false, are determined by the situation of the country, and in proportion to the degree of ease with which the convoy may be turned from the road it is in; that is, if the general should meet with an avenue near the advanced-guard, which will draw the enemy some distance from his main body, and which also leads to that of the troops which attack, it is at that part the real attack should be made: if this avenue is found at the rear-guard, the two false attacks should be made at the advanced-guard, and at the center, supposing there is an opportunity of attacking the center. These false attacks ought to be sufficiently numerous in troops, to be able to employ the enemy, without running a hazard of being beaten, and to prevent his sending assistance to other parts.

If the troops designed to attack the convoy are sufficiently numerous, although divided into three bodies, to attack every part at the same time with equal vigour, the success will thereby become more certain. The escort of a convoy is often more numerous than the troops which attack it; but it being certainly weakened by the division, it is obliged to make, in order to guard the whole length of the convoy, the troops which attack have greatly the advantage, although inferior in number, because those

which they attack cannot send assistance to the parts attacked, especially if attacked on all sides.

If the road is wide enough, and there is room for a waggon to turn, the general should rather choose to attack the advanced and rear-guards than the center, to prevent the enemy's saving any of the waggons belonging to the rear-guard, which will undoubtedly be the case, if only the advanced guard and center are attacked. If the road is so narrow that the waggons cannot turn about, in order to go back, the general should attack the advanced-guard, and employ the center and rear-guard as much as possible.

A convoy may also be attacked at the opening of a defile into a small plain; then it is again the advanced-guard that the general should attack, who should also contrive to have the rear-guard attacked at the same time. The troops in the center will be confused, and not know where to send assistance, because they will hear firing both in front and rear; nevertheless, the general should defer charging till part of the waggons are passed, and the troops of the center are still on this side the defile. An attack, when unforeseen, brisk, and sustained, can never fail succeeding, particularly when the troops attacked are so divided, as not to have it in their power to assist each other; and if the whole convoy is not taken, there is almost a certainty of taking a great part of it, or at least depriving the enemy of it, by setting it on fire, and by hamstringing the horses, if there is not time to carry them off.

The success of these attacks partly depends upon the choice of those places where the troops, which are to fall upon the convoy, are placed in ambuscade; the most secure are those which are least liable to the inspection of the enemy's parties. It is sufficient to have sentries upon the tops of the hills, so that they may see into the roads, and give notice when the convoy is near the place, appointed for the attack: then the troops
charged

charged with the attack of the rear-guard, having nothing more to apprehend from being discovered by the enemy's parties, may draw near the entrances of the avenues.

If the ambuscade is discovered, the conduct which ought to be observed by the troops composing it depends entirely upon their force, and that of the escort; nevertheless, even when they are weakest, the attack should be attempted, which, if unsuccessful, will at least have retarded the march of a convoy, for want of which the enemy may be greatly distressed. A general never risks much in attacking a convoy; the object of the officer commanding the escort being to conduct it in safety, and to avoid fighting: it is the same with the escort of a convoy, as with a chain of forage, the end of which is only to complete it; and consequently the troops charged with them, will rather be attentive to execute the orders which have been given them, than to pursue the enemy, although beaten and drove back. The conducting of a convoy, and the dispositions which relate to foraging, are very different from those of a detachment only: foraging and convoys have a fixed destination, and a point where they are to terminate; whereas a detachment has no other view, than to seek the enemy and fight him, unless it is ordered to carry assistance, or to get possession of some post. Then the commanding officer should act in the same manner, as if he was charged with the conduct of a convoy or a forage; that is, he should endeavour to execute his orders without fighting: but if the intention is only to seek the enemy, the troops in ambuscade, finding themselves too weak for him, should retire; but if they are superior, or even equal in number, they should attack him, and the vigour of their charge should determine the success of it.

In a woody country the situation of it should be considered, in order to regulate the manner of the attack: if the wood is thick, infantry only can act in it; if it is not thick, some hussars or dragoons may be added

to it. If the road through which the convoy passes is large, the advanced and rear-guards should be attacked; the troops in the center will be easily kept employed by a few troops: if the road should be so narrow, that the waggons can neither turn back or double up, the head should be attacked, and the false attacks made at the rear-guard and the whole length of the convoy.

When a convoy marches through an open country, there should be many ambuscades formed: an enemy is less apprehensive in an open country, because, seeing all before him, his searches become the less exact; in proportion as the country is unfavourable for troops to form ambuscades; nevertheless, a general may always find some hollows, heights, or places of the same nature, where troops may be concealed. As soon as the convoy shall be arrived at the place fixed on for the attack, the general should fall upon the advanced and rear-guards, in order to take in the whole, and to induce, if possible, the troops in the center to divide themselves, to run to their assistance; then the third ambuscade must shew itself, and attack the center, and endeavour to divide the convoy, before the commandant of the escort has had time, either to park it or double it up. If the general succeeds in dividing the convoy, and if the troops in the center of the escort are beaten and broke, he should detach some infantry, cavalry, and hussars in pursuit of them: the remainder must be divided in two parts, in order to attack the troops lining the convoy; after which they must join those who attack the advanced and rear-guards. The troops when reunited ought to make this attack with vigour, and entirely determine the defeat of the escort, and consequently the taking of the convoy.

A convoy that is divided is half taken, as soon as the detachment of the center is beaten; because the victorious troops can be divided, and part sent in pursuit of the body that is beaten, and the other part employed
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to reinforce those who still meet with resistance; whereas, if only one part is attacked, that which is not attacked can readily send assistance, especially in an open country, where there is nothing to prevent either cavalry or infantry from acting, and being a mutual assistance to each other.

A general who would attack a convoy, never runs any hazard by dividing his troops, in order to divide those of the enemy: the more the troops of an escort are divided, with the greater ease will they be beaten. An officer who would attack, should know the strength of the escort, in order to regulate the number of his troops by the enemy's, and to be proportionably stronger. He who is attacked, being ignorant of his enemy's force, and being charged on all sides, is at a loss where to send assistance, and how to take care of every part: he who attacks, by the knowledge he should have of the country, is enabled to post his troops after such a manner, as to employ all those belonging to the enemy, without weakening himself. The troops which attack, have certainly great advantages, because, in dividing them, they are still stronger than the body attacked; and then they can chuse the place most favourable for the attack: whatever may be the precautions taken by the officer commanding the escort, whatever may be his vigilance, it will be very difficult for him, considering these different attacks, and the number of his enemy's troops, to dispose his own with sufficient quickness, to place the convoy in security, especially if the attack is made with great quickness and vigour. See the FIFTEENTH PLATE.

The attack and the defence should always be provided against, and the most certain means for succeeding should be taken before hand. Upon this principle he who would attack a convoy, ought to be informed of the day it is to set out, and the number of troops with which it is to be escorted. From the knowledge which he ought to have of the country, he

he will place his ambuscade out of the fight and searches of the enemy's advanced detachments; he will chuse such places for the attack as are most favourable for him, and most disadvantageous for the enemy, and should the convoy have a bridge to pass, that will be the most favourable place for the attack.

On this occasion the commanding officer should divide his troops, which ought to attack, into three bodies: two must be placed in ambuscade on the opposite side of the bridge, and the third remain on its own side. As soon as the officer of the troops in ambuscade shall see the head of the convoy, he will permit the advanced-guard, the body at the center, and some waggons to pass; then the two bodies in ambuscade on the opposite side of the bridge will shew themselves, and charge the troops, one those of the advanced-guard, and the other those of the center: he will also permit some waggons to follow the troops of the center, so that the passage of the bridge may be embarrassed; the third body, which is on its own side, ought to march in order to attack the rear-guard, which cannot have any communication with the advanced-guard and the troops of the center, the passage of the bridge being stopped up with the waggons with which it is covered, and because also the advanced and rear-guards are attacked. It is to be presumed that these three attacks made at the same time by superior force will have the whole advantage of the action, and the more so, as the troops of the escort being every where employed, cannot send assistance to any particular part. If the two bodies which attacked the advanced-guard and the center should break them and put them to flight, there should be troops enough left in pursuit of them to finish their entire defeat, without any fear of being repulsed; the remainder ought to march to the bridge, and cause the waggons that are upon it to be ranged in order, and march to the rear-guard, in order to finish its defeat, if it still continues to make resistance.

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It is necessary to observe, that some troops ought to be left at the head and along the convoy, in order to take care that the horses are not taken off from the waggons, and that none of the soldiers or drivers make use of that method to escape.

If the general has not troops sufficient to be divided into three bodies, the ambuscade on this side the river can no longer take place, but the advanced-guard and the center must be vigorously attacked. The general must observe not to attack, till the troops of the center shall have passed: this attack should always be executed by the infantry with the bayonets fixed and without firing, and by the cavalry, hussars, and dragoons, sword in hand. The general should not then stay to make prisoners; but should put to death all those whom he finds armed. If the two first detachments are beaten, the general should march with the remainder to the rear-guard, which, not being strong enough to resist a body of troops much more numerous, will undoubtedly betake itself to a retreat. As it is the convoy, and not the troops of the escort, that is the principal object, the general should leave only some troops of hussars to pursue the rear-guard; he should make the waggons file off as fast as possible, and conduct them the nearest way to the camp or the neighbouring town.

If the action has happened at too great a distance from the army, and waggons cannot be conducted without running the hazard of being attacked, the traces must be cut, the horses carried away, and the waggons set on fire. The hussars and the dragoons which have been left in pursuit of the advanced and rear-guards and the center, should not follow them more than half a league, and then ought to return in order to form, together, the rear-guard of the convoy that is taken: to which some infantry should be added, especially if it is to pass through a woody country; if it is in a mountainous country, the pursuit of the enemy, as well as the rear-guard on the return, ought to be intrusted to the infantry.

CH A P. VI.

Of the Attack of green and dry Forages.

NEXT to the convoys, the forages become most necessary for the subsistence of an army, as it is by them the cavalry is supported; and if a general can contrive to deprive the enemy of them, or to molest him in the making of them, his cavalry will soon be without resource, his infantry without baggage, and his artillery without the means of being conveyed. An army, however numerous, reduced to this extremity, is necessarily obliged to keep upon the defensive, however inferior in number or troops the army opposed to it may be, its movements will tend only to find subsistence, and all its designs will be by that means destroyed. A general who is so vigilant as to seize on such like opportunities will fight more securely, and, instead of continuing upon the defensive, he will find himself in a capacity of acting offensively.

An army does not fight every day, but it has daily occasion for provisions and forage. When, in the campaign of 1743, marshal Noailles, by marches as skilfully planned as prudently executed, knew so well how to shut up the enemy near Aschaffembourg on the Mayne, by possessing himself of Worts and of Miltenbourg upon the higher Mayne, and of Selguinstat and of Sthenheim upon the lower part of that river, by joining to it detachments of hussars and volunteers, who passed that river, made incursions up to Hanau, and carried off all that could come from that town to the enemy, so that they were obliged to decamp for want of bread and forage; that campaign would have been worthy a Turenne, and would undoubtedly have given peace to Europe, if the known valour of the French, which that day got the better of their prudence, had

had not extricated the enemy from their distressful situation ; but not without great loss, and with so eager a desire to get out of their embarrassment, that they left their dead and wounded behind them, with which Selguinstat was filled next day.

With regard to green forage, it is necessary the general should be informed of the time, and place, where it is to be made, and, if possible, of the number of troops which are to forage. In consequence of this knowledge, he will calculate the extent of ground they will take up, and also the number of troops necessary for forming the chain : from this judgment, and upon this examination, he must make a detachment sufficiently strong, to attack the chain in many parts, and should also be sure, by the number of attacks made in different parts, of penetrating on one side or another.

A general should, on this occasion, make use of ambuscades ; it is a very useful and also secure method of acting, when well performed. War, in the field, is almost entirely founded upon ambuscades ; the great point consists in knowing how to place them advantageously : but it is unnecessary to enlarge upon this subject here, there having been a sufficient detail, given of it in the second chapter of this Book.

If the forage is made in an open country, the detachment destined to attack it, should be composed of infantry, cavalry, and hussars : the infantry should not appear, but ought to remain in ambuscade in some hollows, behind some hedges, and other favourable places ; and it should be careful not to shew its arms, because, by the glittering of the steel, they may be discovered : the cavalry should be divided into two bodies, three quarters of a league one from the other, taking care to be able to join in case of necessity. As for the hussars, they should be distributed about in many small detachments to the right and left, and in the center of the two bodies of cavalry ; upon one of the flanks, there should be a more numerous body of hussars placed in ambush, at a greater distance

than the small detachments. Every one of these small troops should have a great number of trumpets with them; and when the chain is formed, and the foragers spread over the plain, a part of these detachments should leave the ambuscades making a great noise, and attack those belonging to the enemy, which are advanced: and these detachments will charge them with so much the more vigour, as they will be sustained by the large body of hussars in ambuscade behind them, and which should march to sustain them, and attract the attention of the officer commanding the escort. It may happen that this first attack, made on one side only, may induce the enemy to unfurnish the chain in some place, by which it will consequently be weakened; that is the time for the other detachments of hussars to advance, followed by one of the bodies of cavalry, in order to attack the part that has been unfurnished. If the enemy, more prudent, does not weaken the chain in any particular part, which is every where strong, but contents himself with making the reserve march to the assistance of the troops which have been attacked, the second attack ought always to take place; but in order to employ the enemy every where, the second body of cavalry should march and attack the center. This attack ought to be made with great briskness sword in hand, whether the enterprize succeeds or not: if it succeeds, a great advantage may be drawn from the route of the chain; and, by pursuing the troops of the chain with the cavalry and part of the hussars, the other part should fall upon the foragers, where they will without doubt find but little resistance: if the attack does not succeed, and that by the good disposition of the troops of the chain, the detachment has not been able to force it, it should retire to the infantry that has remained behind in ambuscade; this infantry will facilitate the retreat of the cavalry and hussars. But suppose, that the enemy, too eager, is carried away by this first success, a great advantage may be derived from his impru-

imprudence, by attacking him resolutely. The whole strength and each body being united, it is to be imagined and even hoped that the advantage will turn on the side of those troops which were repulsed but a moment before; and the more so, as the general commanding the chain can have pursued only with his cavalry, his hussars, and dragoons, because his infantry will have remained in the posts which it occupied, either to guard them, or to sustain the horse, supposing they should be repulsed.

If the forage is made in a mountainous country, the infantry must act alone, the cavalry being only necessary, in case it can have any ground on which to act and sustain the infantry, in case it is repulsed: the infantry should attack the avenues and the heights, and possess itself, as much as possible, of those which have the greatest command, and make the attack in many places, as in an open country. These different attacks render the enemy undetermined with regard to his dispositions; he does not know where to send assistance: the uncertainty of the general becomes visible to every officer, and soon communicates itself to all the troops; from thence proceeds their confusion, and consequently their defeat.

When the enemy is beaten and driven off, the detachment should pursue him far enough to prevent his returning to finish the forage; taking care not to go too near his camp, from whence there may come assistance, because the alarm will have been undoubtedly carried there by the foragers who may have escaped.

The prisoners and horses that have been taken, should be sent off first with an escort; the rest of the troops will retire immediately after by the shortest road. It is cruelty to abandon the wounded, whether friends or enemies; and as the detachment has undoubtedly found, within the circumference of the chain, some waggons with horses to them, they should be made use of to carry off the wounded, who should also be sent on

before: if there are no waggons, the detachment must take them from the neighbouring towns.

War and compassion are said to be inconsistent with each other; this old tradition was applicable to the barbarous ferocity of the Goths and Vandals. The French, and their neighbours, partakers of their valour, have restored the laws of humanity; they fight for glory, but having conquered, they know how to stretch forth an assisting hand to a fallen enemy. See the SIXTEENTH PLATE.

The attack of a dry forage is conducted nearly in the same manner as that of a green one; but it is often necessary to employ a greater number of troops, because, as the forage is made in the villages, it is almost a certainty they will all be guarded by infantry sustained by cavalry; whereas the chain of green forages is formed with a much greater number of cavalry than infantry, unless it should be in a country where cavalry cannot act. It is difficult to force the villages where infantry is sustained by cavalry, whereas it is easier for cavalry to attack each other in a plain, where the affair is immediately determined; but it is not so soon decided, when entrenched infantry, is attacked by infantry; but whatever resistance a commander may find, he should always attempt to force it. As the principal object is to prevent the forage, it is obtained by attacking the chain briskly, and in all parts, because it is certain that the general commanding the forage will cause the foragers to assemble; or else, seeing the chain attacked, without waiting for an order, they will of their own accord dismish, and fly toward the camp: but whether they assemble, whether they retire in order, or shift for themselves, the end is answered, and the forage is left unperformed. If by their flight the commander cannot hope to make any prisoners, he must keep the troops of the chain at bay such a length of time, as to make it impossible to continue the forage for that day: he should even, if possible, endeavour to
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force them to retire; which if they do, he should pursue them long enough to be certain of their retreat, and then collect all the waggons from the neighbouring villages, cause them to be loaded with the forage intended for the enemy's army, and conducted to the camp: if they do not retire, the commander must remain in sight of them during the night, and send to the camp to demand a reinforcement of troops, in order to oblige the enemy to retire. For the same reason that a forage should not be abandoned till the last extremity, the troops that would prevent the enemy from making it, should be absolutely bent upon it, at the same time without exposing themselves to the danger of being beat by any assistance that may come from the camp to the troops belonging to the chain.

There are some exigencies in war, where a general must not be sparing of large detachments. In attacks which are made by day, it is more prudent and necessary to be in force, than in those which are made by night: in the night, an inferior detachment may beat one that is superior, if it surprises it, and attacks first; whereas, in the day, the enemy can see the strength of the troops attacking him, and make his dispositions either for a defence, or for a retreat.

When detachments are only intended for reconnoitring, the smallest are best: when it is for the surprize of a quarter, or an ambuscade, it is needless to have them stronger, all that is necessary is to surprise and attack briskly; but when it is to cut off the enemy's provisions, or deprive him of his subsistence, they cannot be made too strong; there is nevertheless a medium to be preserved, which it is the general's business to know how to keep. If the detachments are too weak, it is impossible they should succeed; they cannot be prejudicial to the enemy, the troops are fatigued to no end, and are sacrificed to no purpose. If they are too strong, the matter of success is not at all doubtful; but at the conclusion of the campaign, the troops are as much fatigued as the army which they have

have deprived of subsistence : there is then the same inconveniency attends them, when they are either too strong or too weak ; it is true that, in the last case, the troops, not succeeding in any enterprize, will be disheartened, and attribute the fault to those who command : from thence confidence is at an end ; and if a soldier fails in point of respect to his commanders, discipline suffers by it, the subordination is no longer the same, and the best concerted enterprizes will be rendered vain and fruitless.

Troops who have courage are not contented with merely not being beat ; they droop, if their courage is not quickened by some light victory. The loss of a battle is often less fatal than frequent unsuccessful attacks ; after a check, their courage is roused to make new trials and get the better ; it makes an obstinate stand even against misfortune, and an unhopèd-for success is often produced from their defeat ; whereas, by useless attempts, their hope is destroyed, and their courage becomes enervated.

M. de Turenne, who, by repeated successes, had gained the entire confidence of the soldier, was as much indebted for his triumphs to the love the soldiers had for him, and the estimation in which they held his talents, as he was to his own genius ; and he succeeded better with twenty or twenty-five thousand men, than the emperor's generals did with fifty thousand.

What a treasure for a state is such a general ! Besides his knowing how to keep the enemy in bounds with few men, and accomplish his designs, he also supplies the king with brave soldiers, and excellent officers. How many great men have been produced from the school of such a master ? It is an happiness both to the country and to the king, to be possessed of a subject, who knows how to unite in himself the talents of an hero, and the virtues of a citizen.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Attack of a Detachment of Infantry and Dragoons, in an open Country divided by Rivers.

IF every kind of precaution can be taken by a detachment, in order to defend itself, to avoid being surpris'd, and to advance into a country, that which marches with an intention of attacking, has also the same advantage ; but the precautions change in proportion as the object, and the situation of the country differ.

There are three principal things to be observed in all the dispositions relative to a march, the attack, the defence, and the retreat. The attack is voluntary, a general executes it when he chuses, and in what place he pleases ; he can suit his ground and his troops according to circumstances : the defence as well as the retreat are forced ; they ought to be provided for as well as the attack : these different operations can only be performed by conjecture, whereas an attack is made with full knowledge ; a general has sufficient time to reflect upon, and to consider every circumstance. A general knows very nearly what number of troops he is to attack ; he takes his measures to charge them in the most favourable place, and can divide his own army into as many parts as he judges necessary : he who is to be attacked, is ignorant of the number of troops that will attack him ; he does not know whether he shall be attacked in head, flank, or rear, and on what spot it will happen ; therefore he who attacks has the advantage : he is indeed master of circumstances ; but these advantages will become fatal to him, if he neglects the precautions necessary for succeeding ; if he does not take the most favourable post ; if his attack is not vigorous and made at the same time ; if he does

not :

not employ the whole front of the enemy ; and if he gives him time to recollect himself, and to make proper dispositions.

Suppose a detachment of infantry and hussars destined to attack another of infantry and dragoons marching in an open country divided by rivers, the disposition for the attack ought to be relative to the situation of the country, and to the number and nature of the troops which compose the detachment.

The enemy's detachment either marches together or separately ; if it is together, it can only be in column, or in order of battle ; if separately, its order must be according to its strength, either in column or in separate bodies. In both which cases, the troops which would attack, should be divided into four bodies, according to the strength of the detachment ; each body of infantry should have one of hussars along with it, which should be posted in advance, in order to cover it, and each body should be placed after such a manner as to be able to unite, to attack the enemy, and to employ all his troops, as soon as the enemy shall be arrived at the place fixed on for the attack.

If the hussars belonging to the body of the center are discovered by the enemy's advanced parties, they should charge them briskly, but without approaching too near to the main body of the enemy ; and when they see the infantry, they will make a running fight towards their own infantry, which ought to keep itself concealed. If the enemy makes an exact search, it is not possible for any of the bodies in ambuscade to remain undiscovered ; it is therefore the business of that which is most advanced to charge the enemy with the hussars only, and never with the infantry, in order to induce him to pursue them, and by that means fall into the ambuscade.

If the enemy pursues with precaution, the four bodies of hussars must attack the enemy's dragoons, but keep as far from his infantry as possible, because

because they cannot expect to break it; the intention of this attack is only to deceive the enemy with regard to the infantry in ambuscade, and that, whilst he is employed in assisting and protecting his dragoons, the four bodies of infantry will leave their ambuscade, and charge the enemy briskly in head, flank, and rear. During the enemy's astonishment is the most favourable opportunity to beat him, but he should never be suffered to recover from it; he will at first imagine that he has only hussars to deal with, but will, in the end, find himself obliged to fight with infantry.

The soldier, and even the officer, are often undetermined in this first moment, which is precious, and never to be retrieved if once permitted to escape: it is to be feared, that the enemy recovered from his surprize will add good dispositions to resolution, and will not only render the precautions first taken, to beat him ineffectual, but will even turn the slackness with which he has been attacked to his own advantage.

If from the situation of the country, there is a prospect of drawing the enemy into the midst of an ambuscade, without the troops concealed in it, marching into the plain to attack him, the success will thereby become more certain; but in order to execute this attack, the detachment must have some reliance upon the enemy's eagerness and self-security: unhappily for the French, these examples are not rare among them; they often consult their courage only, and have not recourse to their prudence, till the fault is committed and past remedy. How many young officers are there who would think themselves dishonoured, if in meeting the enemy they did not attack him with eagerness; then it happens that the troops attacked fall back upon others, these last upon others also, and when they are in full strength, they return together to the charge, and make themselves ample amends for the ground they lost voluntarily, and which these young officers imagine they have gained by their valour. They often lose

more than they could have expected to have gained : happy again if in attacking with this eagerness, they know how to retire like experienced soldiers, and not lose any of their troops ; but it is often less difficult to inspire a fearful mind with courage, than to stop the impetuosity of those who have too much.

A detachment may also be attacked without forming ambuscades, that is by open force ; but the detachment that attacks should be stronger, or at least of equal strength, and the success depends upon the goodness of the dispositions and the briskness of the attack. Detachments are what the young officers are formed by : they execute in part, that which a general executes with an army ; with a little reflection, and by a regular progression, an officer sooner forms himself for the executing of great enterprises, than if he had originally began, and for many years had seen only the most considerable. It is by detachments he gains the knowledge of a country, and knows how to march with prudence and precaution, how to take an advantageous position, to make proper dispositions with regard to the situation of the country, to retreat in order, and to attack with all the advantage of ground ; and although it cannot be said that an officer knowing how to command a detachment will become a great general, it is indisputable that he has attained one step necessary to it.

There have been many instances of men very capable of conducting ten thousand men, who would not have known what to do with fifty thousand : but this is not always from a want of ability. Such an officer has prudence, understands the detail, hath experience, and also coolness ; but his genius being contracted, cannot take in an object so considerable ; he is confined within a certain sphere, and cannot soar beyond it. The man who can pass for a great one, only whilst he acts within a certain bound, is no longer deserving of that character when he engages in one more extended.

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There are others of a much inferior degree, who at the head of a detachment of a thousand or fifteen hundred men have performed wonders, and gained considerable advantages over the enemy; but who, afterwards, have not known how, or by what means they have been gained: those men have only courage; and although their genius will comprehend but few things, they are not only far from being useless, but on the contrary are often very necessary. These kind of detachments are more common in the course of a campaign than large ones, because there are not always general officers to conduct them. It is essential in all states, to know the genius and talents of men before employing them in great affairs. One who has never been employed would have been a great man if his talents had had an opportunity of shewing themselves; another, after having been a long time employed, has remained in the same state in which he began. A digested study, practice, and experience, are the means by which some arrive at perfection, others attain it with less trouble, and others in short seem so very perplexed in their faculties, that they cannot reap any profit from the most striking instructions, and that often with the most eager desire of receiving information.

It is the general's business to know how to distinguish these different degrees of genius, and to give them employments suitable to their talents: birth should never be preferred to merit; and such men only should be employed whose talents may prove useful to the state and conducive to the glory of their sovereign.

CHAP. VIII.

Attack of a Detachment of Infantry and Hussars, in a mountainous Country.

STRATAGEM, as has already been observed, is more necessary and more easily practised in a mountainous country, than in an open one; and as a detachment there advances with more difficulty and less security, it should therefore be continually increasing its precautions: but with regard to a detachment that would attack, a mountainous country offers innumerable expedients, and presents a variety of methods, for forming surprizes.

A mountainous country is filled with passes, defiles, paths, caverns, hollows, woods, windings, valleys, &c. which are so many places, where ambuscades may be easily formed by infantry, which may be divided in different posts on the right and left in such a manner, as to have a communication with each other, and make the attack at the same time upon a detachment marching through that country: the greatest part of the troops intending to attack, should be concealed behind the heights, if they are practicable; which, if they are not so in one place, they certainly are in another. It is the business of the general who commands, to chuse the easiest road, and that by which he can have his troops most united: the remainder of the troops, always strong enough not to apprehend being broke by the enemy, ought to be concealed in a pass, a hollow, or some place of that nature. The first attack should be made at the pass, to stop the head of the enemy's detachment, to employ it, and attract the attention of the detachments which are upon the heights, guarding the flanks; then the troops concealed upon the heights should shew themselves, and briskly attack those belonging to the enemy, endeavouring at the same time

time to force them to abandon the heights, and march to the main body of their troops. The enemy, thus pressed in head and in flank in a narrow place, cannot avoid being beat, as he can neither act nor defend himself against troops that have the advantage of the ground; the most prudent step he can take is, to endeavour to retreat, the effecting of which will be attended with great difficulty; and however short the retreat may be, the enemy will be harrassed by the fire of the troops from the heights, and by the stones they will roll down upon him.

If the heights are impracticable, the enemy will be unable to occupy them; therefore the disposition for the attack must be changed. There are seldom any passes, but what are crossed by others: there will also be found some whose openings, meeting at the same point, form what is called * goose's feet, and which often lead to new passes. On this occasion the detachment must form many different bodies, according to the number of troops of which it consists. Suppose three: two should then be placed in ambuscade, the first upon the side of one of the roads which forms the goose's foot, the second in a pass crossing that through which the detachment passes, the third, which ought to be as strong as the other two which are in ambuscade, should be partly concealed, and the remainder should keep the road through which the enemy marches, as if the only design of it was to seek him out: as soon as these troops meet the enemy's advanced parties, they must charge them, and push them as far as the advanced-guard. If the pass is so situated, as to make an elbow, which may prevent the main body of the enemy's detachment from being discovered, they should charge his advanced-guard; but as soon as the main body of his troops appear, they must stop, and make a running fight, as if too weak to resist such superior force: the intention of this feigned retreat is to draw the enemy still farther into the pass, to induce

* Des Pattes d'Oyes.

him to cross that, forming the goose's foot, and which is in the road through which the enemy marches, and, in short, that the part of the detachment which has attacked the enemy, may draw near to that which is concealed behind it. If the enemy pursues briskly, he must of course be attacked in flank, by the body concealed in one of the roads which is crossed, and to be again attacked in rear by that which is in the pass crossing the road, where the enemy is, and in head by the troops in front, which have been joined by those concealed behind them : a detachment thus attacked on all sides cannot avoid being beaten.

If the enemy, more prudent and cautious, as soon as he shall be got opposite to the pass that crosses the road, after having caused it to be reconnoitred, leaves a body in it to defend the opening of it, and to secure his retreat ; and also when he is come to the place where the roads meet, halts, and causes a very strict search to be made, there is no longer a probability of surprising him, because there is a certainty of the ambuscade's being discovered, at least that which is in one of the roads forming the goose's foot : it is at this particular time that he should be attacked with great vivacity in the head, as it is certain he will be attacked in flank from the pass where he has posted a body. If the enemy has discovered the ambuscade in this pass, he will not be advanced to the place where it crosses, but will remain at the entrance of it ; and if, in consequence of having discovered it, he halts and detaches some troops to go and attack the troops in ambuscade, he will, by that means, weaken himself ; and then the two other bodies may march, attack what is left, endeavour to make them give ground, and detach a sufficient body to take the enemy in rear, that has entered the pass, in order to attack the body in ambuscade.

If the enemy, in consequence of having discovered the first ambuscade, continues fixed, and it is impossible either to surround him, or to attack him from the heights, it will then be useless to sacrifice troops in an action,

tion, the success of which will be very dubious; because the enemy being in a body, and occupying the whole pass, it will be impossible to present a larger front to him than his own. As he will undoubtedly have made every disposition for a good defence, and even for an attack if he is strong enough, or for a retreat if he thinks himself too weak; success is never to be expected but in proportion as the attack is vigorously executed, and the dispositions which have been made, are just and prudent: but as troops in a mountainous country cannot be expected to act with the same ease as in a plain, the success therefore is often dependant upon chance. On these occasions a general should be contented with harassing the enemy, without engaging in any thing general; with endeavouring to hinder him from penetrating farther into the country, and wait for his retiring, before he pursues him; and that with precaution, for fear he should in his turn form an ambuscade, which, if well done, and he charges properly, may give him the whole advantage of the day.

When a detachment leaves a defile to enter a valley, it presents a favourable opportunity for the attack, provided the ambuscades have not been discovered by the advanced parties; if they have, it is certain that the enemy will not pass the defile, unless he can cause the heights which line it, and come into the valley, to be occupied. It will be easy for the rest of the troops to pass the defile; but still, if an opportunity can be found of attacking those which are upon the heights, and cutting off their retreat, by occupying at the same time the entrance of the defile, although the ambuscades have been discovered, the general should attack them, and keep a body in reserve, to assist the troops that may be distressed: if the enemy can be driven from the heights, it is certain that the enemy in the valley, seeing themselves separated, will be disheartened, no longer knowing how or by what part to retire; troops when disheartened are half beat, and, provided they are attacked briskly, their

their defeat is certain. If the troops which occupy the heights cannot be driven from the ground of which they are in possession, and by their courage, or the advantage of the situation, they can maintain themselves in it, the general should at least keep them employed, and hold them at bay, that they may not be able to assist those which are in the valley, and which will be vigorously attacked by the ambuscades which have been discovered.

The principles of military art are infinite; their certainty consists in the proper application of them to circumstances. These principles may be more justly said to flow from circumstances, than circumstances to arise from the principles; if the one are foreseen, the others will never fail: it is therefore only by a continued system of prudence, and by force of proper considerations that an officer is in some measure enabled to outstrip opportunity. That want of activity which causes an officer to proceed in suspense, and take numberless superfluous precautions, favours too strongly of restlessness and timidity: the prudent man proceeds with a proper degree of speed; the precautions which he takes, are always founded upon principles, properly regulated by circumstances. The most useful proceedings in appearance often become the source of his success; without multiplying them too much, he makes them answer his present wants, as well as those which he foresees will arise for the future.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Attack of a Detachment of Cavalry in an open Country.

AS ambuscades are less to be apprehended in an open country, and a general, by seeing before, and all around him, has fewer obstacles to surmount in order to make good dispositions, it is easier to form attacks upon a detachment of cavalry, almost certain in their success.

There is no profession depends more upon chance, than that of war ; but by the activity, prudence, and capacity of a commander, that which at first sight seems merely supposition, is converted and fixed into a reality. In the speculative part, the end in view is answered by plans only ; in practice, those very plans are rendered useless by a single movement of the enemy ; a general should therefore multiply his projects, and not fix upon any one in particular, but should endeavour to reap advantage from them all, and should be particularly careful never to suffer any mistake of the enemy's to pass unnoticed ; because an experienced general, by the advantages which he will know how to draw from it, will not only render it irreparable to the enemy, but will also make him fall into new ones, notwithstanding all his endeavours to the contrary.

The strength of a detachment of cavalry, consists in the being well united and marching well together by squadrons or by troops in two lines, and in having detachments in front and upon the flanks to scour the whole country. The strength of a detachment intending to attack another, consists in dividing itself into many bodies, and attacking the enemy in different parts, so as to divide his forces, and consequently diminish his weight.

There is no plain, whatever the extent of it may be, where there is not some small heights, hollows, and hedges. It is behind these places a general should conceal his troops, provided they are so far distant from the detachment intended to be attacked, as to be out of reach of the searches of its advanced parties.

Ambuscades may also be formed, especially in Germany, behind the corn, where cavalry laying upon their horses necks, may very well be concealed. These ambuscades are so much the more secure, because it is seldom that, when a general sees an extensive plain, he suspects any ambuscades can be formed in it: nevertheless, it is of these places that are most uncovered, and consequently in appearance the least dangerous, that a general should be most mistrustful.

These troops, in ambuscade, ought to keep themselves well concealed, and divide into four bodies. For the greater certainty of succeeding in these sort of expeditions, the general should attack the enemy in head, center, and at the rear-guard; and have always a reserve, which will make the fourth body.

The body, destined to attack the head of the enemy, should not be placed in ambuscade; but should march as a detachment sent out to examine the country, and is surpris'd at meeting so strong a detachment of the enemy: the fourth body, which is to sustain it, must be in ambuscade still farther behind it. In the mean time, the first body should detach some small parties into the front, who will exchange some pistol-shot with the advanced parties and scouts, in order to engage those upon the flanks to join the head, and thereby give greater strength to the advanced guard; and, by the enemy's thus abandoning his flanks, prevent his discovering the ambuscades which are formed on them. This detachment should advance very leisurely, as if to examine the country, and after that make a feigned retreat.

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If the officer of the detachment intended to be attacked is prudent, he will advance but very slowly; neither will he suffer the flanking parties to desist from scouring the country; but will rather double his attention, and cause a stricter search to be made. If, on the contrary, through imprudence, or carried away by a courage too impetuous, he neglects and forgets all other precautions, if he marches close upon the retiring detachment, if he leaves his flanks exposed, in order to strengthen the advanced guards, the two detachments that are concealed upon the flanks will no longer have any thing to apprehend from discovery; and as soon as that body, which made the feigned retreat, shall be got to the place agreed on for the attack, instead of continuing its retreat, it must charge briskly, which, by a great fire of the hussars belonging to it, will give notice to the concealed troops, who will come out and fall at the same time upon the center and rear-guard of the detachment. This place, agreed on for the attack, should be so far in the front as to enable one of the concealed bodies to fall upon the rear-guard.

The two bodies, which attack the center and rear-guard, should charge sword in hand; as the first detachment should also do, as soon as the two others have attacked: the first fire being but by way of signal, it is certain, that troops who attack vigorously, sword in hand, ought not only to get the better, but they will also lose the fewer number of men. Firing is serviceable only in a retreat, or to amuse the enemy; but when charging is necessary, it should always be done sword in hand: the enemy has less time to recollect himself, and consequently the action is sooner determined.

As soon as the three bodies are engaged, the fourth should make its appearance, and carry itself wherever the resistance is greatest, in order to put an end to the engagement; and the enemy, already employed by the detachment, seeing another arrive intirely fresh, and the number of

his assailants increase, will lose all hopes of defending himself: therefore, being discouraged, he will endeavour to seek for safety in flight; which is the time for the hussars, belonging to the detachment that attacks, to contribute greatly to the completing of the enemy's defeat. These troops are more proper than cavalry, to prevent the rallying of troops already beat: their horses are not so heavy; they are better made to bear fatigue, and consequently these troops can, sooner than any other, procure all the advantage that is to be expected from a defeat.

The hussars belonging to the detachment that is attacked will be carried away in the rout, and will be unable to form, in order to cover their cavalry: but, supposing they can, the cavalry must then fall on them sword in hand, whilst the hussars are engaged in the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry.

When the commanding officer of the victorious detachment thinks he has gained all the advantage that could be expected, and that he has also made as many prisoners as possible, without suffering himself to be attracted by the allurements of greater success, he ought to cause the retreat to be sounded, to avoid falling into any ambuscade, which the enemy may have laid to secure his own retreat.

If the enemy has a bridge to pass, before he arrives at the place he is going to, the ambuscades should be posted on the other side of the bridge, but at a distance one from the other; because it is certain, that the enemy will never be so imprudent as to suffer the detachment to pass, before the country, which is on the other side of the river, has been thoroughly examined: neither should the enemy's detachment be attacked, till he has advanced half, or three quarters of a league on the other side of the bridge. This distance should be regulated by the ground occupied by the detachment intended to be attacked; but it is necessary that the rear-guard of it should always be out of sight of the bridge: then, that of the four bodies
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that will be in ambuscade near the river, but at a distance from the bridge, should march as soon as it sees the detachment advance into the plain. It ought to be concealed, that, at the time of the attack, the enemy being beat, and willing to save themselves, and knowing only the bridge over which they passed, finding that occupied, and seeing themselves between two fires, will be forced to surrender prisoners. A detachment, conducted after this manner, should not suffer a single trooper or hussar to escape.

Yet if the enemy, after having caused the country on the opposite side of the bridge to be examined, and after having made the detachment pass it, leaves one or two bodies to secure his retreat, the detachment of hussars, already mentioned, that should possess itself of it and cover it, must not quit its place. If the enemy's detachment is beat, the detachment of hussars will be informed of it by sentries, who, by being in the trees, will see to a great distance into the plain. If the enemy is beaten, as in all probability he will, and should be briskly repulsed, then the detachment of hussars must leave its ambuscade, and charge the two bodies guarding the bridge. It is almost certain, that, when they see their detachment beaten and routed, they will no longer stand their ground; but will repass the bridge, to avoid sharing the same fate: then the officer, who commands this detachment, must leave two bodies to cover the bridge, and to keep back those, belonging to the enemy, who have passed. Afterwards he will march in front of the enemy, who are flying or retreating, and shut the passage up from them.

If, on the contrary, the detachment that attacks does not succeed, which can hardly be supposed, because of the precautions already mentioned, and should be beat, then the officer who commands the troops which are in ambuscade, near the river, ought to shew themselves, and detach two bodies towards those which are at the bridge, with orders to charge the enemy

enemy sword in hand; at the same time he will himself sustain them. If the two bodies of the enemy are beaten, and repass the bridge, he will leave two to keep them back, and march with the remainder to charge the enemy briskly in the rear. This unforeseen attack will probably change the face of affairs, and reanimate the troops which have given ground, who, finding themselves succoured, and seeing the enemy between two fires, will charge him briskly sword in hand.

CHAP. X.

Of the Passage of Rivers.

THE subject of this chapter is perhaps the most interesting of all, hitherto treated of. This subject, which has never been thoroughly understood by the ancients, and upon which, the greatest part of modern authors have but lightly touched, hath been placed in a new light by the chevalier Folard, in his commentaries upon Polybius*. He owns that it appeared very difficult to him. Many principles are collected from this author, which are diffused throughout this chapter; and, to avoid repeating what he hath already said, the reader is referred to his accounts. The rules which he gives have been extracted from him, and are cited as axioms: in short, the same use is made of his work, as himself made of Montecuculli. However solid his principles may be, it is sometimes thought justifiable not to follow him in every particular. It often happens, that when a man is too desirous of examining a subject to the bottom, he runs a hazard of saying many trivial things, and strays insensibly from his purpose. At the same time, we do not pretend to lay this charge to this skilful commentator: his reflections are so ingenious, and so solid,

* Tom. 4 and 5.

that

that a military man can, no where else, find instructions so much to be depended upon.

Before this subject is entered upon, it will be proper to give some definitions, to avoid the trouble of turning back.

Rivers may be divided into marshes, rivulets, great and small rivers, and streams: they often form lakes, their channel often grows narrow, and their course is lost among the sands. The name of marsh is applicable to a certain extent of water, whose bottom, whether deep or not, is either unsettled or muddy. Of this sort was the marsh of Clusium, over which Hannibal continued his march.

A lake is a large extent of water, formed by the meeting of many rivulets, or by some river which there discharges itself, or passes across it. Such are the lakes of Trasimene, Constantia, and Geneva.

A rivulet runs in an unequal winding channel, whose banks, often overflowed, are unsettled: it grows large in proportion as it is at a distance from its source, and empties itself into a river.

A river generally derives its source from the mountains; and in its channel receives the currents of rivulets and fountains, and throws itself into the large rivers: these have the same original; but being swelled by the waters of the rivers meeting there, they preserve their name and channel quite to the sea.

A river is fordable, when its channel is sufficiently large to allow a free course, and by means of its shallowness to diminish the rapidity; according to that axiom, that all waters passing from a large into a narrower channel, acquire a greater degree of rapidity.

A ford is a part of a river that is shallower, either because the channel is larger, or because the earth is more raised up by the sands which happen to be there.

A river is crossed either by going from one shore to the other in a right

right line, or by going about in an oblique line, as was done by Alexander at the passage of the Granicus, in order to be guided by the current.

There are rivers whose rapidity require infinite precautions; others which, without being rapid, are not less dangerous, because the bottom is unfettled, and slips from under the feet of the soldiers, and the horses; others whose waves are continually rolling over each other, which has a very great effect, whenever there are any stakes and piles drove in them: the waves disperse the sands, and, together with the assistance of time, destroy them. This is what the French term *Renarder* *.

Before an army attempts the passage of a river, it should be furnished with every thing necessary for it. Rivers are passed by swimming, fording, or upon bridges.

It is only small bodies that can pass a river by swimming; yet it will be very difficult to pass a river in this manner, particularly if the enemy makes the least effort of opposition. Antiquity furnishes but few examples where whole armies have passed rivers by swimming. This trial was reserved for the French, encouraged by the example of their king, when they crossed the Rhine at Tolhiutz. It is an action, says M. de Feuquieres †, the success of which was owing to its rashness, and which should never be cited as an example worthy imitation.

When a ford is discovered, it should be sounded in every part, the goodness of the bottom examined, and whether the opposite bank is of difficult or easy access.

There are fords which become impracticable as soon as some troops have passed it, because the bottom has not been sufficiently firm.

If there is reason to apprehend that the enemy has armed the bottom with pointed iron, with stones chained together, or any other kind of

* *Renarder* is one of those technical terms which cannot be translated from one language into another: the author's meaning is, that the water and time together make the bottom very uneven, and also wear it into holes, much the same as those made in the earth by foxes.

† Mem. de Feuquieres, tom. 3.

thing,

thing, some soldiers should be sent, with rakes, to clear away every thing that may retard the passage; they ought also, to take pick-axes and shovels with them, and, indeed, every instrument proper for removing of earth, because, if the bank opposite to the ford, is too steep, they will slope it properly.

If the river is not fordable, bridges made with boats, or pontons, must be made use of, and if there is neither, then rafts. The reader may see what M. de Folard * says upon this subject.

Pontons are made either of brass or tin; of that kind, were those, taken from the Dutch, of which this author makes mention; or of wainscot, the original of which is very ancient.

In the artillery phrase, pontons are defined boats, which being joined together, on the side of each other, and covered with planks, serve to make bridges, over which the troops, artillery, and baggage, pass canals, ditches, rivers, and streams. The reader may see, in the memoirs of St. Remy †, the different methods of making use of, and making bridges of portable, or of common boats, and of every thing relative to their composition.

When a river is not sufficiently large to oblige an army to make use of boats, or pontons, for the building of bridges, they are made upon piles, or upon wooden horses; then they are either fixed, or flying. If they are supported upon piles, they are fixed; if upon wooden horses, they are flying. The method of constructing bridges, with beams, or thick planks strongly fastened to each other, has been given in the fourth chapter of the first Book; if the river is so wide that the beams, or planks, cannot reach from one side to the other, piles driven into the gravel, must be made use of, that they may serve as props to the ends of the beams, in order to be able to establish the bridge; if the army is furnished with

* Tom. 5. liv. 5. chap. 12. §. 5. † Mem. d'Artillerie de St. Remy, tom 2. part 3. tit. 14.

boats, or pontons, they had better be made use of, because the bridge will be the sooner completed.

Piles are large pieces of timber, the extremity of which ends in a point armed with iron, in order that they may be drove with greater ease; the wooden horses are firmer, and the bridge is sooner made: firmer, because they have a double footing, and because the two pieces of timber of which they are made, mutually support each other; and the bridge will be sooner completed, because it is unnecessary to drive them into the gravel; they sustain themselves by being perpendicular, and because that, by the weight of the thick boards and planks, which are placed upon them, they are capable of resisting the current of the water; besides, it is easy to drive a large piece of timber into the gravel, at the foot of the wooden horse, on the side where the current is, in order to break the force of it, and prevent its beating against the wooden horse.

The head of the bridges is secured by entrenchments of earth, that is, by sinking a ditch, and raising a parapet formed of the earth taken out of the ditch. These entrenchments are proportionably large, according to the use to be made of them, or the advantage intended to be derived from them. Sometimes an horn-work is erected, with an half-moon before it, the whole well fraised: a covered way pallisadoed, is also sometimes added; but it is generally thought sufficient to cover the head of the bridge with an half-moon only, but that depends upon the importance of the post. Entrenchments are again made with waggons, where Turkish wells are made in the front; that is, deep holes, placed checquer-wise, at certain distances.

The passage of a river upon rafts, is less dangerous than upon boats; but a very rapid river cannot be passed in this manner, because the rafts are secured only by ropes, which are liable to break; besides, this manner of passing is very tedious, unless there is a very great quantity of rafts;

rafts ; and during the time they take up in constructing, three bridges may be built : this expedient should never be used, except when there are no boats, and it would take up too much time to send for them. Rafts are joists of deal fastened together. In the chevalier de Folard, the reader may see those which he has invented ; his contrivance, for making the cavalry swim over, is more ingenious than practicable.

The ancients had still many other methods for passing navigable rivers ; they passed them, according to Vegetius *, by means of wooden horses, which they sunk in the water, or else made use of empty tubs, which they tied together in a hurry, and floored ; but, adds he, nothing was found more commodious than small boats, made of a single tree, very light by the quality of the wood, and which followed the army upon waggons.

M. de Quincy's † method appears very singular : it consists in collecting the best swimmers in the army, which are made to pass by small detachments, followed by others more considerable, with officers and sergeants at their head, allowing each soldier to have no other arms than a sword and a pistol tied to the hat-string ; afterwards, in chusing the two best swimmers, to the neck of each a knap-sack is fastened, in which is put a ball of pack-thread, the end of which is left upon the shore, for a rope to be tied to it, which is fastened to the pontons, or boats, where the arms and cloaths of the swimmers are put, with utensils proper for the removing of earth. If these swimmers, adds he, meet any of the enemy's troops after their passage, they should run upon them with their swords and pistols, whilst the others with the ropes, draw the boats over in which the cloaths and utensils are, with as much infantry as possible, to work diligently at entrenching themselves. This method seems very difficult, and the execution of it almost impossible.

* Book 3. chap. 2.

† Art. Milit. tom. 1.

Before a general engages in an enterprize, so considerable as passing a river in presence of the enemy, he should, according to the chevalier de Folard, consider opportunity; the condition of the enemy's forces; by what circumstances the attack and the defence may be prevented, or facilitated; and compare them together: he should examine the nature, and the course of the river; remark the places where the fords are, the size and depth of them, their distances from one another, the nature of the bottom, whether it is firm, or boggy; if there are marshes either on one side or the other, whether these marshes are practicable; whether the passage will become more difficult, in proportion to the numbers which pass; whether the banks are steep, and at what part they are most so; whether the ground on the opposite side is more favourable for infantry, than cavalry; the heights on this side to place cannon on them; those which are on the other, where they may be carried; the nature of the river, whether it is apt to swell on a sudden by the rains, or the melting of the snow.

Whenever a general attempts the passage of a river, in strength, as the whole advantage will be on the side of the opposing party, he should suppose the enemy vigilant, resolute, capable of profiting from circumstances, steady in his resolutions, and ready to try all possible means of opposing the passage.

A general should be particularly acquainted with the nature of the banks of the river, as well those of the opposite side, as of that where he is, in order to be strong in every part, and that all the attacks may be equally made, and that, with every advantage the ground will allow. In short, it is very essential for a general to be acquainted, not only with every thing relative to the rivers he has to pass, but also with all concerning rivers in general.

These

These principles established, this chapter will be divided into four articles; in the first, an army shall be supposed to meet a river in its march, which it is obliged to pass.

In the second article, the defence necessary to be made for opposing the enemy, and preventing his passage, shall be treated of.

Thirdly, shall be particularized the means which a general should employ, in order to facilitate the passage, notwithstanding the enemy's opposition.

Fourthly, the securest method of retreating shall be demonstrated by facts.

As more instruction is always to be gathered from examples than precepts, such of the modern ones as have appeared to be best, shall be related, according as the nature of the subject will allow.

A R T I C L E I.

It is easy for an army to effect the passage of a river, when the enemy is at too great a distance to oppose it. A general may chuse his own time and place, and make what disposition he thinks proper: he may either pass it upon bridges, rafts, or at a ford; if he finds a ford, he may let the cavalry pass there, provided the bottom is good; it is much better to throw over a bridge for the infantry, than to expose them to the wet, and unnecessary fatigue.

“Infantry,” according to M. de Montécuculli*, “is the basis, and
“the support of an army, whether for battles, or sieges; and it is with
“that, the Romans and the Swiss have performed such surprising ex-
“ploits.” A general should therefore be very careful of it, and not ex-
pose it to the danger of diseases, by making it ford over rivers,
when it is as easy to cause it to pass over upon bridges. The artillery
and baggage should likewise pass over upon bridges: thus, instead of

* Liv. 2. chap. 2.

causing

causing two or three bridges to be made, one, or two only, will be sufficient, according to the number of troops composing the army, upon which the infantry, artillery, and baggage will pass, while the cavalry ford it over; if there is no ford, the general should order many bridges to be built, in order to expedite the passage.

The method of turning the course of rivers, laid down by Santa-Cruz *, by chusing a spot lower than its channel, making of trenches, and by forcing it to take a new course, by the great quantity of stones which are thrown into the channel, is an enterprize to be executed only upon small streams, or by armies, such as those of Xerxes, whose thirst, according to Juvenal, could dry up a river in a day. Santa-Cruz mistook, when he said this was the opinion of M. de la Valiere; this French author never practised such a method, but for passing the ditch of a town. He caused fascines to be thrown into the ditch till they came up to the water's edge; and then to make them fast, he ordered stones, or earth to be laid on the top of them †. The passage of the Segre by Cæsar, related by Santa-Cruz, is not of any consequence. Cæsar himself owns, in his Commentaries ||, that having caused his cavalry to pass, after having made use of this method, he did not dare expose his infantry; he points out what were his apprehensions thereon; and also adds, that what kept up his soldiers spirits when in the middle of the water, was the hope of the booty they should make in Afranius's army: besides, as marshal de Puyfégur ‡ remarks, the Segre is very fordable in many places, even in time of the greatest floods, for at other seasons this river is scarcely of any consideration. It is true, that Cæsar himself says, the rains had been so heavy, that the flood had carried away his bridges. This is too fine an action of Cæsar's not to be related; it shall therefore,

* *Traité du Passage des Riv.* chap. 1. † *Prat. & Max. de la Guerre*, lib. 3. chap. 6. and 7.

|| *De Bell. Civ.* lib. i. ‡ *Art de la Guerre*, part 2. chap. 9. art. 4.

be transcribed in the words of the duke de Rohan, the abbreviator* of his Parfaite Capitaine.

“ Immediately after the continual rains had carried away his two
 “ bridges, and rendered the river unfordable, by which he was reduced
 “ to great extremities, being unable either to recover his provisions, or
 “ join the forces coming to him from Gaul, or rebuild his bridges, because
 “ of the rapidity of the water, and the disturbance given him by his enemies,
 “ who were on the opposite side of the river; he, at length, caused boats
 “ to be made; and whilst Pompey amused himself, with taking some Gauls
 “ who were coming to join Cæsar, he transported his boats in waggon,
 “ twenty miles from his camp, placed them upon the river, and made
 “ some soldiers pass over to the other side, and without losing any time,
 “ contrived to send two legions thither, under whose protection he built
 “ his bridge; and by this means he re-established the communication,
 “ and the security of his provisions, and joined the troops who were
 “ coming to his assistance. This action infused fresh courage among his
 “ troops, astonished the enemy, and gave so reputable a turn to his affairs,
 “ that five considerable towns surrendered, and many others capitulated
 “ with him; the consequence was, he made his cavalry ford over the
 “ river, and hazarded the passage of it with his infantry.”

As to the manner, by which a general may open himself a passage across the waves, it would be easier, in case of a deficiency of boats, and if time, and the enemy's distance would allow of it, to make a causeway by the means of piles and stones, and by raising up the ground. The only inconvenience to be apprehended, is, that the waves coming in front, and their body being augmented by this impediment, the force of the water will probably break the bank; therefore, in order to render it more substantial, it should be made with an angle in the center, and

* Civil Wars, book 1.

each side of it should be sloped like a glacis. But these operations require a length of time too considerable, and labours which would be too tedious and fatiguing.

The ropes which are sometimes thrown across rivers, and which serve as a support for the infantry, when the ford becomes too deep, may prove of some use; but it is to be feared, that the soldiers, by hanging to it, will only embarrass each other, and that those in the front will be an hindrance to those who follow.

Santa-Cruz proposes that some squadrons of horse should be placed at the head of the fords, who should keep themselves firm and close together, in order to break the force of the current, while the infantry shall pass lower down, and that they shall open from time to time, in order to let the waters they have retained run out.

He would also, have some squadrons at a greater distance, in order that any soldiers, which may have been carried away, may be stopped there; but this contrivance can be of no use, against the depth of a river, it can only be serviceable in stopping the rapidity of it: Vegetius, also, never practised this method, but on an occasion of this sort.

But after whatever manner the fording of a river is attempted, the troops should form as large a front as possible, as they will by that means be better able to resist the violence of the current, and will find themselves in order of battle, after the passage is effected.

As to the passage of a river upon rafts, the infantry who pass first can take the end of a rope with them, the other end of which will be tied to the extremity of the raft; and as soon as they shall be landed, they will draw these rafts to shore. As soon as the cavalry on them shall have debarked, those on the other side will draw the raft back, with another rope that shall be fastened to it, and by degrees the whole cavalry will pass: in order to shorten this passage, many rafts should be made use of.

It

It is again more secure, when practicable, to cause the infantry to pass, mounted behind the cavalry; but then it is also dangerous, because if the enemy presents himself on the other side, both trooper and foot soldier will be confused, and it will be with great difficulty that either the one or the other will be capable of defending themselves, as they cannot dismount readily enough without embarrassment. The least impediment on this occasion, throws the troops into disorder, and exposes them to the danger of being drowned, or to retire disorderly by swimming which cannot be done without considerable loss: this method cannot be put in practice, but when there is a certainty of the enemy's being at a distance.

Troopers, says Vegetius*, after being disengaged from their baggage, put their cuirasses and their arms upon dry rafts, or upon rushes, of which they make bundles, and themselves with their horses swim over, dragging these bundles after them with a thong. This method cannot now be of any service, because the arms are not so weighty as to prevent their being carried.

The chevalier de Folard observes, " That whenever there are two
" fords in a river, however near to each other, where many battalions
" cannot pass a-breast, it is always proper to throw one or two bridges,
" either above or below, for fear any storm should arise, which would
" swell a ford, and render it impracticable; besides, a greater number of
" troops can be passed over at the same time."

This reflection appears unnecessary; for if a general has time to throw two bridges over, why should he hazard the troops at the passage of a ford, which is always more dangerous, or at least attended with more difficulty than that of a bridge? Then it will be sufficient to fasten them well; and if a third can be constructed upon the ford, the general may easily

* Book 3. chap. 2.

make use of rafts or pontons, which are secured by the two bridges. In the business of war, the least dangerous and most simple methods are always the best. If it is true, as some have pretended, that Hannibal could have penetrated into Italy, by an easier way than the Alps; Hannibal would have been a rash inconsiderate man, who on this occasion would have acquired no other merit, than that of the difficulty he surmounted.

It sometimes happens that an army crosses a river, which swells all on a sudden by the melting of the snow. In which case a general should be cautious, as Santa-Cruz remarks, not to undertake the passage, but in proportion as he shall be certain, that the whole army, artillery, ammunition, provisions and baggage, shall have passed before the flood is at its height. In the same place he points out the precautions, which ought to be taken, to prevent confusion amongst the troops during their passage.

ARTICLE II.

It would be impossible to run through every precaution, that can be taken to dispute the passage of a river; we shall therefore confine ourselves to the principal ones, by a succinct relation of the different systems of the authors who have treated on that subject.

In the passage of rivers, the whole advantage is on the side of the army on the defensive; nevertheless, the chevalier de Folard * observes, that it is very seldom that a general attempting the passage of a river, fails in his undertaking, for which he assigns two reasons: 1. Because the general who would pass, by false attacks obliges the general on the defensive, to divide his army into so many different bodies, that he becomes weakened in every part. 2. Because he cannot have any information of what is do-

* Liv. 3. chap. 8. sect. 1.

ing in the enemy's army, and is ignorant of all the enemy's designs, till such time as they are put into execution. There is still a third, which results from the first, and which seems very plausible: it is, says M. de Feuquieres *, impossible to cover the banks of a river, when the ground to be protected is of a great extent, because the assailant who seems to make his effort in many parts, at length determines upon that, where he finds the least resistance; but if he who is on the defensive, knows the river, and is as well acquainted with the fords as he who attacks, why is he not as well able to oppose the enemy, stratagem by stratagem? According to M. Feuquieres, the most certain method on this occasion, is to keep together, within a reasonable distance of those places where the enemy can attempt the passage, and to have persons whose vigilance may be depended on, upon the bank of the river, so as to receive information in such a manner, as to have time sufficient to fall upon the enemy, with the whole army, either before he shall have entirely passed, or before he shall have been able to form himself in order of battle.

In 1743, the Austrians intending to pass the Danube, in order to drive the French entirely out of Bavaria, in the beginning of June made many marches and counter-marches. The fifth, at eleven o'clock at night, they made false attacks on the side of the Iser, as far as Worts, Plifting and Deckendorf; Pladling was attacked at three o'clock in the morning by the Pandours: the marquis de Clermont-Galerande, who commanded there, receiving intelligence, that at eleven o'clock at night, the enemy had effected a passage at Posching, a village upon the Danube, between Strabing and Deckendorf; he was obliged to burn his bridge and retire: which he did in very good order; and with three squadrons he kept back eleven hundred of the enemy's horse, and gave time to the other bodies of troops to retire and join him.

* Mem. tom. 3. chap. 70.

The reason of the Austrians success was the too extensive position of the French, being by that means not strong in any one part; and that also, by the unpardonable neglect of an officer charged with the patroles, they were neither informed of the arrival of the enemy's boats, the building of their bridges, nor of their passage.

The first precaution to be taken, according to the chevalier de Follard *, is, to draw off all the boats which are upon the river; to observe whether any other river has a communication with it; to examine the course, the windings, and the most accessible parts of it; to raise good redoubts near the banks; to ascertain the bottom by means of sacks and baskets filled with stones, large trees with their branches, and by stopping them with stakes.

To this precaution may be also added another, which, executed with exactness, may produce great effects; that is, to throw whole trees with their branches into the river, not so heavy as to sink to the bottom, but whose size and quantity shall be so considerable, as not to be easily stopped; their branches should also be interwoven, and formed like a chain from one bank to the other; they should be held fast, till the enemy's army is engaged in the fords, or upon the bridges, at which time they should be let into the current, the quickness of which will encrease the force of this kind of moving bank, which will overturn every thing it meets with, soldiers, baggage, horses, bridges, and boats; in short, nothing will be capable of withstanding it, if there is any degree of rapidity in the torrent. This method is pointed out in M. de Puysegur † as levelled against bridges only. To avoid also giving any suspicion to the enemy, this chain of trees can be placed upon the bank of the river, of which some engineer must have been careful to take the dimensions before-hand, and when it shall be nearly the same size of the river, and

* Liv. 3. chap. 8. sect. 3. † Art. de la Guerre, art. 9. chap. 8. part 2.

the enemy is passing, it must be held at one end, whilst it is shoved off by the other: the whole of it will be taken by the current, which, without any other assistance, will direct it against the enemy.

In regard to the troops designed for the defence, the best method, according to M. Folard, is to form small camps of two or three thousand men, a league distant one from another, with guards and signals from one to another; to have canoes, in order that the river may be crossed silently in the night by soldiers, who will endeavour to make some prisoners, and who will also listen, in order to discover whether the enemy is preparing to march. A general should particularly endeavour to possess himself of the islands, if any, under cover of which the enemy may attempt the passage; and if the general can be certain, that the enemy's intention is to throw over a bridge where they are, in order to set out from thence, to save so much of the way, the general will by this means assure himself of the place where the enemy will attempt the passage, and which circumstance will be almost sufficient to prevent him.

But in case the general can get possession of these islands, and plant cannon upon them, the passage in that part would then become impracticable for the enemy; for besides the fire of the cannon driving him from the shore opposite the island, it would also greatly annoy him on the right and left, to a considerable distance.

But, in order for the better explaining of the manner in which a river should be defended, let two armies be supposed, one of which, consisting of forty thousand men, defends the passage against another of sixty thousand. This last is divided into three bodies; that of the center consists of forty thousand men, and the two others of ten thousand each: the center body is encamped nearly opposite to the place where the passage is intended to be effected; of the two bodies which are upon the flanks of the center, one will serve to keep the enemy in suspense, with

with relation to the true place where the passage is designed. They ought to be continually moving, sometimes at a distance from the main body of the army, and pretend to throw bridges higher up, or lower down, in order to induce the enemy to divide and separate the different bodies of his army in such a manner, that they can no longer be of assistance to each other, or be in a condition of opposing a superior body of troops, that may attempt the passage.

The army defending the passage is divided into many bodies; three of ten thousand men each, at a league distance from one another, and two others of five thousand men each, composed of the light troops, both horse and foot, and dragoons, encamped at half a league upon the two flanks of the army. The communications should be preserved between each separate body, and constant patrols kept upon the side of the river, which ought continually to cross each other; and detachments of hussars upon the right and the left, both up and down the river: the general is also supposed to have planted batteries of cannon, in different parts upon the shore; and to be possessed of two islands which he has fortified, and in which he has also placed troops and cannon: in short, he is supposed to have taken every advantage of ground, for rendering the passage difficult to the enemy, and to oppose troops to him in every part where he may attempt it. It is impossible to be certain, that the enemy, notwithstanding all these obstacles, will not effect his passage; the means of hindering him, and rendering the passage very difficult and bloody to him, can only be laid down. By the most prudent precautions, the probability, but not the certainty of success may be determined. See the SEVENTEENTH PLATE.

If, notwithstanding all these obstacles, the enemy attempts the passage, he should be attacked as he debarks: it is that reason therefore which makes it essential not to divide the troops, into too small bodies, which,

too

too weak to resist a superior number, will be easily routed. In attacking the enemy's troops, there is no danger to be feared from their cannon, which they cannot make use of without annoying their own troops; whereas the cannon planted upon the side of the river, to defend the passage, can always fire upon the troops which follow, in order to sustain those who attempt the passage: there should also be infantry placed near these batteries to defend them, and to flank such of the enemy as have already passed.

There yet remains many stratagems to be practised on these occasions: a general may make use of those mentioned in the chapter which treats of ambuscades; and they should be particularly directed against those places which are supposed to be most favourable for the enemy. The history of prince Eugene, whom the chevalier Folard styles a great traverser of rivers, furnishes many examples.

The general should be particularly attentive in disturbing the enemy when constructing his bridges; which appears the more practicable, as the bridge is never properly established, if not guarded at each end: besides, by the assistance of artillery, the enemy may be easily prevented from going on with his work. M. Feuquieres in the passage already cited, relates examples, where the enemy hath not been able to prevent the bridges being built under their very noses; but besides the rarity of these examples, the precautions he used are a very convincing proof of the difficulty attending such undertakings.

The method practised by M. Folard on this occasion is that of a consummate soldier. The epaulements*, by whose means the cannon, which cannot be avoided by the enemy, are of very great service. Montecuculli † says, That it is very difficult for a general inferior in force to pre-

* An Epaulement is an intrenchment which is sometimes made of earth, of gabions, sand-bags, or with fascines covered with earth.

† Liv. i. Chap. 6.

vent the passage of one that is superior. He must, according to him, arrive at the opposite shore, before the enemy has had time to make the necessary preparations in the part where he intends to attempt the passage; he should also take post upon some height, and then use the methods pointed out by M. de Folard. Timoleon's manner of acting against the Carthaginians at the passage of the Cumera proves, notwithstanding Montecuculli's opinion to the contrary, that a few troops well disciplined, under the command of a wise and experienced general, may, if not totally prevent the passage, at least repulse the enemy, and beat him as he passes.

A prudent general, and one who is himself acquainted with the river, of which the enemy would attempt the passage, is guided by its depth, by the difficulty of gaining its banks, and in proportion to its rapidity: he often pretends to be inactive, permits the enemy to throw his bridges over it, and waits till he is in the middle of his passage; at which time he makes a furious fire upon him, spreads disorder amongst his troops, and overthrows his ranks, and the enemy, besides losing a great number of men, also fails in the success of his enterprize.

A general may turn a town on the other side of the river, either of his own, or one in alliance with him, to great advantage: in this situation he should cause a body of troops to form a camp on the other side, reaching from the river to the town, in order to be a check upon the enemy, who will always be apprehensive of being taken in flank by this body, if he attempts the passage. The rest of the army will be encamped on the side opposite to it, divided into many bodies, to guard a larger extent of country, that the army may be disposed in such a manner, as to guard every part of the river.

In 1744, M. de Seckendorff took this position near Philipsbourg, an Imperial city, and garrisoned by the Emperor's troops, then in alliance with France: if he had remained there, if he had repassed the Rhine,
and

and joined the right of the army commanded by the marshal de Coigny, prince Charles would never dared to have attempted the passage, at least at the place where he effected it.

This article shall be concluded by another example, to prove how highly dangerous it is, in defending a river, not to have troops sufficient to oppose an enemy, too superior.

During the campaign of 1746, the Spaniards in alliance with France having retired, and marshal de Maillebois, finding himself no longer in a situation to dispute the passage of the Var with the enemy, left only some small bodies upon that river ; in the mean time, the enemy made the same dispositions as if they had the whole army to cope with.

At six o'clock in the morning they unmasked three batteries, from which they made a very brisk fire ; three vessels, which held seven hundred Croats, kept also a great fire with cannon upon the flank of the French troops.

At seven o'clock the firing ceased, in order to let three large columns of cavalry pass, with infantry mounted behind them ; the hussars took the lead of the columns. The Croats debarked at the same time, whilst the Piedmontese, in the same instant, passed the Var at the castle of La Gande.

The enemy's disposition was good as to the passage, but not as to the object, because marshal de Maillebois, separated from the Spaniards, was no longer sufficiently strong to dispute the passage ; he did all that prudence could suggest, but he could not supply the strength he wanted.

A R T I C L E III.

As to the distribution of troops, for the passage of a river, a general should always, according to the chevalier Folard *, regulate the order of

* Liv. iv. Chap. 12. Sect. 2.

his march, and the distribution of the columns of infantry and cavalry, according to the probability of coming to action. His dispositions, as well those relative to the passage, as the order to be observed upon coming to shore, may be seen at the place above cited. His reflections upon the passage of the Granicus are very just, and the reader is referred to them, as they would be too long to be related here.

When a general has discovered two or more fords upon a river, it is sometimes proper to attempt the passage at each of these fords, or at least to make the enemy imagine so, that by having them all guarded, he may weaken himself. Among the reflections of the same author upon this subject, will be found the stratagem made use of by Xenophon upon a like occasion. A general can also make as many false attempts as there are fords; not at the places where the fords are, that would be the means of discovering them to the enemy, but either a little above or below them, in order to keep the enemy's troops divided; because without that, an army not being able to pass all at the same time, would run the danger of being beaten, by degrees, during the passage.

A general who attempts a passage in presence of an enemy, should be very certain of his troops; he ought to place the most intrepid in the front, in order to encourage those who follow them: on these occasions every thing is to be apprehended from ill disciplined troops, because that, as soon as they are engaged in the river or upon the bridges, having no longer any place of refuge to fly to, they will be discouraged, and spread the panic throughout the whole army.

The emperor Leo* relates, that his father, at the passage of a river, kept himself in the middle of the waves; that he gave assistance to some, reached out his hand to others, and that he rescued many from the danger of drowning: it is thus, a general ought to animate his troops.

* Taët. Leonis Imper. Chap. 9.

If,

If, by his rank, he is exempted from exposing himself to the greatest dangers, he at least ought to encourage his troops, as much as he can, by his discourse and his example; he should even share the most painful labours with them, and alleviate them as much as possible.

If the army passes upon two bridges, it is impossible to take too much care for their security: history is filled with fatal examples of bridges falling under the weight of troops. One of the greatest dangers ever experienced by Charles XII. was, when, having caused a bridge to be thrown across the Vistula, the wood which had been made use of being too weak, and the timber-work ill secured, the bridge broke down whilst the king was passing. Charles, the prince of Wirtemberg, and many others, fell into the water: the king, having caught hold of a piece of the timber, that was floating, was carried away by the current; and the troops which had already passed, found themselves at the enemy's mercy, who might have destroyed them; but they did nothing, says the historian Nordberg †, because of the heights of which the Swedes were in possession, and from whence they kept a fire upon the Saxons. Was it not rather an instance of the good fortune which usually attended that intrepid prince?

It is probable, when a river is passed upon bridges in presence of the enemy, that they have been built before his arrival, and consequently there has been time to entrench them at each end, but particularly on that side next the enemy. These entrenchments should be made in such a manner, as to prevent the bridges from being flanked by the enemy's cannon; therefore, instead of the entrenchments, usual at the heads of the bridge, such as a horn-work, a crown-work, or a half-moon, the general should cause redoubts to be thrown up, the farthest of which should be four hundred yards distance, and opposite to the bridge; and

† Hist. de Charles XII. Book 6.

the others should be thrown up nearer to the banks of the river, forming a semi-circle; and in order for their better defence, the general should follow the same dispositions which have been laid down in the sixth chapter of the first Book. If there are many bridges, they should be constructed as near each other as possible, that the same redoubts may equally serve to cover them: the reason of these redoubts being placed at a distance from the bridges is, because that, as the troops pass, they will have room to form and sustain those occupying the redoubts. These redoubts, undoubtedly require a greater degree of labour than is requisite for the construction of a half-moon, and even a crown-work; but it seems impossible to pass a river upon bridges in presence of an enemy, however strongly they may be entrenched, if there is not space enough left between the entrenchments, and the bridges, to contain a number of troops sufficient to oppose the enemy, and to give time for the remainder of the army to pass. Labour should never be considered, when an enterprize is successful; a general, therefore, should never spare any pains for the attainment of his ends, but should take every precaution necessary for success, without troubling himself about the time and the labour it will cost: the glory of having forced the enemy to leave the passage open to him, makes sufficient amends for the trouble he has given himself, in order to attain it.

A general who would hinder his enemy from passing a river, should be beforehand with him in all his designs, and be himself in a condition of attempting it. It is necessary that a particular account should be given of the methods of passing a river, by attacking the enemy, and facilitating the passage of the troops, against the enemy's efforts to the contrary. M. Folard* has laid down many different methods, which may be seen in his works.

* Tom. iv. and v.

In these undertakings art proves often more serviceable than force; secrecy is the soul, vigilance and exactness the springs of them. There have been instances where the greatest naval officers, under favour of the night and silence, have executed designs almost incredible; where they have sailed thro' a whole fleet, and burnt, in the very port, the most formidable ship ever yet seen.

Suppose an army of sixty thousand men would pass a river, guarded by an army of forty thousand. Let it also be supposed, that the army intending to pass, has got the start of the enemy, either because he was not yet arrived, or because he has been amused with marches and counter-marches; the general has also had time to construct three bridges, and to entrench them in the manner above-mentioned; he must begin the passage by causing these redoubts to be occupied by a battalion or half a battalion, according to their size: he must plant cannon between these redoubts, with infantry to guard them. These dispositions being made, the army must march in three columns; the center column must be entirely infantry, and the other two composed of infantry and cavalry. As the infantry passes the bridges it must divide, and form columns consisting of four battalions each, which must pass between the redoubts, having cannon upon their flanks: the cavalry must pass to the right and the left through the interval of the two redoubts nearest the river, and form in order of battle upon the flanks of the columns; the right wing with its right towards the river, and the left with its left. When all these columns shall be formed, and ready to march towards the enemy, the right and left of the two lines of cavalry must sustain it, and the right of those of the right, as well as the left of those of the left, will march to put themselves in a line in presence of the enemy: in this position the army must march towards the enemy and attack him, if he is so rash as to hazard an action; and if he should retire before the army is entirely passed, the passage will be the more easily effected. See the EIGHTEENTH PLATE.

From

From this disposition it appears, that the army which attempts the passage is almost certain of succeeding ; it is sheltered behind the redoubts during the passage of the bridges ; it has ground to form itself upon, and to shew itself in full strength. If the enemy would attack the redoubts, he cannot so quickly carry them, but that assistance may be sent to them : besides, the cannon planted between each redoubt will prevent the enemy approaching it ; or if he should, it will not be without losing a great number of men, a loss which will dishearten the soldiers, abate their eagerness, and give time for a part of the infantry to pass, to form itself in many columns, and attack with vivacity.

But it is seldom a general has time to build the bridges and entrench them after this manner, when the enemy is on the opposite side with an intention of disputing the passage : so circumstanced, he must endeavour to find some fords, and, under shelter of one or more islands, construct a number of rafts behind them ; he must endeavour to keep the enemy at a distance from those places, by marches and counter-marches ; and when that is done, he must cause the cavalry to ford over with grenadiers and labourers behind them ; these labourers must throw up entrenchments as fast as they can, whilst fresh infantry is caused to pass over upon rafts. Provided these entrenchments can stop the enemy for some time, and contain infantry enough to resist him, the remainder of the army will be very soon passed : the cavalry will at the same time pass at the fords which have been discovered, in order to cover the flanks of the infantry ; when it will spread over the plain, being itself protected by the infantry, as it leaves the intrenchments in columns.

The passage of a river cannot be safely attempted, if the general does not provide for a defence, and take infinite precautions to protect the army in its passage.

All which authors have said upon this subject, arises from this principle of Vigetius, which they seem to have commented upon, and to which they have applied different examples. "As the enemy," says he*, "are accustomed to form ambuscades, or to attack openly at the passage of rivers, the general should possess himself beforehand of a good post on the opposite side, and entrench himself even on that on which he already is, to hinder the enemy from attacking his troops, separated by the channel of the river; and still, in order for greater security, the general should cause the two posts to be intrenched and well palli- sadoed, that in case of an attack, he may be able to sustain the efforts of the enemy without great loss."

It may not be improper, in this place, to relate a disposition of M. de la Valiere's, formed upon this principle.

He says, "after the cannon are planted †, a parapet should be raised upon the bank of the river, two hundred yards in length, or thereabouts, behind which, some infantry should be posted, and the boats should be immediately launched from the center of the parapet, and some soldiers with labourers sent over, who must immediately erect a small half-moon: as soon as that is done, more soldiers should be sent in order to defend it, in case it should be attacked; more labourers should also be sent to erect another half-moon, both upon the right and the left.

"If the labourers are not annoyed by the enemy, they should at the same time erect an horn-work, whose wings should be flanked by the first parapet, and the cannon planted in it: if the river is so large, that the wing of the horn-work cannot be defended by musquetry, it must be defended from the half-moon, made from thence to the water."

In the mean time, the general should cause the bridge to be continually worked at, and as soon as it is finished make the troops pass over it,

* Book 3. chap. 2.

† Liv. 2. chap. 4.

if the enemy is not in fight; but if he is, the horn-work must be completed, to prevent the enemy from falling upon the troops as they pass. The horn-work being made as strong, as is judged necessary, as much infantry as it will hold should be lodged in it, with some field-pieces; and as the cannon upon the rising will keep the enemy at a distance, the general may order the cavalry to pass: but still all this cannot be effected, but before an army very inferior. If the enemy's army is of superior force, the safest method is to try passage at some farther distance, still keeping the army in fight, as long as possible, and concealing from the enemy that any troops have been detached.

It is impossible to foresee every stratagem, that may be employed, as they depend upon many circumstances; but it is always right to send, if possible, some trusty spy to discover the enemy's position, on the other side of the river, what obstacles he can place in the passage, what methods are to be used to avoid them, and what parts of the bank are most accessible, or best guarded.

A general should make many false attempts, particularly at those parts where he least intends passing; they should be made as secretly as possible; and also, in order to deceive the enemy, the general may throw over two or three bridges at hazard, in sight of the enemy, at those very places where he has resolved not to pass; the enemy's whole attention will be directed to that side, a constant fire should be made on him from the other side, so that he may not be mistrustful of the stratagem. There is no doubt of these bridges being taken, which is of no consequence, provided the enemy is amused, and the general has time to throw over another bridge, at a distance from that place, by which he can pass.

Cæsar's * method may also be practised, which he made use of in order to pass the Segre, whose opposite shore was guarded by Afranius.

* Comment. Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. 1.

By uniting these two methods, a general can, whilst he amuses the enemy by a feigned passage, or by the bridges which he has thrown over at hazard, make use of the portable boats, and effect a passage at those places which the enemy have abandoned, in order to oppose himself to the bridges.

Whenever two armies are on either side of a river, a general may pretend to have abandoned all design of passing it, and seem to proceed on his march, as if he would attempt a passage elsewhere.

If the enemy should follow the army on the opposite shore, the general may leave a brigade of infantry, pontons, and cannon, in a wood, or behind a hill, to wait till the enemy abandons his post, in order to follow the army that is marching lower down; then those who have remained behind, will throw a bridge over the river, which they will pass, and entrench the head of the bridge. That being done, the general will detach some brigades of infantry and artillery to reinforce the troops which have already passed; so that being joined, they will be sufficiently strong to give the rest of the army time to arrive and effect the passage.

It would be impossible to recapitulate every stratagem which a general may practise: in the histories of prince Eugene, and Charles XII. the reader may see the different methods which they made use of; it will be sufficient here to relate the rules laid down by Montécuculli *, with some modern examples, by which they seem to be corroborated.

1. Says that author, The general must plant artillery upon the bank opposite to the post he intends taking; which will be attended with great advantage, if the river forms a re-entering angle, and if there is any ford near it.

* Mem. liv. 1. chap. 5.

2. In proportion as the construction of the bridge advances he should post some infantry upon it, in order to keep a fire upon the opposite shore.

3. When the bridge is completed, he must cause a body of infantry, some cavalry, some field-pieces, and some pioneers to pass it, in order to fortify the head of the bridge, on the other side.

4. The general must take great care that the enemy has not posted armed barks, or other machines, to break down the bridge when half the army shall be passed.

5. If the general would preserve the bridge, he must fortify it at both ends, and place sufficient guards in it.

In 1743, prince Charles intending to pass the Rhine, kept a continual fire upon all the French posts, from eleven o'clock at night, till three in the morning, in order to conceal his real design with regard to the passage.

Marshal de Coigny assembled his army in three large bodies, and lay all night upon his arms, the only prudent step he could take on that occasion.

By this disposition he found himself in a condition of transporting himself opposite to the isle of Ragnac, of which the enemy was in possession; and it is well known, that they ended the campaign there, without being able to penetrate into Alsace.

The number of columns ought to be regulated by the breadth of the ford, or by the number of bridges that are established.

The third of June 1747, at day-break, the army commanded by M. de Belleisle, passed the Var in five columns.

This passage was effected without any resistance on the part of the enemy, and M. Belleisle had fifteen men drowned, although there was
a chain

a chain formed of peasants, acquainted with the fords, to direct the march of the columns, and to assist the soldiers who were carried away by the rapidity of the current.

ARTICLE IV.

ALL passages of this nature, whether in a march, whether in defence, or for an attack, may be foreseen. A general may, at a distance, make all the preparations necessary for these operations; he may anticipate or foresee the dispositions of the enemy: in regard to a retreat it is otherwise, for although it may have been provided for, a general cannot be certain, whether it can be effected after the manner he hath intended; besides, he must, in a retreat, unite all the different dispositions already mentioned: the least negligence becomes irreparable, and gives the enemy a very great advantage. A moment lost, a movement discovered, may also be the cause of a rout, and render the retreat impossible, or at east very bloody; therefore, if a general, in these circumstances, has not a perfect knowledge of the river he has to pass, if he has not been careful to preserve the bridges, or to keep the materials and instruments proper for the throwing over of new ones, he will be unable to pass in sight of the enemy. Xenophon's retreat with the ten thousand Greeks, furnishes examples of the passages of rivers, which a general should always have present to his view. What prudence, what activity in founding the fords himself, whenever he met with any stream or river to be crossed! What orders to prevent confusion among his troops, and what stratagems to avoid being repulsed!

If a general is certain of returning by the same place, at which he has formerly passed, the best way would be, as Vegetius * says, to have the bridges guarded, and to erect a fort with large ditches at the head of

* Book 3. chap. 2.

each, for their security, and to place troops in it to guard the bridges and the passage, as long as shall be thought necessary.

Thus circumstanced, a general should entrench the heads of the bridges, in the manner directed in Article III. of this chapter; and that the troops may pass the bridges without confusion, according as one brigade of infantry shall enter the circle formed by the redoubts, another shall pass the bridge, and that which enters shall take possession of the posts, which that which passes occupied; he must be careful to establish batteries of cannon to the right and the left, on the other side of the river, to flank the redoubts, and defend the approach to them; so that, when the whole army shall have passed, the troops who occupy the redoubts may retire with ease. The cavalry will pass the bridges without stopping behind the redoubts.

In a retreat of this kind, the infantry should march in column, and the cavalry in order of battle, upon the flanks of the infantry. Before the march is begun, some troops must be sent to occupy the redoubts; as soon as they shall be in possession of them, the army will put itself in march, and proceed towards them. The cavalry of the right must pass over the bridge nearest to it, and that of the left will do the same. The columns of infantry must enter by the spaces which are between each redoubt; the grenadiers and the piquets must remain, in order to sustain the troops occupying the redoubts: some pieces of cannon should also be left to fire upon the enemy, in case he should approach too near; the columns must pass over the three bridges; the grenadiers and the piquets must also draw near the head of the bridges at night-fall; the troops occupying the redoubts must quit them silently, and pass the bridges; they must be followed by the cannon that has been left during the day; the grenadiers must pass last of all; after they are passed, the bridges must be broke down. This may be easily executed, provided order and silence are preserved,

preserved, but if the enemy entertains the least suspicion of the redoubts being abandoned, he will come in full strength, to attack the troops still remaining on that side. These troops, too weak to resist a superior number, cannot avoid being beaten, slaughtered, or drowned, the cannon taken, and the bridges burnt.

For greater security, the grenadiers and the piquets may be furnished with chevaux de frise, which will make an intrenchment, till the troops, which occupied the redoubts are retired. A retreat never merits the epithet of fine, except it is performed with order, and with the loss of as few brave men as possible, to save the rest of the army.

In every enterprize, formed by a general in difficult places, he must, according to M. de la Valiere *, provide for his retreat. In retreats of all kinds, adds the duke of Rohan †, a general cannot be too attentive to render it safe, and to avoid disorder: when it is the effect of his own choice, it ought to be made so early, and so expeditiously, that he may not be under a necessity of fighting.

During the passage of a river, or even after a general has passed it, if he should be repulsed, the retreat becomes very difficult, and cannot be performed without great loss; it is for that reason, that many generals, who have been mistrustful of the firmness of their troops, have burnt their ships in the port, in order to animate them to victory, from considering the impossibility of retreating.

The passages of the rivers now going to be mentioned, will serve both for examples and rules. The particulars which will be entered into, will leave nothing to be wished for, by those who are desirous of instruction only.

In the campaign of 1742, the disposition of M. Saxe for passing the Danube, owed its whole success to secrecy, to the gene-

* Prat. & Max. de la Guerre, liv. 2. chap. 4.. † Par. cap. liv. 1. des Comment. de Cæsar's

ral's address in profiting by circumstances, and particularly, to a very thick fog.

The two armies were encamped two leagues distant from each other, and the light troops skirmished together the whole day.

At seven o'clock at night, count Saxe sent for the general officers, furnished them with instructions, and caused the guards to be doubled.

At nine o'clock, the baggage filed off, over two bridges; one of rafts, and another of piles: after which, the infantry passed, and the grenadiers who formed the rear-guard, cut down and burnt the two bridges. The enemy advanced, in order to charge his rear-guard, but eighteen pieces of cannon that had been planted beforehand, very soon silenced the fire of their musquetry, and he lost not a single man.

At day-break the army formed in order of battle, upon two lines, in order to give time for the Imperialists to retire from Pladling; and as soon as they had joined, the army put itself in march in four columns.

It is particularly necessary, either in passages or retreats, to be acquainted with the nature of places, and if they are fit to furnish the timber necessary for making rafts and bridges. In Germany, and countries where wood is very plenty, in order to pass with greater expedition, a general can make use of rafts, or flying bridges. Two may be placed, one upon the right, the other on the left, of a bridge built upon piles, by which means three columns can pass at once. It should be observed, that the flying bridges are by no means secure against torrents.

In 1742, count Saxe having beforehand possessed himself of Thonau, caused two flying bridges of rafts, and a great work of redans, to be erected, in which he posted five battalions and some cannon.

On the ninth of September all the baggage passed the Danube: on the tenth the army put itself in order of battle in two lines, which retired successively toward the river.

The

The lines passed one after the other ; that is, the cavalry at the ford, and the infantry upon the flying bridges.

Six thousand of the enemy's advanced-guard were witnesses of this retreat, without daring to molest it, so prudently were the orders given, and so exactly executed.

It is in retreats that bridges are most liable to break under the weight of the troops ; it is at that time the precautions are neglected, because the danger becomes more pressing, and they are not sufficiently acquainted with the rivers over which the bridges are thrown.

If Cæsar, says M. de Puyfégur*, had known there were always floods in Spain at the time of the year he was there, he would have been guarded against the accident which he describes : at the end of this reflection the reader may see the methods he proposes for remedying these inconveniencies.

In the following account it may also be seen, that a passage cannot be unfortunate, when it is executed by resolute soldiers, under the command of a prudent and intelligent general.

After the battle given the sixteenth of July, 1746, under Placentia, the combined army of France and Spain, posted on the other side of the Po, subsisted at the expence of the Milanese, and, by means of the communications of Lody, drew provisions from the Venetian territory : the Austrians, to the number of twelve thousand men, attempted the passage of the Po, sustained by the king of Sardinia with thirty thousand men.

The combined army advanced upon the Ambro, to dispute the passage with them ; for that reason a very vigorous defence was resolved on, upon the lower part of the Ambro : by these dispositions they found themselves constrained to attempt the conquest of Lody, a place of no great consequence ; nevertheless, as Lody was the only pass by which the combined

army could draw provisions from the Venetian territory ; and through the apprehension of being a second time shut up in Placentia, where there was no longer any provision remaining, M. de Maillebois proposed the re-passing of the Po ; and, notwithstanding the objections which this proposal already had experienced, and still had to meet with on the part of his royal highness the Infant, it was carried in the affirmative.

It was therefore resolved to pass the Po upon three bridges, on this side of the mouth of the Tydon, the night of the eighth or ninth of August.

The viscount of Crussol was ordered to abandon Lody, which was greatly straitened by the enemy, the night of the seventh or eighth. On the eighth at night, the retreat having served by way of general, each body put itself in motion.

A body consisting of eight thousand men, under the command of M. de Camposaneto, was appointed, to keep back the king of Sardinia's army, and to form the rear-guard.

The marquis de la Chetardie, major-general, with thirty companies of grenadiers, six battalions, five hundred horse, and six pieces of cannon, formed the advanced-guard : he was ordered to throw a bridge over, and to occupy the Tydon, whilst the marquis de Monteynard, brigadier, with four companies of grenadiers, three battalions, three hundred horse, and two pieces of cannon, landed on the right, to close up the interval between the Po and the Tydon, and oppose the detachments of Piedmontese and Austrians, distributed upon the right bank of the Po, as far as Parpenza.

On the eighth at night-fall, the body commanded by M. de la Chetardie came out from Corte St. Andrea, and took post upon the left bank of the Ambro, where he was to embark part of his troops, whilst M. de Monteynard, who came out from Albaroni, embarked with his whole detachment upon the shore upon the right : the Croats were pontoned beforehand, and placed two and two in the mouth of that river.

These

These dispositions being made at midnight, M. de la Chetardie gave orders to march out half an hour after, in order that the remainder of the body which he conducted, and which had not been able to embark, might arrive at Bottaroni di Sotto, in the place where the bridge should end on the other side.

At one o'clock at midnight, the sixty-eight boats, which were to form the two first bridges, left the Ambro in two columns.

There were but twelve grenadiers, or volontiers, killed or wounded in the embarkation; the first bridge was completed at day-break, the second two hours after; and the third, which reached as far as Placentia, was finished at noon: the army, followed by its whole baggage, four thousand mules, a thousand waggons, and sixty pieces of cannon, passed that day and night.

M. de la Chetardie, with his advanced guard, occupied the Tydon from its mouth as far as Verati, after having caused the bridge which belonged to the enemy, upon the lower part of the Tydon, to be burnt, to which place M. de Nogent went.

The marquis de Pignatelli was ordered to occupy the Tydon, from Verati to the Strada Romea; but not having a sufficient number of troops, he contented himself with occupying a *cassine* *, which was within musquet-shot of the Romea. The marquis de Senectere having joined him, and knowing the consequence of guarding the country up to the Romea, took the right of M. de Pignatelli, with the body under his command; but his body of troops, joined to that of M. de Pignatelli, not being considerable enough to occupy the ground necessary, he con-

* *Cassine*. This word is derived from the Italian, *cassina*, and signifies a small house in the country: they are generally surrounded with a ditch, like the castles belonging to the nobility in Flanders; they are very convenient to post small parties in, where they will be sheltered from any sudden attack, and can even make head, till the nearest detachments can come and relieve them.

tented himself with reinforcing those troops, which the Spanish general had sent into the cassine.

M. de Monteynard drove the enemy from Perpenza, whilst a Spanish detachment advanced up to Castel St. Giovany.

The order was given to march on the tenth at day-break: the enemy perceiving that the right of M. de Pignatelli did not reach to the Romea, began their attack in that part, at eight o'clock in the morning.

M. de Pignatelli, pursuant to the orders of marshal de Maillebois, with his grenadiers, occupied a little rising, which was in a creek formed by the Tydon, and which commanded the opposite shore.

The fire of the grenadiers stopped the enemy for a moment, and gave time for M. de Senectere to advance with the two brigades of Anjou, and the Lorrain guards, to cover the causeway of Castel St. Giovany; upon which he caused the piquets of this last brigade, to take post in the cassines on the right and the left. He caused messieurs de Larnage and de Saulx to pass to his left, with the brigade of Anjou behind a hedge, which favoured his fire.

The first effort of these two brigades forced the enemy to repass the Tydon in disorder, pushed on the left by the regiments de la Reine, the Saguntum Spanish dragoons, and by a squadron of Dauphiny.

The enemy being formed again, passed the river near the great causeway, came out in a column upon the cassines, which were occupied, and forced the piquets of the Spanish guards to give way: then M. de Senectere caused M. de Wigier to march with the brigade of Lorrain guards, commanded by the chevalier de Beauveau, which retook the cassines, and maintained itself there till the piquets, obliged to give way by the fire of the enemy's column, left our right and the cannon uncovered; then the Lorrain guards retired in good order, into their former posts.

By

By a motion to the right, which half the brigade of Anjou made, it took the enemy's column in flank, which wanted to get before the brigade of Lorrain guards, stopped it, and mixed itself with it.

Three squadrons of Spaniards caused it to fall back upon its cavalry; then the brigade of Lorrain guards returned to take its post; it received orders to march, to attack a battery of four pieces of cannon; but the Spanish cavalry which was to sustain it, not being able to bear the fire which it received, threw the brigades into confusion, who very soon regained their ground, and maintained it, till they were relieved by the Spanish guards, sustained by all the French cavalry under the command of M. d'Argouges: at last, the enemy was obliged to retreat behind the hedges.

Whilst the prince de Beauveau occupied the castle of Verati on the left, M. de la Chetardie, who sustained that village, drew near to the left of M. de Pignatelli, who had been joined by the Walloon guards, and the Provincial grenadiers. M. de la Chetardie wanted to charge the enemy with bayonets: M. de Pignatelli opposed it; but the French general kept up so continual and great a fire, that the enemy's grew less and less, and at a greater distance.

Things remained in this situation till two in the afternoon, when the retreat was ordered: M. de la Chetardie caused M. de Beauveau to advance with thirty companies of grenadiers and a regiment of dragoons, to guard the great causeway: his appearance stopped the enemy, and M. de la Chetardie continued his march without being molested.

The body which came out of Placentia, along with M. de Castellar, retook the ground where our troops had fought: the enemy repassed the Tydon, and M. de Castellar fell back upon M. de Beauveau with his grenadiers.

The passage of the Po, and the battle of Tydon, are two actions worthy of being handed down to posterity, from the readiness, resolution, and steadiness, with which they were executed.

The passage of the Po, by the assistance of three bridges, was executed in twenty-four hours, notwithstanding the great quantity of waggons which the Spaniards caused to pass by force. The action which followed this passage, is a lesson for every military man, upon the manner in which he must form after a passage. The passage of the Po was effected betwixt two armies of the enemy, and under their eyes; the enemy were terrified at the steadiness of the troops, and the prudence of the generals.

The success of the day of Tydon is partly owing to the marquises of Senectere and Pignatelli, under the orders of marshal Maillebois.

In a word, a general cannot take too many measures in the passage of a river, or sufficient precaution to prevent the enemy from passing, nor make use of too much contrivance or artifice in a retreat; and he should even employ cunning itself, when the enemy is superior in strength, particularly when he harrasses the troops.

It is impossible, says M. de Montesquieu*, to give a detail of every thing without tiring the reader; it has therefore been thought better to cite authors, whenever it has been imagined that the reader would find in their works, solid instructions, which it would be useless to repeat here; but it has again been supposed, that it will convey pleasure to the military readers, in replacing before their eyes, examples, of the most part of which they have been witnesses; a method more conducive to instruction than all the rules that can be given.

* Pref. de l'Esprit des Loix.

C H A P. XI.

O f B A T T L E S.

OF all the operations of a campaign, the most important, and that which is most deserving of attention, is a battle, because it is generally decisive; every other operation is but preparatory to, or consequent of it. A general engagement, says Vegetius*, is often decided in two or three hours; after which there scarcely remains any resource for the vanquished. Battles, says M. de Montécuculli†, bestow and take away crowns; from their decisions princes cannot appeal, by them war is put an end to, and the name of the conqueror immortalised. A general should, therefore, think of, and try every thing, and should leave nothing unattempted, before he proceeds to this last extremity.

A general should by no means suffer himself to be forced to a battle; neither should he offer it but when there is a real necessity for it, and even when he gives battle, it should be rather with an intention of saving, than shedding blood; more with a view of asserting the rights of his master, and the glory of his country, than of oppressing mankind.

However bloody a battle may be, it is always less so than a long war, which, by reiterated troubles consumes the treasures of sovereigns, that sinew of a state, and drains the blood of the subjects. Nevertheless, there are some occasions where it is not left to a general's choice, either to give or accept of battle. An army of observation, and an army acting on the defensive, neither can nor ought to be desirous of coming to action. Both the one and the other should have no other object in view, than that of posting itself in so advantageous a situation, that the enemy

* Book I. chap. 3.

† Book I. chap. 6. art. 2.

may neither entertain a thought of attacking it in its camp, or any hope of forcing it. The army of observation, whose only object is to protect, or to cover the troops forming a siege, should never seek to fight the enemy, unless attacked by him: the other, obliged by its want of strength, to act upon the defensive, should only be desirous of occupying advantageous posts, to prevent the enemy's penetrating into the country, and attacking it in any position it shall have taken.

If the choice is left to the general, he ought to be particularly careful, before he comes to a resolution of giving battle, to examine, whether he can gain greater advantage by winning it, than he will sustain damage by losing it.

It is therefore, neither caprice, nor a mistaken courage, or the desire of distinguishing himself at an improper time, that should determine a general to give battle. "The reasons which should induce a general to give battle, are," according to Mr. de Feuquieres *, "his superiority over the enemy, both in the number and quality of troops, the enemy's incapacity, his ill chosen encampments and negligent marches, the necessity of succouring a place, or the certainty of a reinforcement, by the junction of which the enemy will become superior; or, circumstances which may change the original designs of the campaign." This was the reason, which induced the viscount Turenne, in 1674, to give the battle of Einsheim, because the prince of Bournonville waited the arrival of the elector of Brandenburg, who was coming to join him with a considerable reinforcement; and if he had not given battle before that junction, the enemy's army would have had a very great superiority over his. The reasons given by Montécuculli †, for avoiding a battle, are, "when the loss of it will be more prejudicial, than the gaining it will be advantageous; when inferior to the enemy, or

* Chap. 8. de ses Mem.

† Mem. liv. 2. chap. 6. art. 2.

" when

“ when succour is expected ; when the enemy has the advantage of the
“ ground ; when it is perceived the army is working its own ruin,
“ either by the fault or division of the commanders, or through the dis-
“ agreement of confederates.” It may also be added, when the enemy’s
army labours under some disease ; when it is in want of provisions and
forage ; and that, disheartened by these circumstances, his troops desert
from him.

It is on a day of battle, that it becomes particularly necessary for a
general to be acquainted with his own ground, and also, that which is
occupied by the enemy ; to know in what manner his wings are sup-
ported, the nature of the places where these supports are ; whether he
can be surrounded, and in what part he can be attacked with the
greatest facility.

But however essential these branches of knowledge may be, it is not
always the superiority of number, or quality of the troops, or advantage
of ground, that will secure the best disposed army from being routed :
it is the foresight of the general in the precautions he has taken be-
fore the battle ; it is his genius, his activity, his coolness in the time of
action, and the capacity of the general officers acting under him, that
determine the success.

Ground, seemingly the most advantageous, often presents obstacles,
which do not immediately strike a general, although an experienced one,
and which may prove fatal in the course of a battle ; how, therefore,
will a general be able to correct these mistakes, if he considers them
as only trivial ? At the battle of Cerignoli, given on the twenty-eighth
of April 1503 *, the enemy’s front being more extended than at first it
was supposed to be, in order to give a greater extent to that of the French
army, it was necessary to continue the lines across vineyards and thickets ;

* Guicciard. vol. 1. book 5.

by which means, the neglecting to fill up a ditch caused the defeat of the French, and the death of M. de Nemours their general.

A general should not always pursue his own opinion, it being impossible for one man to see every thing; he should, therefore, cause an exact account to be given to him of whatever he cannot have an opportunity of seeing personally; to inform himself by spies of the enemy's order of battle, and act in consequence of that knowledge; he should possess himself of all places capable of containing ambuscades, which he ought to have had examined some days before the battle. Santa-Cruz † hath given a particular detail of all these preparations.

It is in these moments, which decide the fate of whole nations, that the genius and prudence of a general ought to be conspicuous; he should, at the same time, see what is doing among his own, and the enemy's troops. Beside the precautions which ought to have preceded the day of battle, those which ought to be taken in the course of the action are so numerous, that it is impossible for them all to find a place here.

Some depend upon the general's ability, others upon circumstances, which it is almost as difficult to describe, as to mark out the necessary dispositions for them.

It depends upon the general's genius and foresight to make choice of intelligent, active, and prudent aids-de-camp, to assign to each particular body the properest to command it; not, for example, to place, at the head of infantry, one who has been long accustomed to the service of the cavalry; or, at the head of cavalry, one who is more used to the infantry, &c. to encourage the soldiers by the hope of rewards, and by motives which may spirit them up, and to threaten those who are so unmanly as to tremble at the sight of an enemy, or rash enough to run forwards without order.

† Traité des Dispos. avant la Bataille, tom. 5.

The general should also be capable of forming new schemes, in order to render those of the enemy abortive ; he should also take care, whatever may be the nature of the country, to dispose his army after such a manner, as to render it equally strong in every part, and that each body may protect and assist one another without confusion ; that the intervals necessary for acting, are well preserved, and that the reserve can easily march wherever it shall be ordered : in a word, the troops should be disposed after such a manner, that even before the action they may perceive in what manner they are to act.

It is the work of genius to take advantage of circumstances, and to submit to them ; it is impossible to foresee the precautions dependant on them, as the very circumstances must be, themselves, unforeseen : it is by a general's address, in knowing how to profit by circumstances, that he sometimes makes a motion, conducive to the whole success of the action, from the inequality of the ground, a sure means of beating him. M. de Montécuculli reduces all the advantages that can be gained over an enemy, to four principal heads, which, in reality, are of themselves reduced to the knowledge of profiting by circumstances ; such are the advantages of number, when the enemy is beaten in his posts, his convoys, and in his forages ; when an ambuscade is surrounded, or when a whole army falls upon a small, weak, and separated body : the second head consists in the knowledge of the commander ; the third in the manner of fighting, and the fourth in the advantage of the ground. A general, who properly considers these heads, will dispose of a combined army after such a manner, that it may, at the same time, receive orders without mistake, and execute them without confusion ; a very necessary precaution, and one which Hanno, general of the Carthaginians, neglected to take with regard to the strangers allied with them, which occasioned the troubles re-

lated by Polybius*. He should have mixed the soldiers belonging to those countries, where bravery is in a manner natural to them, with those belonging to countries where it is more extraordinary.

Notwithstanding, Tacitus would endeavour to prove that it is much better to keep them together; because, says he, each different nation, striving to distinguish itself, will be animated by a desire of excelling each other: experience, however, has often proved the contrary.

Vigetius points out the precautions necessary to be taken by a general, to avoid having either the wind or the sun in his front. The wind, which raised the dust, and blew it into the eyes of the Romans, contributed to the loss of the battle of Cannæ: the sun, on the other hand, dazzles the soldiers, and lays open their dispositions and evolutions to the enemy: in a word, the general should not even neglect those precautions which may be in appearance useless, whether before the battle, or at the very time they may be put in execution after the action; as the rallying the troops, the refreshing of them, the retreating from before the enemy, or the pursuit of him, supposing the battle to be gained. A general should have beforehand formed the plans of the marches and the enterprizes he would attempt, and be almost certain of the means of executing them; if, on the contrary, he fails, he should have determined the positions by which the army, fixed in a camp strong by situation, may prevent the enemy from reaping any great advantage from his victory: he should also have provided for the security of the prisoners, the hospitals, the plunder of the soldiers, in short, for all that is necessary for preserving order and discipline, and every thing contributing to the security of the troops: the distress of the enemy, and the glory of the sovereign, should be provided for without waiting for the event,

* Book 1. Chap. 15.

for at that time confusion and disorder would prove more fatal than even the battle.

In the treatise written by Santa-Cruz, upon the dispositions before and after a battle, may be seen a long detail of the precautions depending upon genius, and of those which are regulated by circumstances.

The general's post during an action ought to be, according to Vegetius, on the right wing, between the cavalry and the infantry. Onozander fixes it upon some height, and Santa-Cruz towards the center, in the front of the second line. Titus Livius and Polybius have observed, that the posts of Scipio and Hannibal were always in those parts which were least exposed; because, as observed by Onozander, a general who runs into danger is a rash man, fuller of presumption than courage: neither is daringnefs, adds his Commentator * after Plato, always a sign of courage; besides, a man who is really brave, is never daring but when it is absolutely necessary. Æneas, all valiant as Homer† has painted him, did not judge it proper to wait for Antilochus, who had joined Menelaus, with whom he was fighting.

A general should not always suppose that what particularly strikes him is right, he should reason calmly upon the probability of it, in order to come to a greater degree of certainty with regard to the practicability; he ought also, says Vegetius‡, to be acquainted with the nature of the enemy, and the characters of his generals, whether they are prudent or rash, daring or timid; whether they fight upon principles or at hazard: in effect, a general ought to be earlier or later in making an attack, in proportion to the rashness of the enemy. If, says M. de Montécuculli||, any sign of fear or confusion is perceived among the enemy, which will be known when the ranks are disordered, when the troops mix together in the intervals, when the colours wave about,

* Vegetius sur Onoz. † Iliad, Book 5. ‡ Book 1. Chap. 2. || Liv. i. Chap. 2.

and the pikes shake all at the same time, then he should charge and pursue the enemy without giving him time for recollection : some dragoons, light cavalry, platoons, some loose troops, should be sent forward, who, whilst the army advances in order of battle, will go before, to seize some posts into which the enemy must fall. A general also ought, says Vegetius, to sound the spirit of his soldiers, and observe whether they have a firmer countenance than the enemy. It is dangerous to lead an army on to action, that is not thoroughly determined to do its duty. " Battles," says Vegetius elsewhere *, " are generally won by a small number of " men." The great mystery consists in the general's knowing how to choose them, to post them well, conformable to his plan, and the services required of them.

I cannot assign the reason, says he, why particular bodies fight better against other particular ones, or why those who have beat bodies stronger than themselves, have in their turn been often beaten by those that were weaker ? It is undoubtedly owing to want of confidence ; because the place of action has been different ; or from other circumstances, which cannot be laid hold of, but on the very instant. The situation of the mind is shewn in the countenance of the soldiers ; it is declared in their discourse, and by the most trifling of their actions. The general should consult them ; he ought even to go farther ; the best countenance is not always a sign of the firmest courage. Cowardice often conceals itself under the mask of intrepidity ; but soon as the action begins, the veil falls off, and the coward shews himself, notwithstanding all his endeavours to the contrary. Neither at this time, should a proper degree of fear be thought blameable, nature must be allowed to shrink in that awful and uncertain situation : the coward gives himself up to his fears ; the bully seeks in vain to dissemble them ; and the rash man, who can neither

* Book 3. chap. 4.

distinguish between danger and safety, is insensible of both; the real soldier is always modest, and contented with having done his duty. A good general turns every thing, even want of strength to advantage. Hannibal, at the battle of Cannæ, posted his best troops upon the wings, that the center, which was composed of those on whom he had the least dependence, might be the sooner broke, in order to give the wings an opportunity of surrounding the Romans.

It also requires a very strict examination in a general, in order to be thoroughly master of the circumstances on which he should regulate his dispositions; and he will also find it sometimes necessary to make some change in his original intentions. It is always proper that the corps of reserve should be composed of veterans, and even of part of the flower of the army; for should the army happen to be broke, this reserve alone, may probably give a new face to the action: it was this method which Hannibal pursued, at the battle of Zama, where Scipio, after having defeated the troops which presented themselves to him, was astonished to find he had a new army to fight with. At the battle of Fontenoy, the household troops placed in reserve, with some brigades of infantry, determined the success of that day. Nevertheless, on some occasions this disposition may prove disadvantageous; such for instance, where it would be necessary to present a large front to the enemy, or where it is necessary to prevent his getting possession of a pass, or a defile; where a general finds himself too inferior, and where there are also posts to be defended.

It would be unnecessary to repeat every thing mentioned by Vegetius, relative to the precautions necessary to be taken before a battle; time, and the difference of weapons have greatly altered dispositions: fire-arms, which are now made use of instead of darts and slings; the bayonet, instead of the pike, have contracted the intervals which must necessarily be left between every soldier.

The

The emperor Leo * carries his speculations still farther; he exhorts a general to continue the action with the enemy, according to circumstances of times, seasons, and constitutions: in effect, there is no degree of equality between an army fatigued by a long march, and an army which, although inferior, has been at rest. Soldiers transported from one climate to another, are no longer the same; the southern people naturally weak, are much more so in a northern country; and the northern people sicken in a more temperate climate. This truth has been often confirmed by the experience of almost every nation; particularly by the French, in many of their wars in Italy, and lastly, in their campaigns in Bohemia.

It is upon these circumstances, and upon many others also, which it would be too tedious to particularise, that a general should regulate the dispositions for a battle. Vegetius † mentions only seven different methods, which may be nearly reduced to three: “The first method of ranging an army in order of battle, is,” according to him, “the long square; the second, by marching obliquely with the right, to the enemy’s left; the third, by beginning the action with the left, against the enemy’s right; the fourth, by pushing on the wings against those of the enemy, when the armies come near each other, leaving the center by the way, (which was Hannibal’s disposition at Cannæ) and by trying immediately to break through the enemy’s wings contrary to his expectation.” The fifth is like the fourth, or rather the correction of it, because by means of it the center is concealed, and covered by the archers and light-armed troops. “The sixth resembles the second; when the army in order of battle, draws near to that of the enemy, and with the right attacks his left briskly, where the action is briskly maintained with the best troops, by keeping the rest of the army at a

* *Tract. de aciebus instituendis.*

† *Book 3. chap. 4. art. 7.*

“ distance

“ distance from the enemy’s right, and disposed long-wise like a javelin
“ that presents its point. The seventh is, when the army can form with
“ one wing to the sea, a river, a lake, a morass, or an hollow; and that
“ the general reinforces with the best troops, the wing that is not
“ supported.”

The chevalier de Folard and M. de Puyfégur have themselves also conceived particular dispositions; which, however suppositious, still shew the greatness of their genius, and give great perspicuity to those principles they have established in their works; and although it may never happen that every circumstance which they have supposed, should actually meet together, there are nevertheless cases, where there may be found a very near resemblance of them, and where their imaginary dispositions may be put in execution. But even should these suppositions have no other advantage than that of exercising the genius of an officer, who takes pleasure in his business, to infuse into him that spirit of contrivance, so necessary for one who is placed at the head of an army, and the facility of readily applying rules to circumstances, and theory to practice, they well deserve the praises of posterity.

The order and disposition of troops for action, depend intirely upon the general, who knows how to profit by circumstances; the just execution of them depends upon the capacity of the general officers. The general cannot be every where, or see every thing; he is obliged to rely upon the understanding of those who command under him, for the just execution of his orders; the general officers should know how to vary them, in proportion as circumstances, and the situation of the enemy changes. They should have an exactness and quickness of eye, both to oppose and profit by them; and as M. de Puyfégur * observes, the disposition of the troops being once regulated by that of the enemy, by

* Art de la Guerre, part II. chap. 10. art. 5.

the situation of the country, and the general orders that have been delivered, the only part the general can have in the action, lies in those places where he is within reach of giving orders himself.

M. de Montécuculli * with great reason observes, that there cannot be too many officers in an army on the day of battle, in order to supply the places of those who are killed : but can a man possessed of any degree of humanity, approve of what he adds, that this number should be increased in time of war, and reduced in time of peace ? What a prospect for a soldier, who, after having lavished his blood for the safety of his country, and the glory of his prince, sees himself exposed to the fate of Belisarius ! Whatever were the virtues of his master Justinian, can any one without indignation see this general, after having overcome the Persians, reunited Africa to the empire, punished the Vandals, driven the Goths out of Italy, ravaged Assyria, scattered at a distance from both empires that throng of barbarians by which they were over-run, and preserved the throne, and the life of the emperor ; upon the bare suspicion, or rather under the pretence of a conspiracy, deprived of fight, and reduced to beg alms of passengers, in the streets of that city, which he had so often saved ?

It has been already seen, that the dispositions in a mountainous country change according to the situation of the ground. Vegetius † repeats, speaking of a field of battle, what has been so often established in the foregoing chapters, that an open country is always most advantageous for an army that is strongest in cavalry ; and that an enclosed spot, divided by ditches and marshes, covered with mountains and woods, is most convenient for infantry. In this last, the knowledge of the country, the art, the ability of the general, and the understanding of the general officers under his orders, sooner ascertain the success, than a superiority

* Liv. 1. chap. 2. sect. 21.

† Book 3. chap. 4.

of troops in an open country, which presents little or no variety of ground, and which allows the greatest part, or indeed, the whole of the troops to act; the superiority in troops is attended with great advantage, provided also the disposition is good.

The different disposition for troops are so many, the circumstances differ so greatly, that were it even possible to connect in one body only, all the battles which have been fought since the time mankind resolved to regulate their properties by the law of the strongest, the number of contrivances which remained to be collected, would be greater in number than those which have been executed. It is impossible to give a detail of every thing; every particular spot, and the disposition proper for it, every country, and all the circumstances that may oblige these dispositions to vary, must be described. Those now going to be mentioned, are only with a view of giving the rules, and of more clearly demonstrating those precepts which lead to the knowledge of all others.

May the next peace we enjoy, never permit these principles acquired during war, to be put in practice! or, if necessity should oblige us to take up arms again, may these dispositions be conducive to the good of our country, and the glory of our king!

THE FIRST DISPOSITION.

LET two armies of equal force be supposed, in an open country divided by a river, consisting of fifty-seven battalions and seventy-two squadrons each, cavalry, hussars and dragoons. The two armies are on the same side, the right of the one, and the left of the other, to the river. The left of the army whose right is to the river is unsupported, and that whose left is supported, has a wood on its right. By this disposition, may be seen the necessity of covering the wing of the army A. that is exposed.

The army I. whose right and left are supported, is formed upon two lines, and presents the same front as the army A. with a reserve in the rear. The following is therefore thought to be nearly the disposition which should be made by the general commanding the army whose left is unsupported. It therefore seems, that in order for a safe disposition, the first line ought to consist of twenty battalions, with intervals of about three toises between each battalion; twelve squadrons on the right, with their proper intervals; four battalions on the right of the cavalry, ten pieces of cannon, and a battalion in column close to the river; twelve squadrons on the left of the first line, with their proper intervals; sixteen battalions in the second line, three hundred paces distance from the first; eleven squadrons on its right, placed behind the intervals of those in the first line; and on their right, six squadrons of dragoons, next the river, in order to sustain the infantry and cannon covering the right; eleven squadrons on the left, placed in the same manner as those on the right; ten pieces of cannon, supported by a battalion in column, between the infantry and the cavalry of the right; ten others, supported also by a battalion between the infantry and the cavalry of the left, four battalions in the rear of the second line on the left, with orders to transport itself obliquely, or sideways, as soon as the army moves to attack that which is drawn up against it; twelve squadrons of cavalry in the rear of the first line upon the left, to post themselves obliquely upon the flank, at an hundred paces distance from the first squadron on the left, next to the four battalions and the cannon; the reserve, consisting of ten battalions and eight squadrons of dragoons, in the third line upon the left flank, so that it may fall into the first line as soon as the squadrons of cavalry which were in the rear of those of the first line, shall be posted obliquely: in this position, the army will move forward, the right never quitting the banks of the river.


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If the enemy's army should advance, the disposition of the army A. will become still better, because the army I. will quit the support it had on its right; but if, on the contrary, it remains in its post, in order to keep this support, then the ten battalions of the reserve, followed by the eight squadrons of dragoons, will join the four which support the flanks of the cavalry which is posted obliquely. When marching, this line posted sideways, should proceed obliquely, and when the cannon shall be near enough to cannonade with effect, it should make several discharges in order to break and beat down the entrenchments, or felled trees, which the enemy may have made, and also to destroy their disposition. As soon as the army A. shall be near enough to cannonade the army I. with success, it must halt, and amuse it with a continual fire of the cannon. The principal attack ought to be made at the wood by the fourteen battalions; in order to give more strength and certainty to this attack, six other battalions with ten pieces of cannon should be detached to it from the second line, always keeping up a fire from the front. If during this attack, it is perceived that the enemy weakens his line, in order to carry assistance to the wood that is attacked, then the center and the right of the army should march up, and charge him briskly. The troops who cannonade the wood, ought not to advance, but should only keep the troops posted in it at bay, because that part which the enemy has weakened, will then become the principal attack: it is probable, that the enemy having weakened his front, will certainly be broke. If the enemy should not weaken his front, and the attack of the wood should succeed, as soon as the enemy is driven out of it, the troops which attacked it should take the enemy in flank; then the body of the army, by advancing, ought to determine an affair already half gained. If by the intelligence the general hath received, and the number which he knows the enemy's army to consist of, and which he sees before him, he judges the


wood is filled with infantry, and that consequently, the attack of it will be attended with difficulty; he must attack on the side of the river, by marching by degrees from the right, as if to sustain the left. In order for the greater certainty of succeeding in this attack, he should reinforce the five battalions upon the right, with some others from the second line: the left should continue in the position already mentioned to keep back the enemy. If it should happen that the enemy seeing his left attacked, causes the troops to leave the wood in order to replace those of the center, which he caused to march to the assistance of the left, the fourteen battalions which are posted sideways, ought briskly to attack the wood sustained by dragoons. These last should post themselves upon the left flank of the infantry in order to cover it; and as soon as it shall be within sixty paces of the enemy, it should march up to him with bayonets fixed, and the dragoons ought to attack him in flank, at the time the infantry does the same in head. The wood is all this while supposed to be practicable for the dragoons on horseback; but in case it should not be so, they must dismount, the infantry being sufficiently supported by the twelve squadrons of cavalry, which are placed sideways.

The general may with ease, especially in an open country, attack the enemy's whole army together; but this may be attended with great danger, and if the whole front of the first line is broken, there will not be much difficulty in breaking the second: whereas, by attacking the enemy's army in one or two parts, if one of these attacks succeeds, the battle is won, because the troops who are victorious, take the enemy in flank, at the same time that he is attacked in head by the rest of the army. In case it should not succeed, the troops who made the attack, can retreat, protected by the whole army, which hath not at all suffered.

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


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


OF AN ORDER OF BATTLE

Ist Disposition.



T. Jefferys sculp.



The general should, as much as possible, conceal the motions he intends making from the enemy; consequently, the five battalions and ten pieces of cannon which support the right of the army next the river, ought to march in the rear of the squadrons of the first line, the infantry with their arms secured, and not range themselves in the order of battle intended, till the two armies are ready to march to charge each other. It is the same with regard to the squadrons of cavalry, which should be posted behind those of the first line, to execute the design already laid down. See the NINETEENTH PLATE.

THE SECOND DISPOSITION.

If the two armies are not supported either on their right, or their left, the same position should subsist that hath already been established for the cavalry, which is in the rear of that belonging to the first line, except that it should be distributed on the right and the left. If there is not cavalry sufficient, hussars must be substituted in its place; but if there should be cavalry enough, it must be used on this occasion, because cavalry being a greater body, its charge is heavier, and it also makes a greater impression upon other cavalry opposed to it, provided they execute their order with great quickness. This cavalry or hussars, which are posted sideways, should not quit their post, but wait the success of the attack. If the enemy is repulsed, they must then fall upon his flanks, and by a brisk and vigorous charge endeavour to involve the second line in the confusion of the first; they will be followed by part of the wing of cavalry that is victorious, in order to give a greater force to the attack of the second line, taking as much care as possible not to leave any body of cavalry upon the wing of infantry that is in a condition of protecting it. After these two lines of cavalry have been broken and pursued, half of the victorious line should remain in order of battle, and, by a motion to the
right

right from the left, take the enemy's infantry in flank, at the same time that it is attacked in head by the infantry of the army. The second line should then move into the place of the first, in order to be near enough to assist it, in case the enemy's infantry should stand its ground firmly; but it is probable, that being deprived of its cavalry, it will neither have the same firmness, nor the same spirit as if it was supported, especially when it is attacked on every side.

The cavalry and the hussars who pursue the beaten wing, should not expose themselves too much, or break their order in the pursuit, for fear the enemy's hussars which are behind, should fall upon and beat them by attacking them on all sides, which may very probably happen; if they do not take care to keep in order of battle, which should at least be attended to by the cavalry. After the hussars have pursued the enemy's cavalry so long as to intirely disorder them, they should return, and take their former posts, in order to march from thence to whatever place they may be serviceable. Although it may appear something hard to make the hussars return, there is nothing so difficult but what may be accomplished, when order and discipline are firmly established, and when an officer has the art of making himself obeyed.

At the battle of Cannæ*, the Carthaginian army, superior to that of the Romans, having broke through them, one part continued the pursuit, and the other fell upon the rear and the flanks of their infantry; at the same time the Carthaginian infantry charged that of the Romans in all parts, which decided the victory. Thus Hannibal owed his victory partly to his superiority in cavalry, and to his attack upon the flanks. The Numidians, who were upon the right wing of the Carthaginian army, and who fought nearly in the same manner as the hussars, performed, on

* Polybius, book 3. chap. 4.

this occasion, the same service as the hussars would certainly do in the disposition now before us ; so true it is, that infantry destitute of its cavalry, hath no longer the same firmness, nor the same spirit, and if it is also attacked in head by infantry, it cannot avoid being beat. The principal attention of a general, says M. de Montécuculli *, ought to be to secure the flanks, experience having taught, that when the wings of cavalry are broke, the infantry is easily surrounded, and hath no longer the means, nor even the courage of defending itself. The reader may see the principles he lays down upon that subject. It is seen by the example of the battle of Cannæ, what use the cavalry ought to be put to, particularly in an open country, where it can easily act. What advantage may not be expected from it, when an army of Romans, fourscore thousand strong in infantry, and six thousand horse, was overcome by the Carthaginians, weaker by the half in infantry, but which derived its principal strength from ten thousand cavalry, all veterans, and well disciplined.

It is the manner of drawing up troops, their order and discipline, and not numbers, by which battles are won ; it is very rare, that the whole can be employed. During the late war, scarcely the half have been engaged in all the battles which were gained.

But if the wing of cavalry is beat, it ought to retreat with as much order as possible. The cavalry, or hussars, that are posted sideways, should always continue in the same place ; there is no reason to fear that the enemy will advance briskly to the pursuit, because he will be taken in flank by the body which is posted sideways, a circumstance, which ought not only to abate the eagerness of the conquerors, but also animate the conquered. By this manner of acting, they gain time to pass through the intervals of the second line, and to rally in the rear of it, which

* Liv. i. chap. 2.

they

they can perform with the greater ease, as they are neither pursued or molested, at least but very slightly.

In order to prevent the inconveniencies that may arise if the hussars in charging the first line of the enemy in flank, are charged by the second, it is necessary to detach, instantly from the reserve, a body of dragoons sufficient to fill up the intervals of the hussars, which will form a full line, without taking up more ground: this can be so much better effected, as there would be no ground on the other side the troops, who are posted side-ways, and that besides, these troops would be at too great a distance from the main body of the army.

Again, without causing them to fill up the intervals of the hussars, they may be placed in a second line behind them; and when the hussars attack the flank of the enemy's wing, the dragoons will take their place, in order to keep back the enemy's second line. This method hath the same effect, and is performed with less difficulty. It is almost evident, that the second line will not dare advance to protect the first, for fear of being charged in flank by the dragoons, but that, on the contrary, it will be obliged to retreat.

This disposition, the performance of which appears very difficult, is not in reality so, if the general hath taken the necessary measures, and if his troops are well disciplined, and know how to move with order and exactness. Even when this motion is not performed with all the exactness possible, it can never be dangerous, because the front of the two lines will not be destroyed, and because it is also made upon the rear; and that if the dragoons and hussars are attacked and beat in marching up, their defeat cannot be any way prejudicial to the main body of the army. When the field of battle is in an open country, all the troops generally come down, especially when there is no obstacle to prevent them.

On

On these occasions, it is requisite that the disposition of the troops should be strong in every part; there should always be a reserve, whether of infantry or dragoons, in order to be ready to assist the troops which have suffered.

If it is possible, in an open country, to find any hollow to support the right, and a village to support the left, the general should make choice of that situation, supposing his intention is to accept, and not offer battle. If he designs to give battle, it would be unnecessary to take this position, because he must quit it in order to attack the enemy: but if circumstances require his accepting it, he must seize this post, and post infantry and cannon in the village, and place other infantry in the rear, to support that which is in the village.

As to the disposition for the order of battle, especially for the front of the line, it must be regulated by the ground, by the disposition the enemy has taken, by the troops that can most easily act, and by those that the enemy can oppose to them.

If the enemy has pitched upon a field of battle, and the general would attack him in it, he should keep his whole front employed; but should make his chief efforts on one or two parts, upon the wings, or at the center. This was the method practised by marshal Saxe in all his battles: when he accepted battle, as he was obliged to do at Fontenoy in 1745, he was in expectation that the opposite army would attack him on one side sooner than another; in this situation the dispositions should be properly regulated, the posts intrenched and occupied, the cannon distributed, and troops placed in the rear of each post, to sustain those which are in it: victory should then be expected from the capacity of the commanders, the firmness of the troops, and the assistance that is properly given them. But when a general gives battle, he may attack either the right, the left, or the center, always conforming to the situation of the ground, and the field of

battle which the enemy has chosen, which cannot be ascertained but by a thorough knowledge of the country.

It is dangerous to attack the whole front of the opposite army with equal vivacity, because, if the attack does not succeed, the troops are disheartened, and are witnesses of each other's defeat. If the first line is repulsed, the second is seldom of any great use; whereas, by only employing the whole front of the enemy, and making a strong attack upon one or two parts, and it is successful, the troops can take the enemy in flank; and those which amused his front will then attack him briskly, and prevent him sending assistance to the troops that are beat. If the general does not succeed in the first attack, he can try it again with greater force, by causing the troops of the second line to march as was done at the battle of Lafeldt, fought in 1747: the French troops being repulsed four times, M. Saxe sent them a reinforcement; these troops being united, carried the village at the fifth attack, which determined the fate of the battle.

In a plain but enclosed country, a general can attack only part of an army. Antiquity furnishes many examples of this. Epaminondas, at the battle of Leuctra, attacked only the right of the Lacedemonian army, with a large column of infantry that formed his left; causing the right to be supported, and making the left march, the whole army, according to the opinion of the chevalier de Folard *, wheeled. The battle of Mantinæa †, won by the same general, is also of the same nature, with this exception, that it was the center of the Lacedemonian army that was attacked. These examples are only proposed as what may possibly happen, but which it would be dangerous to imitate on every occasion; and which should be pursued in circumstances only where a general expects great advantage from them.

* Traité de la Colonne, chap. 10.

† Trait. de la Colon. obser. sur la bat. de Mantinée.

As the cavalry can easily act in an open country, and be of great assistance to the infantry, all possible means should be used to contribute to the success of their attack; they should always be supported by troops in their rear. Cavalry is of great use, particularly where the two armies, from the situation of the country, find no obstacle to prevent their joining; and if the cavalry, as M. de Puyfégur * observes, is beat, even when the infantry of the same army is victorious, the best thing that can afterwards happen to it is, to retire in good order.

The ground so often varies, that even in an open country there are unevennesses, thickets, morasses, and hollows; in each of these situations the dispositions should be changed. If these thickets happen to be in the line of cavalry, and it can act there, (for if it cannot, it would be a very great fault to place it in them) it should be intermixed with platoons of infantry, observing also not to take them from the main body of the army, but from the reserve, in order not to diminish the strength of the front; which should never be done on any occasion whatever, unless part of the army, either by its own, or the enemy's position, cannot act offensively, by reason of some morass, hollow, or any other obstacle that the enemy may have placed before him: if, nevertheless, a general can take an advantageous position, by causing these thickets or these hedges to be occupied by infantry, he should give it the preference, to enable the cavalry to act with the greater facility.

There is great care necessary, in fortifying a place, to get possession of the most advantageous parts, whether by fortifying that which overlooks the plain, or by levelling that which might command the fortifications; so as in a polygon, every bastion, and all the out-works, flank and protect each other: in like manner troops drawn out in order of battle ought mutually to protect and support one another. Nothing should be omit-

* Art. de la Guerre, chap. 14. Art. 4. Part I.

ted, nothing neglected; advantages in appearance trifling, often become decisive.

The dispositions vary not only according to the situation of the ground, but also according to the general's views. Some draw up the battalions without intervals, or like a wall; others with small intervals; others leave the distance of half a battalion between each; and others, in pursuance of the chevalier de Folard's method, place them in columns.

The first disposition is without doubt formidable, as to infantry; but as it has been already remarked, it is defective with regard to cavalry. In the third, the interval of half a battalion is too wide, it would require an immense tract of ground; besides, the battalions would not be near enough to have it in their power to protect each other. The second seems better, because the front is not so large, the battalions are more within reach of assisting each other, and have only the distance necessary to prevent their mixing confusedly together. The fourth is undoubtedly very good; but can a general promise himself, that the soldiers can always march at an equal pace together, and without stopping? The fire of the column is continual, it defends itself on all sides; but its oblique fire does not do much execution, and there are situations and spots where this position in column would be faulty. When it cannot approach the enemy, and is also exposed to his cannon, this disposition would be dangerous; because it is certain that cannon plays with much greater advantage upon depth, than upon breadth: besides, not being able to get near the enemy, there are only the heads of the columns able to fire, and the rest remains inactive, exposed to the cannon. The position of the column is therefore only very good, when it can get up to the enemy and charge him.

The

The marshal de Puysegur * asserts, that an army in an open country, formed in two lines, the first of which is without intervals, ought of course to beat an army that is formed with intervals.

The reason he gives for it is sensible; it being certain, that a full line keeps itself much closer in marching, and that charging the first line of the army that has intervals, it ought to have broke through it before the second line, which is an hundred and fifty toises, or three hundred paces behind, can have time to come up to its assistance; which might very well happen, and examples of it may also be cited. But could not there be another disposition opposed to this disposition in wall, keeping the necessary intervals, not only capable of resisting it, but also stronger, whether by the position and arrangement of troops, whether by the ready assistance they can give each other, without being confused in their motions?


Let two armies be supposed in a plain country, without support to the wings of either side, or without any obstacle that may prevent their getting up to each other. The enemy's army, as hath already been said, is in two lines; the first of which is formed in wall, both infantry and cavalry, the second is formed with large intervals, and a body of hussars in the rear. The army to be opposed to it is of equal force, and consists of forty battalions and fifty-four squadrons, cavalry, hussars, and dragoons. The following seems to be nearly the manner in which it ought to act against the enemy, who is supposed to be drawn up in wall.


The first line of infantry composed of fifteen battalions, has the distance of three toises between each battalion, and the distance of half a battalion between each brigade, eight squadrons on the right, and as many on the left, with their proper intervals: fifteen battalions in the second line,

* Art de la Guerre, lib. 2. chap. 14. art. 3.

two hundred paces distant from the first, seven squadrons on the right, and the like number on the left, in the rear of the intervals of those of the first line, supporting the infantry of the second; ten battalions in reserve in two columns, one of which in the rear of the squadrons on the right of the second line, and the other of the same force, posted in the same manner on the left; twelve squadrons of dragoons in the rear of the second line, half on the right, half on the left, and twelve squadrons of cavalry, or hussars, if there is not cavalry, in the rear of those of the first line.

By this disposition, the army appears to be ranged in two lines, with a reserve, and will leave no room for the enemy to doubt of the motions it may make in marching: this disposition will undoubtedly have that effect, and does not appear very formidable; but as soon as the two armies begin to move forward, the second line of infantry must advance as unperceived as possible, forming itself in columns by battalions, each of which, with its head to a battalion of the first line, will form as many T's. The ten battalions in reserve, which form two columns of five battalions each, will march and fill up the space on the right and left, between the infantry and cavalry. The cavalry, or hussars, which are in the rear of the first line, one by a motion to the right, the other by a motion to the left, will post themselves sideways, at an hundred paces from the wings of the army; the dragoons must post themselves in the rear of them in a second line. This will be performed much easier marching, because it is not complicated; it is also performed in the rear, and the front of the first line is not put into disorder; and consequently, the enemy will not perceive it soon enough to change his position, and oppose the disposition which is presented to him. This first line, by this disposition, forming as many columns as there are battalions, of course ought to break through the enemy's army which is in wall;
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but not above four deep, because the impression of a column ought to be much stronger than that of a battalion four or six deep. See the TWENTIETH PLATE.

Supposing the wings of each T. to give way, the battalions which penetrate there will find themselves between two columns, hedged in with bayonets; the ten battalions in reserve, which, according to this disposition, ought to join the right and the left of the infantry, should of course separate the two wings of the infantry, which are on the outside of the disposition in columns. Four battalions should remain in pursuit of them, and the two last take the line in flank, at the same time that it is attacked in head. The cavalry should charge the line which is in wall, with great vigour, and the second line should follow it very close, but in good order; the cavalry, or hussars, which are posted sideways, will attack it in flank, and the dragoons must remain in their post, in order to keep back the enemy's second line.

Whatever dispositions are made in the drawing up of an army, they should always have some object. A general should foresee all that may be done by the enemy, whose disposition he should always suppose to be a good one, and to which he should oppose one at least as strong, and always better; if possible, he should particularly conceal from him the motions he intends making, or disguise them from him in such a manner, that he shall not have time to oppose them, at least not readily enough: neither should a general be so near as to give the enemy an opportunity of discovering and profiting by the method he intends following.

The disposition of an army in wall is good; but in general, only so with respect to infantry, because that body acting by itself, requires but very little ground to retreat, or present itself to the enemy, or to make a motion to the right or to the left. But this same disposition is defective;
and

and even hurtful for cavalry, unless there is a moral certainty of its getting the better: but as with regard to war, a moral certainty would be a real presumption, this disposition of cavalry in wall would be dangerous, because it may happen to be broke. If that which is opposed to it marches up to it resolutely without confusion, and without being afraid of that mass of cavalry, and charges it the first, sword in hand, how can it retire in order if it is broke, being as much straitened in its retreat as in its disposition? All the squadrons filling up the ground, it will neither be able to make any evolution, or to act; and if it retreats through the large intervals of the second line, it will carry it away with it in its flight: were there even six lines behind it, they would all be carried away, the second by the first, the third by the second, and so on with the others.

It is true that it may give the first charge, and consequently, make those squadrons which have intervals, give way; but as these last have more ground to act on, they can retreat with greater ease than those who have none, by passing through the intervals of the second line, which is not to be done by a line that hath no interval. They can rally in the rear, while the second will charge the line that is without interval, and which is already disunited by its first attack; even when these two lines are beaten, they can retire with greater ease, each squadron having ground enough to act upon. They will never be so much disordered as the line which has no interval, which cannot escape being cut in pieces if broke, or which can only find its safety in flight; whereas, these that have intervals can retire one after another, and after a soldier-like manner, sustaining each other.

Besides, in order to prevent the impetuosity of this cavalry in wall, it appears that nothing is to be done but to post hussars, if there is not a sufficiency of horse, behind the squadrons of the first line, who, when
the

the two armies begin to move forward in order to charge, will place themselves on the right and the left sideways, an hundred paces distant from the first line of cavalry: by this position, they will be able to take the enemy's line in flank, whenever it comes to attack the cavalry. If a part of this line perceiving this motion, divides into two, one part to attack the line that has intervals, and the other the hussars, it is so much strength lost; consequently, the line with proper intervals has fewer troops to fight, and may expect to break them by giving the first charge. If the hussars should be beat, it is of no great consequence, the defeat of those troops never deciding the success of the battle: it is the body of the army the enemy must break, and not two regiments of hussars, which retreat with great ease from before cavalry, and rally and return to the attack as readily as they retired. But if instead of hussars, cavalry can be posted there, the enemy's line, which is divided in two, will find itself obliged to fight upon equal terms; the certainty of success depends upon the quickness with which the enemy is attacked; and the more so, as he will be obliged to make a motion in the presence of troops, already posted and ready to charge. If this line without intervals advances, without shewing any attention to the hussars, in order to charge the cavalry, the hussars, at least a great part of them, ought to fall upon the flanks; and the dragoons, which are in the rear of them in reserve, should take their place, to keep back the enemy's second line, and to prevent the hussars from being taken in the rear.

These two dispositions are ideal; a general seldom chuses to fight upon a spot where the wings are void of support, and prevents the enemy, as much as possible, from getting possession of an advantageous post, or at least does not attack him, when he cannot prevent him doing it, especially if the ground which he occupies is every where exposed: there are, nevertheless, circumstances where a general is obliged to fight, al-

though not in a post strong by situation. By the two dispositions just now described, the order which would be most proper to be preserved for covering the wings, which may be exposed by the situation of the ground, has been endeavoured to be shewn; it has been seen of what consequence it is for a general to know, and to secure all the heights, morasses, hollows, and every obstacle he may meet with. On occasions so important, a general should take the same precautions that he would use under the cannon of a place, if he found heights that overlooked the works; in which case he would not fail of constructing others more advanced, to prevent the enemy from getting there, and retarding their approaches.

If the duke of Savoy, at the battle of Marfaille, gained in 1698 by the French army, commanded by M. de Catinat, had been possessed of the heights of Piosaca, the two wings of that prince's army would have been supported; instead of which, his left wing was exposed. M. de Catinat profiting from this fault, extended his right to the foot of these heights, of which he possessed himself, and out-stretched the enemy's left: it was from these heights that the disorder in the duke of Savoy's army commenced; it soon communicated to the whole front, and got possession of the whole army; so true it is, that the most trifling object, being neglected, changes the order of things; that the least fault becomes essential; that confidence in the number, and in the courage of the troops, is often dangerous; and that having a contemptible opinion of an enemy is always fatal. The enemy, although inferior in troops, will soon attain a degree of superiority, if he has the advantage of ground.

In a battle it is impossible that the two armies should be equally well posted. That which is attacked, by taking a good position, and there making up by the assistance of art what is wanting in situation, may maintain itself in that post, and defend itself in it obstinately. On the contrary, the army that would attack, can, in approaching to the enemy,
profit

profit only of the advantage the country offers him; and by the disposition of his troops, make up for the badness of the ground, and attack the enemy although advantageously posted: it is on such an occasion, that a general's capacity opens itself, and shews the great man; whether by properly attacking the enemy in the weakest part, by employing his whole front, and by preventing him from sending assistance to the troops attacked with force and vigour; whether by posting his own troops after such a manner, that notwithstanding their facing the enemy in a disadvantageous post, they can be neither surrounded or flanked. It should always be construed into a fault, when the enemy has time given him to post himself advantageously. It is necessary for a general to be beforehand with the enemy in possessing himself of the post which the enemy had resolved to take; not in order to wait for him and receive battle in it, unless it should be impregnable, but he should seize on it, to prevent the enemy's taking it, and attack him either on his march, or in some situation less strong, which he can neither have perfectly examined, or had time to fortify. [This must be understood in relation to offensive war; for in defensive war a general must carefully avoid fighting, and be contented with guarding his country, covering his towns and magazines, in taking such camps as are strongest by their situation, and in joining the assistance of art to nature.]

In offensive war a general must act in such a manner, as to be beforehand with the enemy in all his designs, in his marches, in the posts he would take; and suppose he hath had time to possess himself of a good situation, he must not have time given him to fortify himself in it, and to render it difficult to be forced.

But a general, whether acting on the offensive or the defensive, ought always to be watchful; sleep is dangerous to him, with whom the safety of the army, and the security of the state are entrusted. A dream sent

by Jupiter to Agamemnon, in Homer *, told him, that a general who presided at so many councils, who had such numbers under his command, and who was loaded with so many cares, should not sleep the night out.

Armies can engage in so many different positions, that it is impossible to particularise all of them. In the beginning of this chapter two armies have been presented in an open country, without any support to their wings : two others have afterwards been posted, one of which is upon a spot advantageously situated, its two wings covered ; the other hath only its right wing supported, and its left exposed. It has been endeavoured to give to that, whose left wing is unsupported, the greatest strength in its whole front that is possible, and by the disposition of the left wing, it is both strong and secure ; but there are such a variety of spots where two armies may meet, that it will suffice to know in general the advantages they may derive from their situation.

A general may cut off the communication of any assistance the enemy would send to the troops which are vigorously and briskly attacked, by employing his whole front with a few troops ; but they must be supported, and not exposed to the danger of being cut off.

It is always a great fault to give battle on a disadvantageous spot ; and if circumstances do sometimes require fighting, the general should, as much as possible, contrive that the cavalry is not exposed to the cannon ; but should at the same time take care that it doth not quit the support which it gives to the infantry, which cannot be done without it is covered by a bank, or by hedges, and which, nevertheless, should not prevent its marching on the first order.

A general should, as much as possible, prevent the enemy from getting possession of any post, however trifling, and should prevent also, his overlooking him. But if the enemy should get possession of such a post, he

* Iliad, book 6.

should

should at least prevent him from fortifying himself in it; he may have spies on whom he can depend, to penetrate into his designs; he should also have advanced detachments, who, by incessantly observing the enemy, may give intelligence of all his motions.

An officer's negligence is more dangerous than his inability. The desire of acquiring honour gives activity; but it is the love of his profession that gives him the penetration necessary for searching into the most secret designs.

THE THIRD DISPOSITION.

THIS third disposition is very different from the two which precede it: the enemy's army is supposed to be advantageously posted; it hath a hollow on its right, through which run the waters of an impassable morass, forming a rivulet. Its left is supported by a large town, crossed by a rivulet. In the center is an height, capable of containing twelve battalions; in the front of it is a plain of seven or eight hundred toises, which extends from its left to the cavalry on its right. Opposite to this cavalry the plain grows narrower, by reason of an height which reaches to the rivulet, and which the cavalry could not occupy, because the enemy hath taken possession of it during the night. The town is entrenched, and filled with infantry and artillery; sixteen battalions in two lines are posted next the town, in order to sustain the troops that are in it. Behind the town there are three bridges upon the rivulet: in the front of the town, on the other side of the rivulet, are posted four battalions and five pieces of cannon, in order to flank the troops intending to attack the town: these four battalions are sustained by eight squadrons of dragoons. The center of the army consists of twenty battalions in the first line, and as many in the second; eight of which are next to the morass, sustained by six squadrons of dragoons; twelve squadrons in the first line, and twelve in the second. The cavalry

cavalry on the right consists of eleven squadrons in the first line, and eleven in the second. Thirty squadrons of hussars, distributed half on the right, and half on the left, and the whole front of the army lined with artillery.

The army A. which was encamped a quarter of a league from the height by which it is separated from the enemy, began its march at dark; it halted at the foot of the height, and sent some detachments of infantry to take possession of the summit of it. The army I. made the above-mentioned dispositions, because the army A. was too near to be able to avoid a battle. The army I. is composed of seventy-eight battalions and ninety squadrons: these two armies are nearly of equal strength.

The left of the army A. hath a fine plain before it, extending from the morafs to that part where the height commences. In that place are posted eight battalions, in two columns of four battalions each, next the morafs, with ten pieces of cannon between the two columns: there are fourteen battalions in the first line, and thirteen in the second; four battalions towards the height, and next the cavalry. Sixteen battalions occupy the height as far as the small wood; four battalions occupy the other side of the wood, and thirty-two battalions upon two lines very close together; twelve battalions behind the height next the rivulet; twelve squadrons of horse, and twenty of hussars, who have orders to pass three bridges, thrown over the rivulet, and attack the town with three columns of four battalions each, sustained by the twelve squadrons of horse, and the twenty of dragoons. In the rear of the cavalry upon the left, are posted sixteen squadrons of dragoons at a little distance, with intervals; so that, if the enemy should attack this left and beat it, the cavalry may easily retire through the intervals of the dragoons, to give them the greater facility of acting, and turn their defeat into an almost certain victory. Fifteen squadrons of horse are posted behind the height, with their right
toward

toward the height, and their left towards the camp, in order to take the enemy in flank, whilst he is employed in pursuing the cavalry of the left, which he has beaten. The chief object of the attack should be the town, although the most difficult; if it is forced, the enemy will be beat without resource, because the infantry who has driven him from that post, will attack him in rear, at the same time that the infantry which remained on the height will come down from it, and join, either to attack, or at least to employ the enemy upon the height, and by that attack prevent him sending assistance to the troops, already driven from the town and put to flight; the cavalry upon the left will advance at the same time to support the infantry, and, if necessary, to charge the enemy's cavalry.

The thirty-two battalions which are upon the height in two lines, will be divided into six columns, of which four of six battalions will be employed in attacking the town, the last battalion of every column excepted; which must remain at the entrance of the wood, with four columns of four battalions upon the left, in order to sustain the infantry attacking the town, and to keep back the enemy's cavalry upon the left. They will descend from the height under the protection of the wood by which it is covered, and which ends at about four hundred toises from the town. These troops will be followed by artillery, which must be posted between the columns; they must halt on leaving the wood, and will begin by making a continual fire of cannon upon the town and the cavalry: during this fire of the artillery, the twelve battalions on the other side of the rivulet ought to attack the four battalions and the eight squadrons of dragoons belonging to the enemy; and when they have forced them to give way, they will amuse them by a constant fire of musquetry. When the artillery shall have played long enough to have broken down the enemy's intrenchments, and destroyed the order of the troops, the four columns

columns, formed of twenty battalions, will march up, and with their bayonets endeavour to penetrate at some part; the twelve battalions on the other side of the rivulet will charge at the same time; the two columns of four battalions each, as well as the four last battalions belonging to the columns which attack the town, will remain at the entrance of the wood with the artillery, in order to keep back the enemy's infantry and cavalry which was next the town. If any one of the columns can penetrate as far as the bridge that is in the town, it will take possession of it, as well as of the market place; the others following it will take possession of the hedges and gardens. One column only will be sufficient to secure the banks of the rivulet, and take possession of the bridges. As soon as the bridges are free from the enemy, the twelve squadrons of horse, and the twenty of hussars, will pass and attack every thing they find to oppose them; then the left ought to advance: the battalions which have remained upon the heights should come down from them, and all together attack the front of the army, whose left wing is already beaten and taken in flank.

But if the enemy, after having examined the disposition of the army A. imagining that the principal attack will be directed against the town, instead of remaining in his first disposition, changes it intirely, and causes a part of his second line of infantry to march to the town; and if he strengthens his right by the cavalry of the left, (a spot more favourable for cavalry than infantry) the attack of the town will then become impracticable, because of the great superiority of the troops defending it; therefore, it would be useless to persist in it; but his right should be vigourously and briskly attacked: it is true, that it is reinforced by the cavalry from the left; but as the ground between the height and the eight battalions which are next the morass, can contain but twelve squadrons, those which the enemy hath drawn from the left, can


can only be posted behind the height, or in the third line ; if they are behind the height, nothing can prevent their being attacked : but supposing the first line broken, it should not be too warmly pursued, for fear of separating, and being taken in flank by the cavalry behind the height. The sixteen squadrons of dragoons which are behind, ought to remain in that situation ; the fifteen squadrons of horse, which are with their right to the height, and their left to the old camp, ought to take the place of those who have attacked the enemy ; and then the twenty battalions which are upon the height, will come down into the plain and attack the enemy's infantry, at the same time that the fifteen squadrons of cavalry, and the sixteen of dragoons, attack the cavalry which is posted behind the height. If they succeed in beating it, or whether the enemy sends assistance or not, if he sends assistance, he will weaken his left, and then the forty-four battalions, who till this time have remained inactive, may come down from the height and attack the town, not so much with a design of forcing it, as to oblige the enemy not to take any troops from it ; if no assistance is sent to the right wing, it will be undoubtedly beaten, being attacked by forces so greatly superior to it : the whole of the cavalry being thus put to flight, the most prudent part the enemy can take is, to endeavour to pass the rivulet by the three bridges behind the town, and by so doing, secure himself from farther insult : if the enemy does this, the twelve battalions, the twelve squadrons of horse, and the twenty of dragoons, will retire by the same road they marched up, and they will be in security as soon as they are in the wood ; besides, a beaten army is seldom to be feared, therefore, they may retire unmolested, and in order.

But if it happens that the enemy, without changing his position, is not to be forced in any of these attacks, the general had better retire to the height, where there will be no danger of the enemy's endeavouring to attack


him : but if he should attempt the attack of the left wing of the army A. it must be reinforced by all the cavalry that can be employed without causing confusion, and two brigades of infantry should be joined to the two which are next the morafs. See the TWENTY-FIRST PLATE.

THE FOURTH DISPOSITION.


THE fourth disposition is supposed in a country mixed with thickets and plains. The enemy's army hath its right to some mountains, and its left to a river ; in about a third part of the length of his front, there is a village a little behind its right : his disposition is, four battalions and six pieces of cannon upon an height which overlooks the plain, to which is also added the cavalry of the right ; behind are two passes intrenched and guarded by four battalions ; upon the heights of these passes there are four more to prevent the enemy penetrating at the flank ; there are eight squadrons in the first line, four battalions posted at the village, and twelve in it with cannon : sixteen battalions on the left of the village, fourteen squadrons and four battalions next the river. The second line consists of eleven squadrons upon the right, eight battalions behind the village, in order to carry timely assistance to it ; twelve battalions in the rear of the sixteen of the first line ; fifteen squadrons and four battalions to the river. The reserve consists of eighteen squadrons of dragoons next the mountains, (in order to dismount and be within reach of assisting the battalions guarding the passes) and of twenty-four squadrons of hussars on the left next the river. An island is supposed a little in the front of the first line : in this island is placed two battalions and six pieces of cannon. A stone-bridge is also supposed between the two lines, behind which is posted two battalions, to support those in the island, and to facilitate their retreat. It seems impossible to attack an army thus situated ; all the troops are a mutual support to each other : the flanks are secured
and



PLAN OF AN ORDER OF BATTLE
III^d Disposition.



Scale of 2 a League.



and well guarded; artillery is planted along the whole front; and the passes are intrenched, and troops posted in them.

In the front of the enemy's army is a large plain, which runs from the mountains as far as the river; but the largeness of it is broke into by some thickets, where nevertheless cavalry may act: in order to attack this army, thus advantageously posted, a disposition must be made, intirely different to that which it is in. If the village, which is entrenched and well furnished with troops and artillery, is attacked, the forcing it will be doubtful: but supposing it should be forced, it will be without losing a great number of men; which should be avoided, because it is the duty of a general to spare the blood of his soldiers as much as possible, and even, if practicable, to employ but few of his troops against a greater number of the enemy's. If the passes only are attacked in order to take the enemy in flank, it is very certain he can send assistance to it without weakening his front, having it in his power to cause the eight battalions in reserve behind the village, to march there, and to cause the eighteen squadrons of dragoons to dismount: if only the left wing next the river is attacked, it is true that attack is more practicable, there being no obstacle or intrenchment to prevent coming up with the enemy; but still there is but one wing beaten, and that, by falling back upon the troops in the village, can retreat by the mountains of which the enemy is master. There is great reason to imagine it will be beat; but the general must endeavour to reap as much profit from that victory as he can: it is therefore thought that, not to lose the fruit of it, the enemy should be attacked on his left wing, from the center to within about two hundred toises of the river, at the same time that the intrenched passes are attacked. During these two attacks, a brisk cannonade should be kept up upon the village, the infantry and cavalry upon the right; the infantry that is posted in the island, and that which is next the ri-

ver: by these two attacks the enemy's front and right wing will be equally annoyed; he will not know where to send assistance, and in that state of uncertainty may probably send it to a part where the danger is not so pressing. But suppose he should act in the most proper and prudent manner, as it should always be imagined he will, the assistance which he will send to that part, cannot be effected without unfurnishing or weakening some other: if he strengthens the passes and the heights of the eight battalions behind the village, they perhaps will not be forced; but he will scarcely venture to take any troops from the village, in order to send them to the assistance of the front that is attacked. But if he should unfurnish the village, it must then be attacked, and that vigorously; which may be the easier done, as it hath been for some time cannonaded, and consequently the earth hath been tumbled down, and openings made, at least large enough for the infantry to enter it: this attack will not at all prevent that at the front from going on.

In order to execute the attack upon the enemy's army, it is imagined the troops ought to be distributed after the following manner: all the infantry should be placed in the first line, excepting that of the reserve, which should consist of twenty battalions; the second line should consist of the cavalry, and the third should be formed of the dragoons and hussars. The twenty battalions on the left, forming five brigades, should remain in order of battle at the coming out of the thickets, with artillery distributed between the intervals of each brigade; the twenty-eight battalions, after making seven brigades as soon as they come out of the thickets, will form in column: then the twenty-four squadrons which are in the rear of the infantry formed in column, will post themselves, four squadrons in the intervals of each brigade. The brigade supporting the right flank will advance on the side of the river; and then the seven columns and the twenty-four squadrons will march up to the enemy

my and attack him with their bayonets, without losing time in firing. As soon as the columns have broken or staggered the enemy's first line, the cavalry will fall furiously upon them, sword in hand; a part of the dragoons and hussars should follow, in order to be within distance of sustaining the troops who have attacked, or to join themselves to the cavalry who have broken in among the enemy: it should be observed, that as soon as the hussars, are engaged and pursuing the enemy, the cavalry should rally in order to sustain them, or to flank the infantry which may still make resistance. The brigade of infantry which supported the right, followed by the seven squadrons, should attack the four battalions on the left of the first line, and the seven squadrons will take them in flank; which they can with the greater ease effect, as the cavalry hath been put to flight. The seventh column should, with four squadrons, attack the four battalions of the second line, at the same time that this attack is executed from the front as far as the river; sixteen battalions of the twenty in reserve, should attack the passes, and also the heights; the remaining four will march under cover of the mountains, sustained by a brigade of infantry and eight squadrons, in order to attack the cavalry on the right: thus of the whole front of the enemy's army, there will remain only the village that hath not been attacked, unless there has been such a number of troops drawn from it, as to render the carrying of it not difficult. It is to be supposed that one of these attacks will succeed; that made by the columns sooner than the rest: the disposition of columns intermixed with cavalry is very formidable, because each body is supported without confusion; besides, it is to be supposed that a column four battalions in depth, and from eighteen to twenty men in front, ought to break through a line that is only four deep, and which being once penetrated, the cavalry will find no difficulty in breaking through it. See the TWENTY-SECOND PLATE.


If

If, at the battle of Fontenoy, won by the French in 1745, the column of English, although formed by accident and without design, could have had its flanks supported and protected by cavalry, it would never have been broken *.


The movement of the infantry to form itself in column, and the evolutions of the cavalry to fill up the intervals of each column, ought to be performed with great quickness, and near enough to the enemy, to surprise him; but not at such a distance as to give him time to remedy it.

The nature of the ground, which is continually changing, cannot be followed through all its various shapes; the author hath therefore endeavoured to form his dispositions in those situations which most ordinarily occur, in order that these general dispositions may be assistant to the ideas in more particular and critical situations. Mountainous countries have not been mentioned, because it is very rare that they present an opportunity of coming to a general action: the affairs which happen among them are generally with regard to some post, which can never decide the fate of an army, however brisk they may be. The four dispositions now mentioned, are ideal; and although the propriety of them may be defended, it would be very imprudent to answer for their success; because with regard to the business of the war, the whole depends upon circumstances, and the least accident often renders a disposition, seemingly the best, the most prejudicial that can be taken. A motion of the enemy's troops ill conducted by their commanders, too much sloth or too much eagerness in the execution of orders, an accidental word falling from the mouth either of an officer or a soldier, and which is always increased when told again, may occasion the defeat of an army, however well disposed or advantageously situated. The epithet of "best" should be given to that ge-


* The reader is, at this particular passage, desired to consider this work as a translation from the French.



PLAN OF AN ORDER OF BATTLE
IV. Disposition.



T. Jefferys sculp.



neral who commits the fewest faults, for there is no man who can flatter himself with having committed none : it is impossible for a general to see every thing himself, or to remedy any unforeseen accident that may happen, if he is not assisted by his general officers, who see things which it is impossible he can ; they ought not only to be the means of putting his orders in execution, but even, in certain circumstances, they should prevent them, and make the same dispositions which the general ought to make, and would certainly order, was he in their situation.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

A R T O F W A R

more than one the fewest limits, for there is no man who can fight
without being first of all a general: it is impossible for a general to do
every thing himself, or to remedy any unforeseen accident that may
happen, if he is not assisted by his officers, who do things which
it is impossible he can; that is to be the means of putting
his orders in execution, but even in the most favorable
circumstances, they should
prevent them, and make the same difficulties which the general ought
to make, and would certainly order, was he in their situation.



THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME

